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Abstract 
A significant new direction in Australian income support policy was introduced in 
2002.  Known as Australians Working Together, this development changed the 
basis of social security entitlement for parents.  Throughout most of the twentieth 
century, low-income sole mothers, and later sole fathers and parents in couple 
families, could claim income support throughout most of their children‟s school 
years.  The primary grounds for their entitlement were low income and parenting 
responsibilities.  Australians Working Together introduced compulsory 
employment-oriented activities to Parenting Payment entitlement for parents whose 
youngest child had turned 13. 
 
This thesis investigates mothers‟ experience of this new welfare system.  Using 
Dorothy Smith‟s „everyday life‟ approach to research, it draws upon qualitative and 
quantitative methods to analyse Australians Working Together.  The research is 
grounded in a longitudinal interview survey of Australian mothers of teenage 
children who were subject to these changes.  The analysis moves from their 
experience outwards through the four levels of analysis in Williams and Popay‟s 
welfare research framework.  The thesis examines mothers‟ day-to-day worlds, the 
opportunities and constraints they navigate, the policies and institutions which 
shape their opportunities, the political framing of those policies, and wider social 
and economic transformations.   
 
In their negotiation of the social security system, mothers are striving for 
recognition of autonomy and care.  They want their capacity to determine for 
themselves how to live their lives to be acknowledged.  They would like the social 
contributions they make through employment, education and voluntary work to be 
recognised.  They struggle for their unpaid work caring for their families to be 
valued.  They wish that they had sufficient material resources to care well for their 
families.  The thesis develops a theoretical framework to examine these struggles 
drawing on the work of Honneth, Fraser, Lister, Sennett, Fisher and Tronto, Daly 
and Lewis.  This multi-level, everyday life analysis reveals the possibility of 
reframing the social security system around mutual respect.  
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Research Participants 
 
I provide here a brief summary of each of the mothers who participated in my 
research.  The descriptions are pieced together from the interview transcripts.  Some 
women who did not wish to be tape-recorded and so I rely solely on my notes but I 
have done my best to represent their voices and their circumstances as they told 
them to me.  If I interviewed someone more than once, the demographic information 
relates to our first interview, when they first described themselves and their families 
to me.  I have changed some aspects of the women‟s stories to protect their 
identities.  The names are all pseudonyms which mothers selected themselves. 
 
Alia, 34, western Sydney, Parenting Payment Partnered.  Alia speaks Arabic and 
Farsi and a small amount of English.   
 
I have three children.  The 17 year old is at TAFE, the others are at 
school, they‟re 14 and 13.  I‟ve received Parenting Payment since 
coming to Australia.  My husband, he is unemployed.  He has 
depression.  He has been given three months from Centrelink to 
recover.  I am studying English – I have 520 hours, I have used 
about 300 hours.  When it is hot, I find it hard to go because of my 
asthma.  But I want to study, I am willing to study, it is not because 
I had to.  I love studying.  I‟ve never had a job, but for work, if they 
could find me suitable work, no problem.   
 
Ana, 50, western Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Ana speaks Arabic and Farsi 
and a small amount of English. 
 
I have five children.  They are 25, 24, 23, 18 and the youngest is 15 
nearly 16.  My 18 year old daughter is a bit slow.  She can‟t 
concentrate. She can‟t express herself properly.  I am doing both 
my own and my daughter‟s job.  I am taking English classes here at 
the centre, but not reading and writing, I can‟t read or write.  I‟ve 
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been to two meetings at Centrelink.  I said to them „Whose going to 
give me a job?  With my age? My language?‟  I‟m sick. I can‟t 
walk properly.  I have heart problems, a disk in my back hurts.  I 
can‟t even finish my housework, so how can I do tasks at work? 
 
Belle, inner Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Belle was born in Australia and 
speaks fluent English. 
 
I went back to uni when my son was two, when my marriage broke 
up. Straight onto Parenting Payment.  I had a plan of where I would 
be and what qualification I would have.  I have constructed myself 
as Centrelink‟s pinup girl who got a PhD while being on sole 
Parenting Payment.  [My son] looks like a bloke even though he is 
only fourteen.  I have pulled back teaching partly because he was 
unwell half way through last year and needed a lot more of my 
attention. He‟s all right now though, he‟s all right. 
 
Caroline, 48, inner Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Caroline was born in 
Australia and speaks fluent English.  
 
I‟ve got two boys living with me now [the youngest is 15].  Well, it 
is a big responsibility, big responsibility, a lot of hard work.  A 
fulfilling job, tiring, an important role I feel.  It‟s very hard when 
you‟re on your own.  I live just around the corner from [my oldest 
son].  I started TAFE this year, because I knew I was coming off the 
pension next year, and I thought, „Well, I‟ve got this opportunity to 
do it‟.  And I did work experience a few weeks back and they liked 
me that much they employed me.  I haven‟t ever looked for work, it 
always comes along 
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Cheryl, 36, western Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Cheryl was born in 
Australia and speaks fluent English. 
 
I have two children.  I have a daughter who‟s 15 and a half and 
she‟s actually working part time, she has three different jobs.  My 
son‟s just started high school, he‟s 12.  I actually do dog minding 
and dogs come and live with me and people pay a small fee and I 
have a couple of cleaning jobs as well.  My husband passed away 
10 years ago, he took his own life.  My children needed to basically 
get themselves back together.  They‟re really good kids, we talk a 
lot, they‟ve done a lot of counselling.  I think it‟s helped build their 
self esteem up and make them very confident children.  I was 
working full time in school holidays, which I just didn‟t think was 
very fair to my children. As far as I was concerned they‟d already 
lost one parent, they didn‟t need to lose another one to a business.  
So I ended up giving it up. But found that I need to do something in 
my life to fulfil my life.   
 
Erica, 50, southern Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Erica was born in Australia 
and speaks fluent English. 
 
My son is nearly 14.  He had health problems, primarily hearing 
problems were picked up, and like many parents, you do the 
rounds.  You get on the health merry-go-round trying to find the 
right answer the right decision for your child.  It was a full time job 
when he was very young.  He was diagnosed as ADHD that was 
confirmed at a very young age.  They wanted to medicate him then 
which is why I decided to be hands on because I thought, even if he 
was, it‟s too young to want to medicate a child at that age.  With 
that Centrelink were part of my life from early on.  But it‟s good, 
it‟s a good life and it‟s good to see him doing well, the effort paying 
off.  The work I do is really good work with good people.  They 
were incredibly understanding of the needs of my child, so I stuck 
with them. 
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Grace, 39, inner Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Grace was born in Australia 
and speaks fluent English. 
 
I‟ve got two children, 12 and 13. My son who‟s 13 ½ has had some 
behavioural problems.  When I was working, the thing that I found 
was I‟d get calls from the school saying, „Oh, he has left the school 
grounds, you‟ve got to go and find him‟ and it impacted on my 
work, quite significantly. I lost my job.  It‟s undermined my self-
confidence as a parent.  It has been actually a juggling act then of 
trying to manage him, as well as then think about what sort of work 
I can do that can fit into that.  And in the meantime of course, I 
came down with depression and it‟s progressively got worse.  Over 
the last two years I‟ve actually tried to do two things.  One is start 
my own business, [but I need to raise the capital]. I think single 
mothers are quite ingenious, very resourceful people.  I came up 
with an idea of writing a book.   
 
Helen, 36, western Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Helen was born in Australia 
and speaks fluent English. 
 
I have just one child, luckily for me [we laugh].  He‟s 14.  It‟s been 
a pretty hellish year.  A few months ago he was diagnosed with 
diabetes. He‟s been pretty all over the place.  The first couple of 
months he was really good.  With anything traumatic, you cope and 
cope and cope, and then eventually it just gets the better of you and 
you kind of fall apart for a while.  So we‟ve had a couple of months 
where we just kind of fell apart.  I think I was extremely depressed 
and just couldn‟t cope with it.  In the last month it‟s just been 
getting slowly better.  I‟ve had part time work, mostly admin kind 
of stuff, you know, secretarial, so I‟ve been receiving part 
payments. I have also studied as well for a couple of years.  I‟m 
going to study full time from next year, while I still can be working 
towards getting an education.  I think that is the good thing about, 
about the Parenting Payment.  
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Kumiko, 37, inner Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Kumiko speaks Japanese and 
has learned fluent English. 
 
My sons are 15 and 17 and they‟re both in high school.  I became a 
single parent about five years ago and since then I have been getting 
help from Centrelink.  The last job I had was waitressing, I then got 
pregnant.  I‟m doing a Bachelor of Fine Arts.  My major is 
sculpture.  I find it very hard, I feel tired all the time, and I‟ve been 
to the doctors and all that but they can‟t find anything wrong with 
me, they think it is all stress. I want to study, but my situation is 
very hard.  Once my son turns 16 they are going to cut off my 
single parent pension.  Then I might have to apply to Austudy, but 
everyone has said it‟s much harder that way.  It‟s about two-thirds 
of single parent pension.  And I have hard time just managing [the 
cost of] how they eat. 
 
Margaret, 42, inner Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Margaret was born in 
Australia and speaks fluent English. 
 
I am 54, a single parent with three boys, the oldest one‟s 18.  He is 
studying and has just got a part time job.  The next boy is 15.  He is 
in year 10 and has a part time job at a café.  And then there is a 14 
year old, he‟s in year 8.  He‟s currently not attending any school.  
We are just about to enrol him in distance education because he is 
refusing to go to any school, but we are still looking at options.  So, 
that‟s the family.  I am actually working, teaching, well not right 
now because I have cancer, but prior to that I was working. 
 
Mary, 42, western Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Mary speak Arabic plus 
another two languages.  She is learning English.  
 
I have seven children, one died; now I have six.  The father is dead.  
I have an 18 year old, and 16 and 14 year old.  In December another 
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one is going to be 12.  There are two elder ones.  You know 
because of the war, we went separate direction so I miss contact 
with them.   I came [to Australia] in 2003.  I‟m studying English.  
I‟m doing part time, two days a week.  They said if you know 
English, maybe when you reach level four, then you can do other 
courses so you can get a job.  When I was in [my home country], I 
used to work as a nurse in the afternoon, in the morning I worked in 
a child care centre.  But here they want you to go to go to TAFE or 
maybe to uni to get that job, to be a nurse.  So I‟d like to study to be 
a nurse. 
 
Naomi, 41, inner Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Naomi was born in New 
Zealand and speaks fluent English. 
 
My son, he‟s 12, so he‟s in his last year of primary school, about to 
start secondary school next year.  I‟ve brought my son up on my 
own since he was one and a half.  He is quite well adjusted, I hope.  
I moved here from New Zealand.  It‟s been a long time, maybe 
sixteen years.  I have been studying for three years, so this is my 
third year I have been receiving Parenting Payment.  Prior to that – 
intermittently.  I might do a Dip. Ed. [Diploma of Education] next 
year.  I haven‟t decided.  I think with my son starting school, the 
secondary school, I think I might want to slow down a bit and 
spend some time with him this year, be with him through these 
changes.  It‟s only a short window of time for me to be a parent to 
him in that way, so I really want to do that. 
 
Nicole, 31, western Sydney, Parenting Payment Single. Nicole was born in 
Australia and speaks fluent English. 
 
I‟m a single mum, I‟ve got three children, my eldest will be 15 in 
June, he‟s a boy. And then there‟s [my daughter], she‟ll be 13 soon.  
And then there‟s my youngest, she‟ll be 11 next Wednesday. She 
doesn‟t live with me she lives with her father.  Not having a car we 
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don‟t really go anywhere.  We hang around the house a lot.  My 
mum and dad are really good, they come and take us out.  I had an 
accident a couple of years ago, which sort of knocked me around 
for a while.  I‟ve been trying to get on track and maybe try and get 
back to some kind of study or maybe get a job or something. 
 
Pam, 42, southern Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Pam speaks fluent Greek and 
English. 
 
Well, I‟ve got two children.  The girl‟s 19 and the boy‟s nearly 14.  
They are both living with me.  My son had a car accident five years 
ago, a serious car accident.  He was in hospital for 11 weeks.  After 
the accident every little thing would upset him. So something this 
small would become this big.  You can tell he is a lot better, but 
once every month or once every two months he could have an 
outburst.  I‟ve got blood pressure and a lot more problems too. I 
have got really bad arthritis, really bad.  I had a stroke at birth so 
my left side is weaker than my right side.  My mother passed away 
[recently] and we moved into the house.  It‟s a lot better.  Better 
area.  I‟m financially better off.   I‟ve got a bit of a social life.  My 
son‟s a lot better, he seems better at school this year.  My 
daughter‟s happier, I feel safer because it is a better neighbourhood 
and I am not so stressed out. 
 
Tara, 50, inner Sydney, Parenting Payment Single.  Tara was born in Australia and 
speaks fluent English. 
 
I have two boys, 12 and 14.  Although the children are older now, 
they almost require more supervision, especially to do their 
homework.  I don‟t get Parenting Payment currently because I have 
too much income from working nearly full time in casual jobs.  I 
have a social work degree but I‟ve never used it.  I‟ve always 
worked in casual jobs.  I work as a teacher‟s aide at my sons‟ 
school, in the holidays I work at the races, and also in holiday care. 
xiii 
 
It‟s good to be connected to Parenting Payment in case I get sick.  I 
see it as a bit of a safety net.  All the casual work is a bit of a juggle.  
When all this stuff came out about Mutual Obligation, I was a bit 
angry.  They think all single mothers are living in the western 
suburbs and having children with lots of men. 
 
Zahra, 42, western Sydney, Disability Support Pension.
1
  Zahra speaks Arabic and 
Farsi and a small amount of English.   
 
I have three children too, sixteen and a half, 14, 13.  Our 14 year 
olds are in the same class.  My husband is my carer, he gets Carers 
Allowance.  I get the pension.  Everyday I feel worse.  [I have no 
employment experience in Australia or Iraq] I have enough work at 
home.  If it comes to work, I‟ll leave that to my husband.  But if 
there was a place just for women, where they could tailor, that 
would be wonderful.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 When I asked Zahra what kind of pension she received, she did not know, and showed me her 
Pensioner Concession Card.  I then learned she was receiving Disability Support Pension, not 
Parenting Payment.  I kept her in the study because she was one of two women from non-English 
speaking backgrounds who did not know what kind of payment they received.  The other, whose 
youngest child was aged over 17, I did not include in the study. 
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Introduction 
 
 
It‟s like I feel like damned both ways.  If I work then I am a bad 
parent, and if I stay at home I am also a bad parent because, hey, 
I‟m reliant on social security and I should be supporting myself.  So 
that‟s what I mean, so the conflicting messages.  And I know I 
shouldn‟t probably internalise it, but you can‟t help it.  It‟s kind of 
like you get it no matter which way you turn.  Other people say it to 
me, I‟ve had friends and family say to me, „Well, why aren‟t you 
working at the moment?‟ Or, when I was working part time, „Don‟t 
you think you should be doing full-time work?‟  Or, when I wasn‟t 
coping with full-time work, it was like, „Maybe you should drop 
down to part-time work.‟  It‟s like no matter what you do you‟re not 
going to win anyway.  So I‟ve just sort of – I‟ve now kind of 
reached this point where I‟m aiming for peace. (Grace) 
 
Since 2002, Grace and thousands of other Australian parents, most of them mothers, 
have faced radical changes to the income support on which they rely to provide for 
their families.  A new and strong focus on employment for income support 
recipients was introduced in Australia through the federal government‟s 
„Australians Working Together‟ package of 2002, expanded in the „Welfare to 
Work‟ package of 2006.  While sole and partnered low-income parents had 
previously been entitled to income support throughout their children‟s infancy and 
most of their school years on the basis of their caring responsibilities, this is no 
longer the case.  The Australians Working Together reforms introduced compulsory 
 2 
participation in employment or employment-oriented activities for parents of 
school-aged children for the first time. 
 
The new policy required Parenting Payment claimants, sole and partnered, to agree 
to undertake at least 150 hours of employment-oriented activities every six months, 
around six hours per week.  Claimants attended an annual compulsory meeting with 
a personal adviser to draw up this agreement.  However, many parents were already 
busily in jobs, study or job search.  This thesis arises from a concern about how 
parents like Grace, who raise their families with the assistance of government 
income support, deal with changing demands from the state brought about by the 
implementation of Australians Working Together while managing competing 
demands from their children, employers and the community.  I explore mothers‟ 
experience of this new policy, both those mothers who already met the activity 
requirements and those who did not. 
 
The thesis is grounded in the everyday worlds of Grace and other mothers who I 
interviewed for this research, as they go about the daily business of preparing meals, 
picking their children up from school, caring for parents and friends, shopping for 
bargains, stretching meagre budgets between income support payments, attending 
meetings at the local social security office, travelling to their jobs, negotiating with 
bosses, spending time with friends and somewhere amidst this finding time for 
themselves.  I examine the everyday implementation of Australians Working 
Together to determine how these women responded to the new policy direction, 
what reactions were possible, and why.  My analysis starts with the perspective of 
mothers and moved outwards to develop a policy, social and economic context for 
the possibilities and constraints under which the new policy was enacted. 
 
The demands Grace encounters happen every day.  She said her children‟s 
behaviour was most difficult when she was working full time; she believes that this 
was because they were not receiving the mothering attention they needed.  She 
found it difficult when tired from a day at work to „not only cook dinner for two 
children, but listen and try and sort them out and manage them, help them with 
homework‟.  She also described her workplace supervisor, who purported to 
understand Grace‟s responsibilities as a sole parent but would nonetheless tut and 
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sigh, if she needed to leave work because of her children, saying „Oh, again. You 
have to leave the office again.‟ [Grace‟s emphasis.] 
 
Grace is trying to negotiate her way between being a mother, an employee and a 
welfare recipient.  Conflicting expectations, she says, become „internalised‟; she 
feels social pressures as she tries to find a way to be that will give her „peace‟.  As a 
good mother, should she devote herself full time to her children? As a good citizen, 
shouldn‟t she be in employment?  How can she both work full time and care for her 
children full time?  If she gives priority to employment, her children might suffer, 
but she also knows she is not doing what „good mothers‟ should do.  If she tries to 
find a midway point and works part time, she finds she is no longer considered a 
committed enough employee.  If she quits her job to care for her children full time, 
as she knows she should as a good mother, she knows that she is also demonstrating 
she is a bad mother, because she should be in employment. „No matter what you do 
you‟re not going to win anyway.‟ 
 
Grace is articulating the difficulty of negotiating gender and citizenship.  This is a 
central concern of recent feminist scholars undertaking welfare regime analysis that 
reveals the ways gender affects the kinds of claims mothers can make on the welfare 
state (for example, Giullari and Lewis 2005; O‟Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999; 
Skevik 2005).  As a woman and a mother, she understands she has certain 
obligations to her family; as a citizen, she knows she has obligations to the 
community.  Grace finds these obligations almost irreconcilable.  This complex of 
responsibilities and obligations is apparent too in the experience of other parents, 
and is present, although with different emphasis, in the language and rules of policy 
and in the principles of the Australian welfare regime.  Theories of care and 
recognition provide insight into the gender and citizenship struggles to which Grace 
alludes here. 
 
Nearly all the interviews started with talk about family.  This was partly an effect of 
my questioning, because I felt that I needed to understand people‟s family situation 
(how many children they have, how old they are, how their health is, how the family 
interacts, how they feel about being a parent) to have a context for the other things 
they would tell me about their lives (work, study, dealing with Centrelink, plans for 
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the future).  This focus on family was amplified and maintained by the interviewees.  
Grace, when I gave her an overview of the topics I thought we might end up 
discussing, launched immediately into the subject: „Well I might start off with 
parenting, cause that‟s kind of like the big thing.  I‟ve got two children, 12 and 13.‟ 
The centrality of family for mothers highlights the need for a theoretical knowledge 
of care and the place of care in policy.  In chapter one, I canvass feminist theories of 
care to develop an understanding of care which informs my analysis throughout the 
thesis. 
 
Grace, in observing that she feels „damned‟ both when she takes employment and 
when she relies on income support, is articulating her experience of disrespect as a 
mother and a welfare recipient.  She told me: 
 
It‟s just a whole lot of things that make the sole parenting 
experience in some ways quite negative when it could be quite 
positive.  I just feel like sometimes maybe if – not that mothering 
were valued more – but if there wasn‟t so much criticism of them, 
of single mums particularly, and if we got a lot more positive or 
affirmative messages, then maybe the stress on some of us would 
be less. 
 
Later, in an email, Grace explained how she felt about being a welfare recipient: 
 
Never has the government ... asked me what I need.  Well for the 
record, first I need to get well ... and some youth programs so that 
my kids have safe supervision (rather than none) when I do go back 
to work (yes, I still have hope that one day I‟ll find the right job).  
Mostly a recognition that I have a brain, and I can make choices. 
 
Grace‟s experience of being misrecognised and feeling that her needs are ignored is 
a common one.  The UK Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power, for 
example, reported that „the lack of respect for people living in poverty was one of 
the clearest and most heartfelt messages which came across to us as a Commission‟ 
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(cited in Lister 2006:94)
2
.  The mothers who participated in my study emphasised 
the personal contact they have with staff in Centrelink offices as central to whether 
they experienced Australians Working Together as respectful or disrespectful. 
 
While engaged in struggles regarding the recognition of care, Grace also 
experiences particular forms of disrespect which arise from her status as a claimant 
of social security benefits.  In chapter one, I explore the work of key theorists of 
respect and recognition, drawing on the insights of their work to expand my analysis 
of mothers‟ experience of Australians Working Together.  Together, theories on 
care and recognition underpin much of the other theory I draw upon to interpret the 
experience of Australian parents who claim income support.   
Relocating the subject of welfare research  
I took an everyday life approach in the design of this study.  As Dorothy Smith 
(1987:98) explains, this involves treating the everyday life of mothers as a 
sociological problematic, or taking the standpoint of women as the starting point for 
research.  In an everyday life approach, research participants are treated as having a 
unique perspective and understanding of an issue.  This makes them experts, just as 
being a sociologist or policy analyst or theorist makes someone an expert, but 
mothers‟ expertise is of a different nature.  Grace and the other mothers I 
interviewed have an understanding of their circumstances that derives from living 
the policy and negotiating every day through that policy, as well as social norms, 
immediate family needs and demands, and other policies.  It is my task, as an 
analyst of social policy, to explore how the daily acts and decisions of mothers fit 
with social relations.  In this thesis, I have made the everyday approach primary in 
the writing as well as the research design.  It is for this reason that Grace appears at 
the outset of the thesis.  In discussing her personal experience, Grace articulates the 
concerns of the thesis.  Furthermore, as one of those affected by the policy, her 
voice should carry weight. 
 
                                                 
2
 The Australian equivalent, the Senate Community Affairs References Committee (2004) made no 
similar observation.  Not, it would seem, because Australians living in poverty do not experience 
disrespect, but rather because of a lack of recognition by the Committee itself.  Only one of the 
Committee‟s 95 recommendations encouraged engagement with people living in poverty about their 
needs. 
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Smith (1987:89) describes the everyday world as: 
 
...that world we experience directly.  It is the world in which we are 
located physically and socially.  Our experience arises in it as 
conditions, occasions, objects, possibilities, relevances, presences, 
and so on, organized in and by the practices and methods through 
which we supply and discover organization.   
 
Research that starts with the everyday does not finish there.  Treating people‟s 
everyday lives as a „sociological problematic‟ means exploring the interactions 
between the quotidian and broader social structures and relations (Smith 1987:98).  
This is most important because it means that everyday life research reaches out from 
the experience of participants; their experience is the basis from which to explore 
relations of power, social trends, discourses, norms and expectations.  While „on the 
one hand the surface of the everyday (its manifest content) needs to be given the 
closest of scrutiny ... on the other hand the project is precisely to go behind the 
scenes and reveal underlying structures and latent contents‟ (Highmore 2002:8). 
The contributions of everyday approaches to policy analysis  
Situating research within the quotidian highlights the gaps, overlaps and 
contradictions between policy assumptions and social structures, institutions, norms, 
practices and ideologies in parents‟ daily lives.  However, such an approach is 
uncommon in policy research, especially in research on Australian social security 
policy.  My study builds on and expands the small number of studies which take an 
every life approach to policy analysis by critiquing policy logics from the 
perspective of the mothers who are most affected by that policy.  The studies 
described below demonstrate utility of research which has taken an everyday life 
approach informing policy understanding.   
 
Lone Mothers, Paid Work and Gendered Moral Rationalities by Simon Duncan and 
Rosalind Edwards (1999) is an outstanding example.  Duncan and Edwards 
(1999:6) describe their methodological approach as „going inside the “closed box”„ 
of lone mothers, by which they mean ceasing to treat lone mothers as a homogenous 
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group, one category in a table of family types, and instead recognising that lone 
mothers are heterogenous and so looking more closely for their differences, using 
both qualitative and quantitative methods.  This approach led Duncan and Edwards 
to understand the „gendered moral rationalities‟ that inform lone mothers‟ decisions 
about employment, family and welfare.  Duncan and Edwards interviewed British, 
German, Swedish and American lone mothers in geographical clusters and small 
social networks.  By analysing the results within and across geographical categories, 
they were able to uncover the effect of location, culture, and circles of family and 
friends on lone parents‟ decisions.  In this way they linked lone parents‟ daily lives 
to broader social and economic structures, but they also demonstrated that national 
employment markets, social attitudes and debates generally influenced parents less 
than did local labour markets, local attitudes and local care arrangements.   
 
Duncan and Edwards (1999) demonstrate that lone mothers‟ employment decisions 
are rational, but do not follow the model of rational economic man that policy 
makers tend to expect.  Rather, mothers‟ rationality is gendered and moral.  It is 
gendered because parenthood, care work and the labour market are fundamentally 
gendered.  Mothers continue to undertake the majority of all unpaid care work and 
face a labour market which is structured around gender lines so that women‟s 
employment is concentrated in certain occupations at certain levels (Cass 2006:252; 
Craig 2004:14; Millar 2003:20).  Lone mothers are strongly guided in their 
employment decisions by their understanding of what is best for their children; they 
want to take the moral actions of good mothers.  In addition, by recognising the 
importance of local geographies and social strata, Duncan and Edwards show that 
local labour markets and understandings of good mothering informed by localities 
and class result in different mothers in different situations making different 
decisions, all of which are rational. 
 
Duncan and Edwards (1999:288-292) use their results to examine UK welfare-to-
work policies for lone parents and found three „mistakes‟.  The first, the „rationality 
mistake‟ was policy makers‟ assumption that lone parents will be rational actors, 
understood to be rational economic men.  Duncan and Edwards demonstrate that 
when policy assumptions about the basis on which people make decisions are 
misguided, the resulting policies can only have a limited effect, because people will 
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not necessarily respond to policy interventions in the way it has been assumed.  The 
second, the „economic mistake‟, is seeking to make income support claimants 
„employable‟, and so addressing the „supply side‟ of employment, but failing to 
attend to the creation of jobs, the demand side.  If employment is available but is 
mostly poorly paid, then lone parents‟ poverty and reliance on income support will 
not be reduced.  The third is the „geographical mistake‟: due to policy ignoring the 
spatial divisions of labour and lone parenthood.  Neither employment opportunities, 
social opportunities nor lone parenthood are evenly distributed geographically.  
Pockets of unemployment and pockets of disadvantage affect the opportunities 
available to lone mothers. 
 
In her study of American mothers in receipt of income support negotiating the 
demands of their families and their state-funded higher education programs, Nancy 
Naples (1998), drawing on Smith‟s (1998) feminist methodology, reveals the work, 
usually invisible, that women undertake to link and maintain the various arenas in 
which they live.  These include creatively stretching small budgets, sharing unpaid 
care with other mothers and supporting other students as mentors (Naples 1998:40).  
Sometimes they experience conflict between income support rules, requirements 
regarding their education and the needs of their families.  For example, they need to 
enrol full time in order to receive financial assistance, but a lack of flexibility on the 
part of the education institution means that mothers with sick children can fail the 
course if they miss classes that contain essential pieces of assessment.  Where a 
child is chronically ill, its mother may be unable to attend classes full time, thereby 
losing her entitlement to financial support.  These sometimes impossible, often 
stressful, conflicts can be best uncovered by speaking to those whose lives require 
that they be experts at identifying and creatively negotiating such matters daily.  
 
Carol Cleaveland (2005) undertook an ethnographic study to investigate why 
women sometimes refuse employment even if they became ineligible for income 
support as a result.  By engaging with women in Philadelphia who had taken this 
action, Cleaveland was able to understand what might otherwise appear to be 
irresponsible behaviour.  The women in her study did not leave employment 
because of a lack of commitment to the world of work, or because they did not 
grasp the consequences of living without an income.  Rather, in the move from 
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welfare receipt into very low paid, menial jobs they were responding to what they 
perceived as a lack of respect by employers who regarded them as occupying the 
very bottom of the company hierarchy.  Resigning from their employment following 
incidents in which they were poorly treated was the only way they could retain 
some sense of dignity.  Akesha, one of the respondents explained: 
 
I tried to stick in there but every time I turned around my manager 
was there giving me attitude.  You know, I tell her, I don‟t have to 
respect you but I chose to respect you because you‟re my elder.  But 
just like you want to be respected, I would like to be respected also. 
(Cleaveland 2005:50) 
 
The actions of these women have tended to be interpreted as evidence of personal 
deficiencies: a failure of their work ethic or an inability to do such things as arrive at 
work on time.  Policy responses have been developed accordingly and so address 
personal „barriers‟ to taking and retaining employment (Cleaveland 2005:54-55).  
Taking time to examine the women‟s point of view not only reveals their sense of a 
loss of personal dignity, but also structural inadequacies.  The employment women 
are being directed to upon leaving welfare is frequently menial and insecure and 
offers little prospect for advancement.  It is also so poorly paid that many continue 
to live in poverty despite working full time.  Welfare programs in the USA rarely 
attempt to improve conditions in the local labour market. A top official in Oregon‟s 
welfare service, upon being presented with research findings that demonstrated a 
need to improve the low wage labour market, „explained patiently to us that these 
were issues over which he had no control‟ (Morgen 2002:754).  The women in 
Cleaveland‟s (2005:55) study, „recognizing that continued poverty was almost 
inevitably their future fate, with or without the help of programs … chose to engage 
in small acts of contestation and resistance in order to have some feeling of agency 
and dignity in the face of these structural realities.‟  
 
Research into how low-income working mothers organise their time illustrates how 
an everyday life approach can inform public policy.  A study by Kevin Roy and his 
colleagues (2004), shows how American mothers negotiating time, obligations, to 
children, other family members, employment and government agencies, strive daily 
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for their own best paths.  Women working in low-income jobs and caring for young 
children, creatively manage competing, overlapping and often unpredictable 
demands on their time, within the confines of limited child care options, poor public 
transport and the fixed schedules of public agencies (Roy et al. 2004:175-176).  
They find their own way through a complex maze of obligations and resources. 
 
The authors challenge the assumption of some policy makers and welfare 
researchers that „poor families make ill-informed decisions and do not exhibit a 
work ethic‟ (Roy et al. 2004:177).  Instead, they demonstrate that mothers working 
for low-incomes search daily for the optimal time-configurations for their family 
lives, exhibiting creativity and excellent time-management skills.  Their research 
contributes evidence to policy debates regarding the importance which mothers 
place on time in making decisions about welfare receipt and employment.  It is not 
only money but also time that women take into account when balancing the costs 
and benefits for themselves and their families of ceasing to receive welfare support 
and enter into employment, or vice versa.  Like the other studies cited above, this 
one highlights possible structural improvements which could assist low-income 
working mothers in their day-to-day lives, including better and more flexible child 
care, better public transport, greater flexibility on the part of government agencies in 
when and how they engage with the public, and enhanced employment conditions 
that offer security, good pay and work-family benefits (Roy et al. 2004:176). 
A framework to bring everyday life into welfare policy research 
The everyday life approaches to policy research described above resonates with the 
framework for welfare research developed by Fiona Williams and Jennie Popay 
(1999).  Reflecting on the state of welfare research, Williams and Popay find that 
the field tends to be polarised between those who explore the field at a structural 
level and those who focus on individual recipients.  They argue that each approach, 
on its own, is inadequate.  The former tends to neglect individual experience and 
agency, so that welfare recipients are „shadowy, largely forgotten inhabitants of the 
research terrain‟; the latter tends to overlook the social and economic environments 
in which people live and the structures which constrain and facilitate their choices 
(Williams and Popay 1999:157). 
 11 
 
Williams and Popay (1999:179) propose a new framework, one which they 
anticipate will operate beyond existing dichotomous approaches.  The framework 
encompasses four interconnected levels of analysis: 
 the welfare subject 
 the social topography of enablement and constraint 
 the institutional and discursive context of policy formation and 
implementation 
 the contextual dynamics of social and economic change. 
 
Research should, they conclude, attempt to engage with all levels of analysis; not 
necessarily all equally but taking account of influences at all four levels (Williams 
and Popay 1999:182-183).  I have used an everyday life approach to do just that, 
focus on the experience of individuals in their day-to-day world, while seeking to 
understand their actions, choices, dilemmas, priorities, confusions, frustrations and 
triumphs by analysing not only how they themselves interpret their situation but 
also the availability and types of opportunities and resources they can or cannot 
access; the policies and institutions that shape these opportunities and the discourse 
that describes those policies; and wider social and economic transformations, such 
as changing labour markets, new international policy agendas, and shifting patterns 
in demography and household formation. 
 
Bringing these levels of analysis to Grace‟s experience, illustrates that her 
frustration lies partly with a lack of employment opportunities and a lack of flexible 
employment which would allow her to meet her children‟s needs while also being a 
good employee.  Lone mothers have much higher rates of unemployment than 
partnered mothers and few believe they have the necessary skills to find a job; of 
those who are working, many are working fewer hours than they would wish 
(Dockery and Stromback 2004:438; Gray et al. 2003:3,17).  Grace has no family to 
care for her children while she is at work, nor can she find after-school care that will 
accept her son, because none can accommodate his behaviour which can be quite 
challenging at times.  Grace has difficulty finding suitable employment despite 
having gained tertiary qualifications, something that is not possible for most 
 12 
mothers in receipt of income support, many of whom have not finished high school 
(Butterworth 2003:26). 
 
Grace is aware of policy rhetoric: 
 
I‟m receiving lots of messages from outside, you know, like 
through the media, listening to public debate going on policies and 
the reality is that trying to juggle it all is not as easy as what it‟s 
made out to be ... I‟m just really depressed.  I‟ve tried it and I‟ve 
failed.  And this further obligation on me, it somehow says, „Oh 
well, yeah you‟re parenting but you‟re not quite good enough, 
you‟re not participating enough‟.  Or, „Parenting and trying to raise 
two well-adjusted children and to be there for them is not quite 
good enough, you still have to do an extra bit‟ 
 
Grace regards the introduction of a compulsory activity requirement to income 
support and the associated discourse of obligation and participation, as a comment 
on the inadequacy of the social contribution she makes through parenting.  This 
adds to her sense that there is no way to satisfactorily balance being a parent with 
other obligations.   
 
At the fourth level of Williams and Popay‟s analytical framework, Grace‟s 
experience is shaped by broad and sweeping changes to welfare regimes.  Increased 
obligations for welfare recipients are being introduced widely, in many countries, 
for many „categories‟ of recipient, as welfare regimes move away from what is 
termed „passive‟ welfare.  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) set an agenda for radical change among its member countries 
in 1994, advocating „active labour market policies‟ (OECD 2006:24).  Many 
countries, including Australia, followed its guidance, restructuring the social 
contract between citizen, community and state (O‟Connor, Orloff and Shaver 
1999:147).  Welfare system reforms have been accompanied by broad changes to 
labour markets, also along the lines advocated by the OECD which called for 
greater „flexibility‟ in working time and wage and labour costs.  Australia has taken 
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a similar but not identical path to that of other liberal welfare regimes such as the 
UK and USA (Mahon 2001:27).   
The research methods of an everyday life research design 
An everyday life approach to policy analysis starts with the perspective of the 
people affected by the policy.  In this study, taking an everyday life approach meant 
conducting interviews with mothers who were subject to the compulsory 
components of Australians Working Together.  However, interviews in themselves 
are not sufficient; other methods are required to develop a context for mothers‟ 
experience and so I also undertook quantitative analysis, literature reviews, and 
analysis of policy logics, frameworks and official representations of the policy 
„problem‟.3  
 
I carried out a qualitative longitudinal study with Australian mothers claiming 
Parenting Payment whose youngest child was aged between 12 and 15 years old.  I 
selected this group because the Australians Working Together compulsory activity 
requirements targeted parents whose youngest child was aged 13 to 15.  It is rare in 
welfare research to focus on both lone and partnered mothers, and on mothers of 
teenaged children.  Most research about parents and income support is conducted 
with sole mothers of preschool-aged children.   
 
The qualitative study involved 33 in-depth interviews with 16 mothers.  Where 
possible, I interviewed mothers between two or three times over a period of two 
years.  All respondents were women.
4
  All but one lived in Sydney, in the inner, 
southern or western suburbs; the other lived in a small regional town in New South 
Wales.  Only one mother was married.  The remainder were living in one-parent 
families, and of these two mothers were widowed.   
  
I contacted potential research participants through a range of indirect methods using 
a passive sampling technique.  I approached a diverse group of organisations for 
                                                 
3
 The research methodology was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Sydney, reference number 6950. 
4
 No fathers responded to my invitation to participate in the study, which is perhaps not surprising. 
As I show in chapter 1, they constitute a small proportion of all Parenting Payment recipients.  
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assistance and with their permission promoted the research to their members or 
service users.  I placed flyers at doctors‟ surgeries, community and neighbourhood 
centres, sports centres, family associations and Centrelink offices.  I posted several 
notices on a national lone parent email list and sought help from Catholic and public 
high schools, lone parent associations, divisions of general practice, family support 
organisations, women‟s health centres, migrant support centres, and Lebanese, 
Filipino, Vietnamese and Arabic community organisations.  I published articles in 
the newsletters of several of these groups.  I also spread word through friends, 
colleagues and family.  Low-income parents of teenage children proved difficult to 
find.  They appeared not to be linked into services like parents of younger children.  
Mothers rarely responded to flyers, posters or newsletter articles.  The most 
successful approach was word of mouth.  Most mothers who took part in the 
research did so after a friend of a friend, community worker or other trusted person 
told them about the study. 
 
In arranging and conducting the interviews, I sought to ensure that mothers were as 
comfortable with the process as possible, did not incur any costs and maintained a 
sense of control.  For this reason, I met them in a public place of their choosing or, 
if they did not offer a suggestion, a place which we selected together.  Most 
interviews took place in parks, libraries, community centres and cafes near their 
homes.  At each interview, participants received $30 to cover any costs they may 
have incurred by meeting with me.  As well as travel costs, this might also include, 
for example, the price of a take-away meal that evening because the time spent on 
the interview would otherwise have been used to prepare dinner.  It was also my 
intention to recognise the value of their time.  The interviews were loosely 
structured and conversational.  While guiding the direction of our conversation 
across the range of topics I anticipated I would need to explore, I also tried to allow 
the participants to lead the discussion and raise aspects of their experience I had not 
previously considered.  With the respondents‟ permission I made audio recordings 
of the interviews, which were later transcribed.  Three women preferred that the 
interview be conducted in Arabic, not English, so I spoke to them with the aid of an 
interpreter.  Two of these women did not wish to be recorded, so my analysis of 
those interviews is based solely on my notes. 
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I also arranged to interview personal advisers who work in Centrelink offices.  The 
Department of Family and Community services and then Centrelink gave me 
permission to approach five Sydney Centrelink offices.  As when recruiting mothers 
for the research, I again used passive techniques.  I contacted the manager at each of 
the offices and explained the research project. The managers then provided the 
advisers with information about the research so that the advisers could elect whether 
or not to participate.  I made an appointment with four advisers to conduct an 
interview in their workplaces.  Some of these interviews we did in the open plan 
office space where they worked and for others we retired to a separate meeting 
room.  I assured the advisers that their contribution to the project would remain 
confidential and would not be identifiable in the analysis. 
 
The pseudonyms which I use throughout this thesis were chosen by the 
interviewees.  Most respondents liked the chance to select the name by which they 
would be depicted and found choosing a name to be fun.  The names they selected 
generally convey something of their cultural background.  One mother did not wish 
to select a pseudonym, so I suggested a name to her. 
 
I selected the themes through which I analysed the data by immersing myself in the 
interviews and the transcripts to determine which issues were most important to 
mothers as „expert practitioners of their everyday worlds‟ and which also spoke to 
key aspects of welfare policy (Smith 1987:161).  I analysed the interviews by these 
themes and by key words, reading and listening to the material again and again.  I 
then used NVIVO to code the data so that patterns and disjunctures became 
apparent.  In analysing the interviews I was seeking to understand how small daily 
acts fit within a complex of social relations (Smith 1987:167); that is, how the 
elements of everyday life for a woman claiming Parenting Payment are organised 
by and contribute to a web of interacting family, policy, social, educational and 
economic relations.  Parents‟ conception of themselves as welfare recipients, as 
parents and as employees (or potential employees) varied widely and not only from 
person to person; often each mother had a complex and varying understanding of 
herself.   
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Australians Working Together was implemented during the period in which I was 
conducting this research, so when I first met the mothers I interviewed they had 
mostly just faced or were about to attend their first compulsory interview with an 
adviser.  In our subsequent interviews, they had generally met again with an adviser 
and drawn up an enforceable Participation Agreement which set out their 
engagement in specific activities for a period of six months.  These parents were 
experiencing compulsory requirements as income support claimants for the first 
time.  I interviewed the advisers in late 2005, after Australians Working Together 
had been operating for two years. 
 
The qualitative data is supplemented by analysis of the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics of Australia (HILDA) survey.  HILDA is a nation-wide panel 
survey of Australian households that collects data on a wide range of topics 
including families, income, employment and wellbeing (Headley et al. 2006:vii).  
The survey has been carried out annually since 2001 and, at the time of writing, had 
been funded by the Australian Department of Families, Communities and 
Indigenous Affairs to continue data collection until 2012 (FACSIA 2007:7).  I have 
drawn on the wave four data collected in 2004 when 12,408 people in 6,987 
households took part in the survey (Headey and Warren 2007:vi).  The data is 
weighted using cross-sectional weights.  In 2004, 413 respondents said that they 
were currently in receipt of Parenting Payment and 519 said they had claimed 
Parenting Payment at some time in the previous year.  Due to the small number of 
Parenting Payment recipients in the HILDA survey, I clustered sole and partnered 
claimants together in my analysis.  While there are significant differences between 
the sole and partnered claimants, analysing data on the two groups together 
provided me with sufficient cases for a valid analysis, which would not have been 
possible otherwise. 
 
The complexity of mothers‟ lives required a broad body of literature to aid 
interpretation.  In this thesis I draw upon extensive reviews of literatures regarding 
welfare-to-work policies for parents and other claimants, balancing the demands of 
work and family, care, respect and recognition, policy implementation, the policy 
space, street level bureaucrats, contemporary modes of welfare service delivery, 
lone parents and lone mothers, income support claimants, low-income families, 
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poverty, policy language, feminist welfare regime analysis, citizenship and social 
security policy, gender and time use, the interaction of tax and transfer policies, 
effective marginal tax rates, feminist economics and employment conditions for 
low-income workers.  Where possible I have sourced Australian studies, but I also 
draw upon research from Britain, Europe and North America. 
 
To better understand the policy logics at work in the social security changes which 
took place under Australians Working Together and Welfare to Work, I undertook 
an analysis of „official talk‟ about welfare reform (Bessant 2002).  I examine how 
the policy „problem‟ in Australian welfare reform has been represented when 
ministers argue for the need for change (Bacchi 1999).  Such arguments most often 
occur when a review of the social security system is announced and a new approach 
is advocated prior to the passage of legislation.  In order to uncover policy logics, 
the official depiction of the „problem‟ and the rationales for reform,  I read and 
analysed the following speeches, reports, white papers and other official 
pronouncements from the Prime Minister, Ministers, Centrelink and the Chief 
Executive Officer of Centrelink:  
 
 Australia, House of Representatives. 2005. „Employment and Workplace 
Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) 
Bill 2005: Second Reading.‟ Debates. (Kevin Andrews, MP, Minister for 
Employment and Workplace Relations and Minister Assisting the Prime 
Minister for the Public Service). 9 November.  2. 
 Australia, House of Representatives. 2005. „Family and Community 
Services Legislation Amendment (Australians Working Together and Other 
2001 Budget Measures) Bill 2002 Second Reading Speech.‟ Debates. (Larry 
Anthony, MP, Minister for Children and Youth Affairs). 16 May.  2309-
2311. 
 Centrelink. 2002a. Mutual Obligation Requirements. Centrelink. 
 Centrelink. 2002b. Parents and Employment: A Guide to Support Your 
Workforce Participation.  Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. 
 Centrelink. 2004a. Helping Parents Return to Work. Canberra: Centrelink.  
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 Australia, House of Representatives. 2005. „Appropriation Bill (No.1) 2005-
2006: Second Reading Speech.‟ Debates. (Peter Costello, MP, Treasurer). 
10 May. 55. 
 Howard, John. 1997. Address at the Official Launch of Centrelink 
(Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency. 24 September. Canberra: 
Parliament House. 
 Newman, Jocelyn. 1999a. The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st 
Century. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. 
 Newman, Jocelyn. 1999b. The Future of Welfare in the 21st Century. 29 
September. Canberra: National Press Club. 
 Australia, Senate. 2002. „Family and Community Services Legislation 
Amendment (Australians Working Together and Other 2001 Budget 
Measures) Bill 2002 Contingent Motion.‟ Debates. (Amanda Vanstone, 
Minister for Family and Community Services). 12 December. 7974. 
 Vardon, Sue. 2000. „One to One: Personalised Service Delivery.‟ Case 
Management: Fact or Fiction. Case Management Society of Australia, 3
rd
 
Annual Conference. 11 February. Melbourne. 
 Vardon, Sue. 2001. „Corporate Governance: Building Trust and Credibility, 
“Trust Us, We‟re From Centrelink.”„ Institute of Public Administration 
Conference. 24 August. Brisbane. 
 
Together, the qualitative and quantitative data, literature reviews and analysis of 
government rhetoric provide the resources needed to conduct an everyday life 
analysis of Australians Working Together. 
Thesis overview 
My everyday life analysis of Australians Working Together highlighted three areas 
for particular attention.  Firstly, mothers‟ conceptions of the policy situation and 
what they see as the primary issues requiring policy change and how this compared 
to the presentation of policy issues by officials.  Did the official presentation of the 
policy „problem‟ resonate with the circumstances of welfare recipients and their 
views of the problems?   
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Secondly, talking with mothers about Australians Working Together led me to 
understand the centrality of the personal adviser interviews to the policy 
implementation and delivery.  For mothers it was not until they met with the 
advisers at Centrelink that the policy was enacted.  As a result I investigated the 
„street level‟ implementation of the policy.   
 
Thirdly, it became apparent that mothers made detailed, careful, calculations about 
employment, education and other activities.  In doing so, they incorporated a far 
wider range of factors than the policy rationale provides for.  Mothers‟ attempts to 
balance the relative advantages and disadvantages of employment and income 
support led me to consider Parenting Payment as a policy which enables rather than 
inhibits employment.  These three issues form the focus of the thesis.  I explored 
them using the methods outlined above drawing particularly upon theories of care 
and recognition in my analysis.  
 
In chapter one, I lay down two foundations upon which this thesis rests.  The first is 
a detailed description of Australian social security policy for parents, focusing 
particularly on the Australians Working Together set of policies which were in 
place when I conducted my research.  I also describe the Welfare to Work policies 
which replaced Australians Working Together.  The policy detail provided in this 
section underpins the analysis of later chapters.  Chapter one also sets out the 
theoretical framework that guides my analysis.  As I have explained, mothers‟ 
descriptions of their lived experience of welfare policy led me to two bodies of 
theory: care and recognition.  Feminist theorists have sought to ensure that care is 
incorporated into sociological, economic and policy analysis and encouraged policy 
makers to recognise its importance.  In doing so, theorists have investigated the 
meanings and place of care.  The fine-grained understanding of care they have 
developed makes possible a more nuanced comprehension of the experiences of 
Parenting Payment claimants, whose lives centre around the provision of care.  As 
welfare recipients and as mothers, Parenting Payment recipients are engaged in 
constant negotiations for recognition.  Theories of respect and recognition, as 
articulated by Axel Honneth (1995, 2003), Nancy Fraser (2003), Richard Sennett 
(2003) and Ruth Lister (2002b) speak to this aspect of mothers‟ experience.  The 
importance of respect becomes most apparent when mothers negotiate their 
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compulsory activity agreements.  The work of these theorists provides a framework 
within which to analyse the meaning of respect, the effect of disrespect and how 
recognition might be achieved.  
 
In chapter two, I introduce the mothers I interviewed.  They explain how they view 
themselves and how they perceive they are regarded by policy and society.  They 
describe stereotypes about lone motherhood and welfare recipients, particularly 
stereotypes about lone mothers who are also welfare recipients.  I add to parents‟ 
rebuttal of these myths by investigating demographic data about lone parents, 
income support claimants, their employment and their plans for the future.  Also in 
chapter two, I focus on parents‟ understanding of good parenting and how this 
informs their views on income support and employment.  Mothers here explain the 
key policy issues from their perspective.   
 
In chapter three, I detail the policy context for this research.  Chapter three expands 
on the national discursive and institutional settings for welfare reform in Australia, 
locating these, in turn, within broader international moves to reconfigure welfare.  
While exploring the nature of Australian welfare reform under Australians Working 
Together, I examine the policy logics underpinning these changes and how they 
shape the policy conception of parenthood, motherhood and care; welfare receipt, 
entitlement and obligation; and responsible citizenship, dependence and 
employment.  In this chapter I describe the policy logic that people claiming welfare 
assistance are, for that very reason, demonstrating an inability to make rational 
decisions in their own best interest, and are, therefore, not full citizens and not 
entitled to full autonomy.  As a result, parents are also denied the autonomy to 
arrange family care as they see fit – perhaps not a surprising outcome given the 
policy preference for paid work over unpaid work and the failure as a result to 
recognise the value of care. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the administrative mechanism that lies at the heart of the 
welfare reform agenda – interviews between parents and personal advisers.  It is 
clear from mothers‟ description of welfare-to-work policies, that the adviser 
meetings can constitute the entirety of their knowledge of the policy and their 
experience of its implementation.  This means that their experience of these (often 
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short) encounters is critical in determining how they engage with the policy.  As 
demonstrated in chapters two and three, there is a disjuncture between mothers‟ 
understandings of their own needs, motivations and actions and those embedded in 
the policy.  In chapter four, I demonstrate how parents are interpellated by the 
policy, or how the policy addresses parents as though they were of a particular type, 
how this is mediated by personal advisers, and how parents respond.  I start by 
looking at the way in which adviser appointments are set: the letters Parenting 
Payment claimants receive notifying them that they are required to attend a meeting. 
Uniquely in welfare policy research, this study recognises that parents attending an 
adviser meeting walk into an office space that embodies conceptions about clients 
and the relations between staff and clients.  I explore the effect of the physical 
environment on mothers‟ approach to the meeting.  I then examine Australian 
mothers‟ negotiations with their personal advisers to discover why some meetings 
were considered satisfactory and useful by parents and others were regarded as not 
useful or even offensive.  
 
In the fifth chapter, I examine the calculations which parents described undertaking 
when considering employment.  Policy descriptions of the decision to take a job 
centre on the financial imperatives, but surprisingly, given the primacy of financial 
„incentives‟ to welfare-to-work policy, there is little research on how these operate 
in practice.  Mothers described complex calculations of the economic costs and 
benefits of employment, measuring effective marginal tax rates, taper rates, benefits 
that arise from the use of concession cards and the intersection of social security and 
public housing earnings rules.  In contrast to claims made in orthodox economics, 
much of the reasoning behind parents‟ employment decisions was not 
straightforwardly financial.  In the second section of chapter five, I explore the 
family-friendly arrangements that parents can access at work, how they reconcile 
their family needs with employment and the role that Parenting Payment plays in 
developing satisfactory arrangements.  I use logistic regression analysis of the 
Household Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia survey to demonstrate the 
inaccessibility of the most basic of in-work benefits among part-time workers, 
regardless of their education or employment experience.  This leads me to conclude, 
as did a number of mothers in the study, that Parenting Payment could be regarded 
as a work-family benefit that enables rather than inhibits parents‟ employment. 
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In the conclusion, I bring together the key themes of the thesis in order to reflect on 
the implications of my research for the Welfare to Work policy changes which came 
into effect in 2006 and 2007, replacing Australians Working Together.   
 
In planning this research and reviewing the literature on welfare policy for parents, I 
could not imagine pictures of mothers‟ lives equal to the insight that they 
themselves gave me.  With their help I developed an understanding of the 
complexity of navigating every day as a parent and a welfare recipient.  Without 
their expertise, I would never have acquired such a depth of knowledge about 
welfare-to-work policy in action. 
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Chapter one 
Policy history and theoretical frameworks  
of care and recognition 
 
 
Two foundations uphold the analysis which I develop in this thesis: the policy and 
the theory.  In this chapter I lay down these foundations in detail.  I begin by giving 
an historical overview of Australian social security policy and the development of 
income support, tracing the expansion of eligibility from widows to mothers to 
parents.  I document the development of welfare reform under the Liberal/National 
Coalition Government led by John Howard: Work for the Dole, the establishment of 
the Reference Group on Welfare Reform and the Australians Working Together 
package announced in the 2001-2002 federal Budget.  I next describe Australians 
Working Together as it was implemented for Parenting Payment recipients.  
Welfare to Work, the package of policy changes which replaced Australians 
Working Together, started to be developed not long after Australians Working 
Together began operating.  Welfare to Work was announced in the 2005-2006 
Budget and implementation began in 2006.  This first section of chapter one is 
descriptive.  It presents information about the policy which is necessary in order to 
understand the analysis which follows in later chapters.  I interpret the meaning of 
these policy changes in the remainder of the thesis, focusing on Australians 
Working Together, as the policy in operation when I undertook my field work.  I 
return to Welfare to Work in the concluding chapter, when I reflect on the 
implications of my findings. 
 
The second body of foundational material I explore in this chapter is the theoretical 
framework.  As I noted in the introduction, theories of care and theories of 
recognition are central to my interpretation of Australians Working Together in the 
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everyday. An understanding of recognition and care underpin the other theoretical 
considerations which arise throughout the thesis.   
 
I start by investigating care.  Family was central to the thinking of the mothers who 
participated in this study.  The ways in which they understood care, managed it, felt 
about it and accommodated it resonated with the work of feminist theorists who 
have strived to incorporate care within sociological and policy analyses.  In contrast, 
at a policy development level, there was little discussion of care, despite the focus 
of Australians Working Together on mothers who receive income support.  Feminist 
policy analysts have documented a shift in policy assumptions in the twentieth 
century from a male-breadwinner, female-care-giver family model to an adult-
worker model (for example, Cass and Brennan 2003; Giullari and Lewis 2005; 
O‟Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999; Shaver 2002a).  These theorists‟ analytical 
frameworks are grounded in theories of care, and arise through a well-developed 
understanding of the nature of care work.  In this chapter, I explore theoretical 
conceptions of care including those developed by Clare Ungerson (1983), Berenice 
Fisher and Joan Tronto (1990), Arlie Russell Hochschild (1995) and Mary Daly and 
Jane Lewis (2000). 
 
Finally, I examine theories of recognition.  Here I draw principally upon the work of 
Axel Honneth (1995, 2003), Nancy Fraser (2003), Richard Sennett (2003) and Ruth 
Lister (2002b).  As Grace‟s comments in the introduction make clear, seeking 
respectful relations with the state and with Centrelink officers is critically important 
for Parenting Payment recipients.  Honneth provides a framework within which to 
interpret struggles for recognition and the effect of disrespect, while Sennett offers a 
nuanced understanding of the meaning of respect for welfare recipients.  Fraser and 
Lister bring recognition for the unpaid work of care into the analysis.  Fraser 
emphasises the importance of redistribution as a distinct dimension in analysis, 
arguing that it should not be subsumed by recognition.   
Social security for Australian families: a brief history 
In this section I provide an historical overview of Parenting Payment and its place in 
the Australian social security system, leading to a discussion of the policies of 
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Australians Working Together and Welfare to Work.  I present the policy packages 
to provide a context for the coming analysis.  The meaning of these policy 
developments is investigated throughout the thesis.  In chapters two and three, I 
explore the differing interpretations of the policy issues as seen by mothers and by 
public officials, which leads me to reflect on policy developments in terms of 
feminist welfare regime analysis; the transition to normative models of the adult 
worker; and the growing emphasis on employment as the core citizenship 
responsibility.  In chapter four, I examine the policy meaning in practice by 
investigating the day-to-day implementation of Australians Working Together.  In 
chapter five, I delve into mothers‟ employment decisions and evaluate the meaning 
of policy in terms of incentives to employment and support for mothers‟ 
employment. 
 
Like many other Australian income support policies, Parenting Payment has its 
origins in the national, publicly funded social security system which burgeoned 
during and immediately after World War II.  The system was developed to provide 
income support to people without paid work due to unemployment, ill-health, 
disability, retirement or caring responsibilities (Shaver 2002a:333).  It was built on 
the existing invalid and aged pension systems which were introduced in 1908 and 
1909 respectively and on the war widows‟ pensions which were paid following 
passage of the World War I Repatriation Acts of 1917 and 1920 (Carney and Hanks 
1994:30; Cooke 2003:465).   
 
The first federally managed, publicly funded social security payment for sole 
parents was legislated in 1942 under the Widows’ Pensions Act (Carney and Hanks 
1994:212).  The pension provided assistance to mothers of dependent children who 
were de jure widows or divorced by their husband, deserted by their husband for 
more than six months, or living alone because their husband had been hospitalised 
for insanity.  De facto widows also qualified if their relationship had persisted for at 
least three years.  While many sole mothers benefited, select groups could not 
receive support under this payment; namely mothers who themselves left or agreed 
to end a relationship, mothers deserted by de facto husbands, mothers who were 
never de jure or de facto married, and wives of prisoners.  Those who were not 
eligible for the Widows‟ Pension could apply to their state governments for 
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assistance that was worth less and was more discretionary than the Widows‟ 
Pension (Brennan and Cass 2005:6).  A moral distinction was made between 
„deserving‟ mothers who demonstrated a commitment to marriage, and the 
„undeserving‟, who failed to enter the institution or left it.  Only those of „good 
character‟ could claim support (Carney and Hanks 1994:212).  There was a racial 
dimension to the moral entitlement of the pension, with migrants (excepting British 
migrants), indigenous peoples from Africa, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, 
and most Indigenous Australians excluded from entitlement (Kewley 1973:215).  
The racial exclusions persisted until 1966 (Carney and Hanks 1994:212 note 12).   
 
All sole mothers were brought under federal schemes in 1973 with the introduction 
of the Supporting Mothers Benefit, expanded in 1977 and renamed Supporting 
Parents Benefit to include fathers caring for children alone (Whiteford, Stanton and 
Gray 2001:26).  Extending eligibility to fathers marked an important shift in policy 
logic.  Sole motherhood was no longer the basis of entitlement; it was, instead, sole 
parenthood.  The Widows‟ Pension persisted until 1989 when the Sole Parent 
Pension was introduced, combining payments for unmarried and widowed or 
divorced parents into the one payment (Cass 2005:40).  Until the 1990s, federal cash 
assistance programs assumed that participation in paid employment would interfere 
with lone parents‟ ability to care for their children and so income support was 
provided so that parents would not be forced to choose employment over care 
(Carney and Hanks 1994:220).  The payments were made in acknowledgement of 
the absence of a family breadwinner (Whiteford 2001:65).  That is, the policy 
assumption was that parents could either be carers or workers, not both.  Moreover, 
mothers had moral responsibility to their children to be carers. 
 
The trend towards a policy assumption that parents could, if they chose, be both 
carers and workers began with the Social Security Review.  The Social Security 
Review was established in 1986 by the Minister for Social Security, Brian Howe.  
Headed by Bettina Cass, the review was tasked with examining the social security 
system with a particular focus on three areas, one which was income support for 
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families with children
5
.  The review argued that changes to the existing system 
could reduce poverty in one-parent families. Key recommendations included 
providing support to parents in seeking employment and improving their skills, and 
removing barriers to employment (for example, by increasing the amount parents 
could earn at a paid job before their benefits were affected) (Raymond 1987:129).  
Such measures were designed to improve the financial independence of lone 
parents.  Shortly afterwards, in 1989, the Jobs, Education and Training (JET) 
program began.  JET was a voluntary program available to parents in which JET 
advisers provided information and referrals about education, employment and child 
care (Whiteford 2001:74).   
 
Parenting Payment, which brought together payments for lone and partnered 
parents, was established in 1998 (Whiteford, Stanton and Gray 2001:27).  Parenting 
Payment was available to parents whose youngest child was aged less than 16 years 
and whose household had a low income.  Recipients could be either lone parents or 
in heterosexual couples.
6
  In the case of couples, the individual classified as the 
main carer received the payment, which was means-tested both on her income and 
that of her partner.   While similar, the payments for lone and couple parents had 
important differences, because Parenting Payment Single was a pension and 
Parenting Payment Partnered was an allowance.  The Australian social security 
benefits grouped together as pensions have more generous rates of payment, greater 
annual increases in payment rate, and more additional benefits than allowances.
7
  
Pensions also have a higher earnings disregard, allowing a higher level of earnings 
before the recipient‟s entitlement is reduced, and when earnings do affect pensions, 
the taper rate, the rate at which benefits are withdrawn, is lower. 
Australians Working Together 
The Australians Working Together package has its origins in a form of reciprocity 
which was introduced to social security policy in the 1990s.  The Keating Labor 
                                                 
5
 The other areas for focus were social security and workforce issues and income support for the 
aged. 
6
 Same-sex couples are not recognised by Australian social security law.   The primary carer for a 
child with same-sex parents may be eligible for Parenting Payment (Single). 
7
 Pensions include the Aged Pension and the Disability Support Pension; allowances are paid to 
unemployed people and young people as Newstart Allowance and Youth Allowance. 
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Government first developed this concept as „Reciprocal Obligation‟ in its Working 
Nation package (McClelland 2002:216).  Reciprocal Obligation required long-term 
unemployed people to engage, through a more individualised system, in the 
programs and assistance that were offered to them.  Penalties could be applied if this 
obligation was not met.  Prior to this development, the primary obligation of 
unemployed people was to meet the „work test‟, that is, to demonstrate that they 
were seeking full-time employment.  Following its election in 1996, the Howard 
Liberal/National Coalition Government replaced Reciprocal Obligation with 
„Mutual Obligation‟ (see appendix two for a timeline of social security policy 
reform under the Howard Government).  The slightly different term was associated 
with a shift in meaning: in Reciprocal Obligation the „obligation‟ was to take 
advantage of the assistance offered to improve one‟s situation, whereas in Mutual 
Obligation it became an obligation to give something to the community in return for 
income support (McClelland 2002:216).  Mutual Obligation was first put into 
practice in the Work for the Dole program.  Announced in 1997, Work for the Dole 
required unemployed people aged less than 25 years who had been unemployed for 
more than six months to engage in 25 hours of prescribed work per week in order to 
be eligible for income support (Harris 2001:18).  Participation in Work for the Dole 
usually lasted for six months. 
 
In 1999, the Minister for Family and Community Services, Jocelyn Newman 
(1999b), announced the government‟s intention to undertake „comprehensive 
reform‟ of the Australian welfare system (see appendix two for a list of Howard 
Government ministers active in social security reform).  The Howard Government 
established the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (hereafter the Reference 
Group), headed by Patrick McClure, „to provide advice on possible initiatives to 
prevent and reduce welfare dependency among people of workforce age‟ (Newman 
1999b:3).  The extension of a Mutual Obligation framework was one of the six 
guiding principles for the Reference Group.  Parenting Payment recipients, 
unemployed people and income support claimants with disabilities were highlighted 
as groups requiring particular attention.  Following the release of an interim report 
for community consultation, the Reference Group (2000) published Participation 
Support for a More Equitable Society, which became known as the McClure Report.  
The McClure Report proposed changes in five areas: 
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
 Individualised service delivery 
 A simpler income support structure 
 Incentives and financial assistance 
 Mutual obligations 
 Social partnerships 
 
With regard to Parenting Payment, the McClure Report recommended that 
recipients with school-aged children attend a compulsory annual interview for 
advice about education and employment, and that recipients with high-school-aged 
children should be required to agree to a plan for their employment, education or 
other form of employment-oriented participation (Reference Group 2000:43).  The 
Australian Government response, Welfare Reform: A Stronger, Fairer Australia, 
endorsed many of the Reference Group‟s recommendations, including the changes 
to Parenting Payment (Australian Government 2001).  The welfare changes were 
announced as „Australians Working Together‟ in the 2001-2002 Budget.   
 
Australians Working Together legislation was introduced to Parliament in May 
2002, but was not passed by both houses until March 2003.  The bill faced 
considerable opposition from the Senate, where a majority, consisting of the 
Australian Labor Party, the Australian Greens and the Australian Democrats, was 
concerned about extending the concept of Mutual Obligation to new groups of 
income support recipients, particularly families, and was also worried about the 
effects of harsh penalties.  On 12 December, the last day of Parliament in 2002, 
parliamentarians debated for 25 consecutive hours in an attempt to pass both the 
Australians Working Together legislation and another controversial bill that sought 
to extend the authority of the national security services.  Both bills bounced back 
and forth from the Senate to the House of Representatives, but by 10.30 the 
following morning neither had passed into law.
8
 
                                                 
8
 The bouncing back and forth of the bill from the Senate to the House created an historic precedent 
during this all-night sitting on the last day of Parliament for the year.  The Senate split the bill and 
approved half of it; the section which contained extra funding and introduced the Working Credit.  
The other half, containing the measures regarding Mutual Obligation and penalties, the Senate 
retained for further consideration.  The House, however, rejected the Senate‟s authority to split the 
bill and asked that the Senate consider the bill as it was originally presented.  While not insisting on 
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It was only following a deal made with the Democrats that the government 
succeeded in passing Australians Working Together through both Houses of 
Parliament (Morris 2003:10).  It occurred during a week in which the Australian 
Democrats formed a majority with the Liberal/National Party in the Senate to 
support the passage of a number of bills that would not have succeeded without 
Democrat support.  Australians Working Together passed into law on the second of 
two days in which no less than 24 „priority‟ bills were listed for debate by the 
Senate.  Most of the 24 were accepted.  The Democrats agreed to support the 
Australians Working Together bill after the government conceded to changes that 
softened breach penalties and agreed to create a task force to investigate breach 
penalties (Morris 2003:10). 
 
The implementation of Australians Working Together began in September 2002, 
before the legislation had been passed by parliament, as the first stages of 
implementation did not require legislative reform.  For parents in receipt of 
Parenting Payment whose youngest child was aged six to 15, this involved 
attendance at a compulsory „participation interview‟ with an „adviser‟.  The 
meetings were to occur annually and the adviser would provide information and 
advice about employment and training.  The full implementation of Australians 
Working Together began a year later in September 2003, following the passage of 
Family and Community Services Legislation Amendment (Australians Working 
Together and other 2001 Budget Measures) 2003.  Australians Working Together 
clustered Parenting Payment claimants into three groups: those whose youngest 
child was preschool-aged, in primary school or in secondary school.  The first 
group, those who youngest child was aged less than six years, faced no new 
requirements.  The second, parents whose youngest child was aged between six and 
12 years, continued their compulsory annual interviews with personal advisers with 
no further requirements.   
 
                                                                                                                                         
its decision to split the bill, the Senate sent a message to the House that splitting a bill was an 
amendment like any other amendment and that the Senate expected the House to treat it as such, thus 
extending the bounds of appropriate Parliamentary procedure (Harris 2005:447-448, 826-828). 
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The third group included the mothers in this study, those with a youngest child aged 
between 13 and 15 years.  Like parents with younger children, these parents had to 
attend an annual interview; however, this group were obliged at their interview to 
develop a Participation Agreement.  The agreement would set out recipients‟ 
commitment to meet a „participation requirement‟ of 150 hours spent on 
employment-oriented activities every six months.  The 150 hours could be spread 
out over the full six months, averaging just over six hours per week, or could be 
concentrated into a shorter period.  The interviews were conducted by JET advisers 
who had experience of providing information to parents through the JET program.
9
  
Parents with primary-school-aged children were also offered the option to create a 
participation plan, but were not compelled to do so.  The activities in the agreements 
could include paid employment, education and training and vocationally oriented 
voluntary work.   
 
Failure to attend a compulsory meeting or to comply with a Participation Agreement 
could result in „breach penalties‟.  The first two „breaches‟ in a period of two years 
resulted in a reduction of Parenting Payment for 26 weeks; the first penalty a 
reduction of 18 per cent, the second of 24 per cent.  For the third penalty, all 
payments were stopped for eight weeks (National Welfare Rights Network 2004:2).  
If, upon receiving notice of a first penalty, the parent subsequently complied with 
the activity requirement, their payments could be reinstated at the full amount; the 
second and third penalties continued for the full duration whether or not parents 
eventually fulfilled the requirements.  The taskforce created to examine the impact 
of penalties, established as a result of negotiations to pass Australians Working 
Together through the Senate, handed its report to the government in December 2004 
(Yaxley 2005).  At the time of writing the report had not been made public, but a 
leaked copy was said to conclude that „penalties imposed on welfare recipients have 
been excessive, unfair and counter-productive‟ (Yaxley 2005).  The taskforce 
recommended that penalties not last beyond eight weeks. 
                                                 
9
 As noted above, the JET (Jobs, Education and Training) program first began in 1989.  It was a 
voluntary program designed to support parents in taking up opportunities for employment or study. 
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Welfare to Work 
Moves towards further changes to the Australian social security system started prior 
to the full implementation of Australians Working Together.  In June 2003, the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Workplace 
Relations and Workforce Participation (2005:xiii, hereafter Standing Committee on 
Employment) was asked to investigate measures that would increase employment 
participation and consider „how a balance of assistance, incentives and obligations 
can increase participation, for income support recipients‟.  
 
With regard to Parenting Payment, the Standing Committee on Employment 
(2005:150) recommended that the Australian Government „review strategies for 
encouraging increased participation‟.  By the time the report, Working for 
Australia’s Future: Increasing Participation in the Workforce, was released in 
March 2005, Australians Working Together had been fully implemented for 18 
months.  Evaluation evidence was not yet available, but the recommendation that 
Australians Working Together strategies should be reviewed was based on 
testimony from the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations that „early 
signs indicate[d] a positive improvement‟ (Standing Committee on Employment 
2005:149).   
 
Two months later, Welfare to Work was announced as part of the 2005-2006 
Budget (Costello 2005).   Welfare to Work substantially extended the participation 
requirements for sole and partnered parents claiming income support.  In contrast to 
Australians Working Together, Welfare to Work passed into legislation after little 
parliamentary debate.  The Howard Government was able to hasten its passage 
because the Liberal/National Coalition had achieved a majority in both Houses of 
Parliament in the 2004 election.  Two bills to enable the Welfare to Work changes 
were introduced to the House of Representatives on 9 November 2005: the 
Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work 
and Other Measures) Bill 2005 and the Family and Community Services Legislation 
Amendment (Welfare to Work) Bill 2005.  The same day, the bills were referred to 
the Senate, which in turn, also on the same day, referred the bills to the Senate 
Community Affairs Legislation Committee.  The short time frame given by the 
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Senate for the Community Affairs Legislation Committee to consider these two bills 
provides a stark example of the speed at which the legislation was debated.  The 
Senate requested that the Committee complete its examination of the legislation, 
undertake community consultations and report back to the Senate in less than three 
weeks on Monday 28 November. 
 
The members of the committee belonging to the Australian Labor Party, Australian 
Democrats and Australian Greens wrote a dissenting report in which they were 
disparaging of the short time given to the committee to consider the bills: 
 
These bills represent the most drastic changes to the provision of 
social security in Australia since the introduction of the Social 
Security Act in 1947, affecting hundreds of thousands of the most 
vulnerable Australians. By so severely limiting the time frame of 
this inquiry, the government has diminished the capacity of 
Senators, and the community in general, to appropriately consider 
the details of these changes. Given the importance of these 
proposed Welfare to Work measures, this should not have been the 
case. (Community Affairs Legislation Committee 2005:66) 
 
The government majority in the committee recommended that both pieces of 
legislation be passed, subject to just one recommendation: that large families be 
exempt from participation requirements (Community Affairs Legislation Committee 
2005:vii).  The legislation, slightly amended, passed into law in the final sitting days 
of Parliament in December 2005.  The Welfare to Work changes were passed in the 
same five-day period in which Parliament also passed legislation to radically change 
industrial relations and further extend anti-terrorism laws (Murphy 2005:4). 
 
Welfare to Work introduced greater activity measures for parents in receipt of 
income support, made social security considerably more employment-oriented and 
substantially complicated the array of payments and requirements.  Again the policy 
divided parents into groups according to the age of their children, but now it only 
distinguishes between parents with preschool- and school-aged-children.  These 
 34 
groups are further divided into new and existing claimants, with some additional 
distinctions made between one- and two-parent families. 
 
Parents of preschool-aged children experience no differences under Welfare to 
Work, neither those who are new to the system nor those already in receipt of 
payments.  These parents, whether partnered or single, continue to be entitled to 
Parenting Payment with no additional requirements to attend adviser interviews or 
engage in employment or training. 
 
For parents with school-aged children, however, the situation is more complex.  
Parents, both sole and partnered, already in receipt of Parenting Payment on 1 July 
2006 remain eligible for Parenting Payment until their youngest child reaches 16, 
but the activity requirements for these parents has increased.  Once their youngest 
child reaches 7, they are required to undertake 15 hours of employment per week.  
Those parents not in employment are to seek such employment, plus engage in a 
„Mutual Obligation‟ activity for 150 hours within a six-month period once every 
year.  Alternatively, these parents can study full time to satisfy their Mutual 
Obligation requirements; part-time study must be combined with employment or job 
search. 
 
New claimants who are the primary carer in a couple relationship and whose 
youngest child is aged six or over are no longer eligible for Parenting Payment 
Partnered.  Instead, these parents have to apply for Newstart Allowance, the 
payment which, until Welfare to Work, was the benefit for unemployed adults 
seeking full-time employment.  To remain eligible for Newstart, partnered parents 
must be employed for at least 15 hours per week, or seek such employment.  If not 
employed, parents are also required to engage in a Mutual Obligation Activity for 
150 hours for six months each year.  Education is not an acceptable activity for 
these parents.  If they wish to study they have two options: either seek or take 15 
hours of employment in addition to their studies; or study full time and apply for 
Austudy, which attracts a lower rate of payment. 
 
New claimants who are sole parents face a slightly different set of rules again.  Sole 
parents who have a child aged six or seven may apply for Parenting Payment.  
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While in receipt of this benefit, they must comply with the same set of requirements 
as existing Parenting Payment claimants; that is, 15 hours of employment per week, 
or job search plus Mutual Obligation activity for 150 hours within six months.  Like 
existing claimants, new lone parent claimants can study to meet the activity 
requirements.  Once new claimants‟ youngest child reaches eight years, they are no 
longer eligible for Parenting Payment Single, and, like their partnered counterparts, 
must apply for Newstart Allowance.  Once claiming Newstart, they must to comply 
with the same set of requirements as partnered primary carers on Newstart.  
Education in itself no longer fulfils their activity requirements.   
 
Failure to comply with any activity requirement may result in an eight-week 
suspension of payments, both for Parenting Payment and Newstart claimants.  This 
new set of arrangements for parents is extremely complicated (please refer to 
appendix one, table A1, which sets out some of the differences which depend on the 
age of the youngest child).  The sketch I have provided here demonstrates only the 
most substantial differences between parents in a variety of circumstances; the 
policy‟s intricacies reveal further complications and variations in entitlements, 
supplementary benefits and exemptions from requirements. 
 
The most critical difference between Parenting Payment and Newstart is the amount 
of payment sole parents receive.  As noted earlier, Parenting Payment Single is a 
pension, while Parenting Payment Partnered and Newstart are both allowances.  
Lone parents on Newstart face a lower level of benefit plus higher taper rates which 
begin at a lower rate of earnings than they do for lone parents receiving Parenting 
Payment Single (please refer to appendix one, Table A2, for detail on the earnings 
mechanisms for each payment).  As a result, lone parents combining part-time 
employment with receipt of Newstart keep substantially less of their earnings when 
compared to someone with the same income receiving Parenting Payment Single 
(Harding et al. 2005:13-14). 
Administrative contexts and other family policy 
At the time of my fieldwork, Parenting Payment recipients were affected by a 
number of other family policies and policy environments.  I cover the most directly 
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pertinent of them in this section.  Centrelink administered all Commonwealth 
income support payments on behalf of the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations (DEWR) and the Department of Family and Community 
Services (FACS).
10
  Parenting Payment was the responsibility of FACS until the 
October 2004 federal election, after which responsibility for most „working age‟ 
income support payments, including Parenting Payment Single and Partnered, was 
transferred to DEWR.  Centrelink is a statutory authority which operates within a 
purchaser/provider framework, these two departments being its largest clients 
(Centrelink 2005:12-15).  The personal advisers who conducted the annual 
interviews with parents were employed by Centrelink. 
 
There are two other forms of financial assistance available to Parenting Payment 
claimants; Family Tax Benefits and Child Support.  In 2000, as part of a substantial 
restructuring of the Australian tax system, the Australian Government introduced 
Family Tax Benefits Part A and Part B.  These replaced a number of other family 
assistance payments.  Family Tax Benefit Part A is means-tested on parental 
income.  If a couple family, the means test applies to joint parental income (Cass 
and Brennan 2003:54).  Family Tax Benefit Part B has no means test on the primary 
earner‟s income, which means that sole parent families, regardless of earnings, are 
eligible for the full Part B payment.  However, for couple families, Part B is means 
tested on the income of the so-called „secondary earner‟ and eligibility ceases at a 
low level of earnings.  As a result, mothers in couples faced strong financial 
disincentives to employment (Cass and Brennan 2003:55). 
 
The Child Support Scheme began in 1988, replacing previous child maintenance 
provisions.  Under the scheme, non-resident parents are assessed by the Child 
Support Agency, which collects the payments from them and directs them to the 
resident parent via the social security system (Walter 2002:18-19).  The level of the 
payments is determined according to the income of both parents and the proportion 
of time which children spend with each parent (Keebaugh 2003:166).  Child 
                                                 
10
 In January 2006, FACS became the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs (FaCSIA) and then, in late 2007, the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). 
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Support payments are received by slightly less than half of all sole-parent families 
(Keebaugh 2003:159). 
 
This first half of this chapter has outlined the social security policy environment in 
which I conducted my study.  The changes introduced under Australians Working 
Together significantly altered the social security landscape for low-income parents 
in Australia, and were radically extended under Welfare to Work.  Both policy 
packages placed little emphasis on care and strong emphasis on the obligations of 
income support recipients.  
Theorising care and respect for parents in receipt of social security 
Care 
When I interviewed mothers receiving income support, everything came back to 
families; they were the centre around which everything else had to fit.  The 
participants spoke of their lives as infused with care and care responsibilities, 
primarily for their children, but also for other family members and friends.  The care 
they described is a mixture of love and responsibility: the two dimensions of care 
differentiated by Clare Ungerson (1983:31) as caring about and caring for.  The 
former is a „sense of feeling affection‟ for someone, „based on spontaneous feelings 
of affinity‟; the latter is essentially „servicing their needs‟ (Ungerson 1983:31).  In 
making this distinction, Ungerson emphasises the difference between the emotion of 
care and the work of care.  Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto (1990) further and more 
finely categorise care into four interrelated elements.  Like Ungerson they regard 
care as consisting of caring about and caring for, for which they have similar 
definitions, but they also add caregiving and care-receiving.  Fisher and Tronto 
(1990:42-43) distinguish between the „responsibility [for] initiating and maintaining 
caring activities‟ involved in caring for and the „more continuous and dense time 
commitment‟ involved in caregiving, which is concrete, hands-on work.  They also 
include those who are cared for, recognising that as care recipients they are active 
participants in acts of care. 
 
Separating and analysing different dimensions of care allows for the examination of 
the resources required for care work, the relationships involved and the social 
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contexts in which it takes place.  This is an important counter to the popular 
conception of care as something that occurs spontaneously and easily as a result of 
women‟s love, captured classically in the image of a Madonna-like mother holding 
her child (Hochschild 1995:331). 
 
She is at home, not in a public place ... the caregiving seems 
natural, effortless.  She is sitting, quiescent, not standing or moving 
– stances associated with „working‟.  She seems to enjoy caring for 
the child and as the child‟s face often suggests, she is good at 
caring. (Hochschild 1995:331) 
 
This is a feminine, private and natural ideal of care (Hochschild 1995:331).  In 
contrast, treating caring about as different to caring for draws attention to the 
labour involved in caring for: labour which requires time, material resources, 
knowledge and skill (Fisher and Tronto 1990:41).  Access to these resources is 
mediated by locality, class, race and family structure (Duncan and Edwards 1999; 
Fisher and Tronto 1990). 
 
All the mothers I interviewed stressed the highly time-consuming nature of caring 
for children.  As time-use research confirms (see for example Bittman and Pixley 
1997; Craig 2004), the tasks mothers perform require a lot of time: maintaining a 
household for themselves and their children; cooking, washing, cleaning, shopping, 
tidying; overseeing children‟s development as they play, socialise, learn day-to-day 
life skills and complete their homework; keeping children safe by supervising their 
activities and watching over their environment.   
 
Care work does not only take the form of intensive one-on-one provision (Fisher 
and Tronto 1990:39).  Employed parents also manage care remotely, ensuring their 
children are safe, secure and nurtured; for instance, by coordinating the collection of 
children from school and their transfer to after-school care, making telephone calls 
to and from children who are at home on their own, or researching the best care 
providers and choosing among schools, family members, friends and paid carers and 
then ensuring that these non-parental carers provide good quality care (Hochschild 
1997:77; Morehead 2001).  The work of coordinating care is ongoing, adapting to 
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new circumstances as children‟s needs change and, for many parents, as their 
employment situation changes.  The unpredictable hours of many part-time jobs 
exacerbate the complexity of weekly childcare arrangements (Brennan 1998:225; 
Pocock 2003)  
 
Raising children is costly (Valenzuela 1999).  Mothers talked to me about the 
material resources essential for the delivery of care: a warm safe home supplied 
with power and water, good and plentiful food, access to transport and medicines.  
Yet poverty sometimes threatened these essentials.  Mothers also described other 
resources that might facilitate their ability to care for their children; these included 
many items owned by most households: a car, a washing machine and a clothes 
dryer, a computer (Saunders et al. 2007:34-35).  In addition, of course, money is 
required for paid care, such as after-school care or holiday programs. 
 
Parents require time to develop the knowledge and skill needed to provide good 
care, time to develop and revise care provision, and to update it as children and 
circumstances change.  They also need time to interact with and learn from other 
parents and others who know and care for their children: friends, family members, 
teachers, children‟s friends and their family. 
 
A mother‟s ability despite meagre resources she can command can be regarded as a 
mark of her quality and commitment as a carer.  As Fisher and Tronto (1990:43) 
note 
 
One of the most pervasive contradictions involved in taking care of 
concerns the asymmetry between responsibility and power.  To the 
extent that women are assigned responsibility for maintaining and 
repairing our world, this contradiction between responsibility and 
power becomes especially severe: the „caring woman‟ makes things 
better, regardless of how little she has with which to work.  Where 
responsibility is great but power is limited, women are expected to 
compensate for deficiencies in the caring process. 
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Although mothers require resources to provide care, the degree to which they can 
mobilise these resources is often shaped by strong and persistent ideologies about 
motherhood and fatherhood, dependence and independence.  These ideologies are 
manifest in the mothers‟ own beliefs and actions around care, the attitudes of their 
families, friends and neighbours, the structure of the labour market, and state 
policies, including those on welfare and employment (Duncan and Edwards 
1999:42-49, Lister 2002a, Young 1995:548).  I will explore this issue further in 
chapter three, but for the time being I note that the neo-liberal equation of 
independence with paid employment and the elevation of this form of independence 
to the primary virtue of citizens renders caregivers and care-receivers invisible and 
relegates them to second-class status (Young 1995:548).  Not only is their ability to 
command the resources they require to provide and receive care hampered, but their 
struggles are largely unseen or ignored as they and care work is devalued.  Mothers 
who can afford to parent full time due to the financial support of a husband may 
perhaps be an exception, but even they feel the need to justify being „just a mum‟ as 
more and more mothers enter the workforce (Wilson et al. 1999:14).  Neither do 
these ideologies accommodate the experiences of fathers who parent alone: the 
assumption is that full-time care work is done by mothers and a father‟s role in a 
family is to provide through employment (despite media images of the „new father‟ 
who participates in his children‟s care) (Connell 2005:374).   
 
Mothers also grapple with care relations within the household.  Children are not 
passive recipients of their parents‟ care.  Instead they are active members of the 
family who voice their expectations, make demands, and contribute to the running 
of the household (Ridge 2007). 
 
Caregiving, is time-consuming, hands-on labour, but it can also be seen as a gift, 
generously and freely given.  This interpretation is evident in the Madonna-like 
mother described by Hochschild.  Meyer and her colleagues (2000:2) have criticised 
feminist scholars‟ use of the term „caregiving‟ because they feel that it „implies the 
care is given freely, either at no cost or at a cost that the giver is willing and able to 
shoulder.  Implicit in the term is the notion of choice.‟  Instead, as they point out, 
the choice to care is highly constrained by ideologies around gender and care, the 
uneven gender distribution of paid and unpaid labour, unaffordable market care and 
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unstable, inadequate social support.  While this is true, I believe they underestimate 
the complexity of gift giving.  As Sennett (2003:217) observes, drawing on the large 
anthropological literature, gift exchanges are asymmetrical; it is this asymmetry 
which creates an emotional bond between people.  Gift giving is reciprocal, but the 
reciprocity, in contrast to market transactions, is neither equal nor simultaneous.  A 
mother‟s gift of care to an infant is an obvious example: it is done in a framework of 
gendered norms and obligations, within a gendered labour market and policy 
environment, but without any expectation of a concurrent return of care from the 
child. 
 
While it is useful to distinguish between forms of care relating to love and affect 
and those which are about tending and care work, it is also important that we retain 
the connection between care as work and care as an emotion.  Care is, as so often 
termed, a „labour of love‟ (see, for example, Borchgrevink and Holter 1995; Finch 
and Groves 1983).  As Hilary Graham (1983:27) emphasises, care is more than „a 
kind of domestic labour performed on people‟.   She uses a psychological 
perspective to unveil the emotionality of care and, in so doing, highlights its 
centrality in relationships and identity (Graham 1983:29-30).  Although more and 
more women are entering employment and more men are doing care work, 
femininities continue to be constituted by women‟s relationship with the domestic 
world and masculinities by men‟s activities in the economy (Connell 2005:371). 
 
Others have drawn attention to the emotional labour involved in care work.  
Himmelweit (1999:30-35) notes that care is usually understood to consist of both 
physical and emotional activities; the emotional labour involves the carer managing 
her own emotions, as well as tending to the emotions of her charges.  Arlie Russell 
Hochschild (1995:333) adds, „all the moments when we are also trying to get into 
the task in the right spirit, with the appropriate feeling, can be considered the 
emotional work of care‟.  The emotional significance of care is not limited to care 
for people, but also care for the home.  Jorun Solheim (1995) argues for the 
psychological importance of housework by drawing a parallel between the home 
and the women‟s body. She argues that women‟s work in the home is intimate and 
personal, a performance of ritual cleansing of a feminine space (Solheim 1995:57-
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58).  This is one reason why, she suggests, it can be difficult for men to fully 
participate in housework, even where they are keen to do so. 
 
However, as we have seen, in enacting care, infused as it is with emotion, parents 
nonetheless face limited resources, constraints due to their social status, competing 
ideologies, and negotiations with their children and others who receive their care.  
In researching the care practices of parents in receipt of income support, I will 
maintain a dual focus on the emotions as well as the labour of care. 
 
Mary Daly and Jane Lewis (2000) develop the concept of „social care‟ to further the 
analytic potential of the notion of care in welfare regime analysis.  They define 
social care as: 
 
… the activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and 
emotional requirements of dependent adults and children, and the 
normative, economic and social frameworks within which these are 
assigned and carried out. (Daly and Lewis 2000:285) 
 
Daly and Lewis draw on the multi-dimensional descriptions of care developed by 
other feminist theorists to create this concept.  So, they too emphasise the labour 
involved in care and the financial and emotional costs of providing and receiving 
care, but they also factor in the obligation and responsibility which tend to underpin 
the provision of care.  Because they seek to make social care a concept relevant to 
welfare regime analysis, Daly and Lewis draw in the broader frameworks in which 
care is situated.  These frameworks include the degree and form of state influence 
on whether the labour of care tends to be paid or unpaid; how the costs of care are 
distributed among individuals, families and society; and the social relations of care 
and how these are reinforced or challenged by the state (Daly and Lewis 2000:285).  
This multi-layered approach makes the concept of social care compatible with a 
tiered everyday-life analysis moving outwards from the welfare recipient who is a 
care provider or receiver. 
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Respect and recognition 
Theories of care provide a good basis for an analysis of parents‟ provision of care, 
of their relationships with their children, of the juncture between paid and unpaid 
care and of the role of the state and the market in care provision.  However, the 
relationship between the welfare recipient and the state requires the exploration of a 
further field of scholarship, one which was suggested by the most common 
complaint about being a welfare recipient among the mothers I interviewed.  
Although they did not always articulate it explicitly in this way, mothers were often 
concerned about relations of respect and disrespect. 
 
Recognition, for Axel Honneth (1995), is constitutive of ourselves.  We require 
mutual recognition for our development as individual social beings.   
 
The reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of 
mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-
self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative 
perspective of one‟s partners in interaction, as their social 
addressee. (Honneth 1995:93) 
 
That is, our understanding of ourselves not only depends on our recognition by 
others, but also on recognising ourselves in the recognition of others.   
 
Honneth builds on the work of Hegel and Mead to present a theory of recognition 
consisting of three spheres: love, rights and solidarity.  The first, love, refers to our 
primary affective relations with family, friends and lovers.  These are 
interdependent relationships which enable subjects‟ independence by providing an 
assurance of a continuity of care (Honneth 1995:105-107).  
 
For it is only this symbiotically nourished bond, which emerges 
through mutually desired demarcation, that produces the degree of 
basic individual self-confidence indispensable for autonomous 
participation in public life. (Honneth 1995:107) 
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The second sphere is that of legal recognition, or rights.  In this sphere we find our 
claims for equality as persons – that is, for universal rights.  Honneth (1995:120) 
maintains that realising one has universal legal rights and shares legal recognition 
with others in the community is the basis for self respect.  The third sphere is that of 
solidarity and social esteem, in which we establish our difference as unique 
individuals.  This final sphere of recognition is underpinned by principles of 
individual achievement (Honneth 2003:149).  It constitutes a process of mutual 
recognition of skills and social contribution and is, as a result, the source of our 
sense of self-worth or self-esteem (Honneth 1995:129).   
 
For Honneth (1995:173), recognition is essential to our sense of self due to the 
intersubjective nature of personal identity.  He writes: 
 
The only way in which individuals are constituted as persons is by 
learning to refer to themselves, from the perspective of an 
approving or encouraging other, as beings with certain positive 
traits and abilities.  The scope of such traits – and hence the extent 
of one‟s positive relation-to-self – increases with each new form of 
recognition that individuals are able to apply to themselves as 
subjects.  In this way, the prospect of basic self-confidence is 
inherent in the experience of love; the prospect of self-respect, in 
the experience of legal recognition; and finally the prospect of self-
esteem, in the experience of solidarity (Honneth 1995:173). 
 
Recognition in each of the spheres of love, law and solidarity contributes to our 
personal identity and sureness in ourselves.  As a result, misrecognition in these 
spheres could damage our sense of self-confidence, self-respect or self-esteem. 
 
Richard Sennett‟s (2003) reflection on respect and inequality has particular 
relevance to Honneth‟s third sphere of recognition, where independence is asserted 
and esteem is gained.  Sennett explores the respect that occurs when we are 
necessarily unequal due to an uneven distribution of talent.  He outlines three areas 
in which people in modern societies can earn or fail to elicit respect.  He describes 
these succinctly as „make something of yourself, take care of yourself, help others‟ 
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(Sennett 2003:260).  This observation appears to resonate with Grace‟s frustration 
with being „damned both ways‟.  By not engaging in employment she could be 
regarded as failing to make something of herself or take care of herself.  By not 
mothering full time, she is not devoting herself to her children as she might.  For 
her, seeking respect in one realm results in disrespect in the others. 
 
The first form of respect relates to self-development.  People make something of 
themselves by developing and applying their abilities or skills (Sennett 2003:63).  
This is the case regardless of inequalities in talent.  Highly talented people who do 
not make the most of their ability do not earn this form of respect, whereas someone 
who is striving to the best of their ability does.  However, meritocratic principles 
that see rewards given to the talented have negative consequences; people compare 
themselves unfavourably to those who are more talented (Sennett 2003:65-94).  So 
while people can gain esteem as a result of their talent, they can also experience low 
self-esteem if they feel they are not achieving as they ought even where they are 
doing the best they are capable of.  Even if Grace did not feel disrespect from 
others, she might experience low self-esteem by comparing herself to other mothers, 
other employees, others in her family, etc.  The solution, Sennett (2003:83-4,98) 
argues, is partly to be found in the notion of craftwork, because work that is craft 
relies on the worker‟s own standards rather than those of others.  The worker is 
focused on doing this work well and, as a result, „The craftsman can sustain his or 
her self-respect in an unequal world‟ (Sennett 2003:98).  Perhaps for Grace, „aiming 
for peace‟ might include re-conceiving the work of motherhood as a craft.  
 
Sennett relates care of oneself to dependence and independence.  In liberal welfare 
regimes, independence has come to be associated with adulthood.  By being 
independent one can demonstrate one‟s maturity; dependency indicates that one is 
an immature adult, or a less than full citizen (Fraser and Gordon 1994:18; Shaver 
2001).  Furthermore, dependence is highly gendered.  It has a long history of 
association with femininity, unpaid domestic labour and a wife‟s supposed 
dependency on her husband (Fraser and Gordon 1994).  Sennett observes that 
dependency has a dual meaning.  In the private sphere, in our relationships with 
friends, relatives, lovers and children, dependency binds us together; but in the 
public sphere, dependency has become shameful (Sennett 2003:101-102).   
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The third area of respect has its basis in helping those who need assistance.  Sennett 
draws on anthropological literature on gift-giving to demonstrate some of the 
complexities of these relationships.  Giving can be a manipulative act, or a pitying 
one with an undercurrent of contempt; warm and compassionate, or cold and bereft 
of emotion.  Any of these gifts can be difficult to receive.  A manipulative gift 
requires something in return.  A pitying gift is demeaning, underscoring the 
inequality between the giver and the receiver.  Even a freely given, compassionate 
gift can be painful to receive, as „it lays a heavy burden of gratitude on the recipient, 
who may have nothing to give back but submission‟ (Sennett 2003:149).  The 
Australian welfare regime has its origins in charity and traces of these gift-giving 
relations remain.  For this reason, and to avoid „burn out‟ among compassionate 
givers, „some strategists of welfare reform have tried to imagine the provision of 
care divorced from sentiments of compassion‟, and yet, Sennett (2003:150) argues, 
„most people cannot accept the provision of care as a neutral function‟. 
 
There are many connections between Sennett‟s characterisation of respect and 
Honneth‟s typography of recognition.  Sennett‟s notion of gaining respect through 
self-development relates directly to Honneth‟s sphere of solidarity.  This form of 
respect is akin to self-esteem and social esteem due to one‟s application to 
furthering oneself and making a social contribution using talents and developing 
skills.  Recognition of achievement in this sphere is the source of respect for 
independence, particularly with regard to using skills in employment or business to 
raise the financial resources necessarily to support oneself and family.  The private 
realm of dependence belongs in Honneth‟s sphere of love, where neediness among 
friends and relatives is the basis for mutual support.   
 
Helping others, the third source of respect described by Sennett, relates to all three 
of Honneth‟s recognition spheres.  Helping others in the area of intimate relations is 
about love, helping others on the basis of our equal claims as citizens refers to our 
legal rights, and helping others in the public world of work is a social contribution 
on which we base our claims for social esteem.  (Although, as will be explored 
further below, in the labour market, the financial rewards for some forms of helping 
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others, especially the care work largely performed by women, is valued 
considerably less than other forms of social contribution.) 
 
Dependency in the public realm is my prime interest here.  If it is in the sphere of 
achievement and solidarity that a person‟s social contribution is recognised, then a 
failure to recognise that someone is making such a contribution constitutes 
misrecognition.  This can be very painful.  As Sennett (2003:3) explains: 
 
Lack of respect, though less aggressive than an outright insult, can 
take an equally wounding form.  No insult is offered another 
person, but neither is recognition extended; he or she is not seen – 
as a full human being whose presence matters. 
 
To Honneth, the experience of disrespect is psychologically wounding because it 
cuts to the centre of the self, which is constituted in relation to the recognition of 
others.  A lack of recognition of our abilities and contributions can damage our 
sense that our abilities are valuable and that our acts are contributions; this can 
undermine our self-esteem (Honneth 1995:134).  If we believe that we are not 
recognised unjustly, for instance because our self-confidence and sense of equal 
worth are such that we insist that our actions are achievements, then we are likely to 
experience indignation or rage (Honneth 1995:136; 2003:144).   
 
Welfare bureaucracies were developed with the assumption that the institution 
ought to define what claimants need; it is a feature of rational bureaucratic systems 
to place restrictions on how the resources they provide can be used (Sennett 
2003:177).  In doing so, these bureaucracies commit the „glaring error of denying 
that the clients [are] competent to participate in the terms of their own dependency‟ 
(Sennett 2003:178).  Mutual respect, in contrast, would rely on mutual recognition 
of autonomy.  Just as we grant doctors autonomy to treat patients, because they have 
specialist knowledge of medicine that we do not understand, so doctors ought to 
grant autonomy to patients, who know about their own illnesses in ways doctors 
could never understand (Sennett 2003:122).  In the same way, a respectful welfare 
system would accept in its clients what it does not understand about them and so 
treat their autonomy with respect (Sennett 2003:262). 
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Honneth (2003:144) regards our emotional reactions as the basis of our compulsion 
to struggle for recognition.  He (2003:154) also argues that, under capitalism, 
struggles for the redistribution of material resources are struggles for recognition.  It 
follows that, a social group whose achievements are not recognised and who feel 
disrespected, will fight to have these achievements valued as social contributions, 
and, thereby, for a different pattern of redistribution.  Such „redistribution struggles 
are definitional conflicts over the legitimacy of the current application of the 
achievement principle‟ (Honneth 2003:154).  Honneth presents the creation of the 
welfare state as an example of a recognition struggle that successfully redrew the 
boundaries between the sphere of legal rights and that of solidarity.   
 
The development of social-welfare measures can be understood 
such that individual members of society should be guaranteed a 
minimum of social status and hence economic resources 
independently of the meritocratic recognition principle by 
transforming these claims into social rights (Honneth 2003:147) 
 
This repositioning of the boundaries between the sphere of legal equality and 
solidarity was associated with a redistribution of material resources.  Members of 
society can only make use of their legal autonomy if they have the economic 
resources to do so (Honneth 2003:149).   
 
Nancy Fraser, however, strongly disagrees that redistribution is adequately treated 
when it is considered to be a form of recognition.  She does not dispute the 
intertwined „mutual irreducibility‟ of recognition and redistribution; rather she 
strongly argues against treating recognition and redistribution as opposing or 
exclusive categories (Fraser 2003:26, 48).  Nonetheless, she posits that the two 
ought to be treated as distinct analytic concepts.  In this way she hopes to ensure 
that struggles for redistribution do not get lost in what she perceives as a trend 
towards emphasis on recognition in identity politics.   
 
Fraser treats recognition as a cultural matter and redistribution as economic.  Their 
separation for critical analytical purposes brings both to the fore, so that addressing 
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redistribution claims, for example, does not unintentionally cause misrecognition 
(Fraser 2003:63).  Fraser (2003:65) provides an example: 
 
Redistributive policies have misrecognition effects when 
background patterns of cultural value skew the meaning of 
economic reforms, when, for example, a pervasive cultural 
devaluation of female caregiving inflects support for single-mother 
families as „getting something for nothing‟.  In this context, welfare 
reform cannot succeed unless it is joined with struggles for cultural 
change aimed at revaluing caregiving and the feminine associations 
that code it.  In short, no redistribution without recognition. (her 
emphasis) 
 
Honneth claims he does not overlook redistribution; however, while he does explain 
redistribution struggles within his recent work on the theory of recognition 
(Honneth 2003:141-2), he did not give redistribution the same degree of 
significance when he outlined his tripartite framework in his influential earlier 
work, The Struggle for Recognition (1995).  In contrast, one of the strengths of 
Fraser‟s argument is her explicit focus on redistribution as a concept that is both 
distinct and closely intermingled with recognition. 
 
In addition, Fraser offers a clear normative framework with which to judge how 
claims for recognition and redistribution are addressed.  Just policy responses ought 
to be transformative rather than affirmative (Fraser 2003:74).  Affirmative measures 
seek to address the inequitable outcomes of misrecognition and maldistribution.  
Transformative measures, by contrast, tackle the root causes.  Transformative 
approaches to recognition attempt to break down the categories into which people 
are classified and from which misrecognition stems (Fraser 2003:74).  For example, 
the binary categories of tax-payer/welfare recipient would be reconceived in 
recognition of the fact that most citizens both pay taxes and receive welfare support.  
This could have positive benefits for redistribution.  If we no longer regard welfare 
as a transfer of money from the tax-payer to the welfare recipient, but as a pool into 
which we all contribute and from which all benefit, we might be more willing to 
distribute the resources equitably.   Fraser (2003:77) argues that transformative 
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approaches to maldistribution tend to be universalistic and solidaristic with positive 
recognition effects. 
 
Fraser and Honneth‟s disagreements on this issue are many and lie deep and I have 
hardly touched on them here.
11
  Nonetheless, both contribute to our understanding 
of recognition.  Honneth does this by articulating the psychological dimensions of 
recognition and by demonstrating how struggles for recognition occur not just 
within distinct spheres, but also over the boundaries between them; Fraser does it by 
providing a framework that separates redistribution from recognition for the purpose 
of analysis.  Sennett‟s work expands on and provides greater insight into the lack of 
respect which results from dependency in the public realm.  In exploring the 
operation of modes of recognition for those who find it hardest to attain, he explains 
how mutual respect could lead to a better system of welfare and a more responsive, 
kinder welfare bureaucracy. 
 
Ruth Lister brings many of these arguments together in relation to welfare.  She 
notes, for instance, that the UK tendency towards redistribution „by stealth‟, while 
benefiting many families living in poverty, does little to create public support for 
the need for such policies (Lister 2001:98).  Moreover, a successful approach to 
redistribution would, Lister (2001:102) contends, entail striving for equality of 
respect.  In this she is arguing for an extension of the redrawing of the boundaries 
between Honneth‟s spheres of solidarity and legal rights.  Our status should be 
determined more by our equality as citizens and less by our differentiation in terms 
of achievement.  The opposite case is put by others, such as Peter Saunders (2003), 
who considers that achievement contributes too little to our status and that the 
welfare state undermines rather than enables us because it does not require us to 
derive more of our status from our individual achievements, particularly in 
employment.  Lister (2002b:105) counters, drawing on Honneth, that it is rights 
which are essential to our maintenance of self-respect: we require both the self-
respect which derives from our legal status, and the self-esteem which we gain 
through individual achievement.   
                                                 
11
 For more points of disagreement and also agreement see Thompson (2005) and the introduction to 
Fraser and Honneth (2003). 
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Conclusion 
It is evident that the place of care in the Australian welfare regime is shifting and 
diminishing.  While the trend in the Australian welfare regime throughout the 
twentieth century had been to gradually expand eligibility for income support on the 
basis of parental care-giving responsibilities, in the final years of the century and the 
first years of the twenty-first century, eligibility was contracted.  The 
implementation of Australians Working Together meant some parents could no 
longer provide full-time care, and Welfare to Work continued and reinforced this 
trend.  This direction in welfare policy stands in contrast to the calls for welfare 
regimes to better recognise care; expanding the notion of „work‟ because „other 
forms of work such as volunteering and community work, as well as care work, do 
not really count, even if lip service is paid to their value‟ (Lister 2002b:100).  Like 
Williams and Popay (1999), Lister (2002b:103) notes that people living in poverty 
and people claiming welfare have little opportunity to voice their own needs and the 
state grants their own interpretation of their needs little recognition.  In this context, 
mothers claiming welfare payments struggle for respect and for recognition of care. 
 
While care and recognition are very different theoretical fields both have a great 
deal to contribute to research on welfare and parenting; particularly regarding 
recognition for care; care as work, as a social and emotional activity, and as a social 
contribution.  The notion of social care provides a framework in which to analyse 
care as a form of labour which takes place both in the public and the private world 
and moves, sometimes daily, between the two.  The welfare state and the labour 
market both influence how and where care is practised.  Most notably, the increased 
participation of women in employment and policy makers‟ new concern with the 
employability of welfare claimants is leaving less time for unpaid care in the home, 
but not necessarily opening opportunities for this care to be provided elsewhere 
(Daly and Lewis 2000:288; Hancock 2002).  The claims for recognition of parents 
in this study are, however, not only based on their status as carers.  As welfare 
recipients, they experience particular forms of disrespect.  These can be damaging 
and painful, as recognition is vital to our sense of self.  Instead, we could reconsider 
the relationship between welfare recipients and the state as one which could be 
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based on mutual recognition, and so recognise both welfare recipients‟ autonomy 
and the value of their unpaid care work. 
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Chapter two 
‘They should live on the pension for a month.’ 
Exploring the everyday lives of Parenting Payment recipients 
 
 
[Welfare recipients] need to go back to the workforce and 
everything but the government is making it tough.  They [the 
government] should live on the pension for a month, live in housing 
commission, or lose a loved one who was the breadwinner. (Pam) 
 
Pam‟s objection was one I often heard.  A number of the mothers I interviewed said 
that politicians, bureaucrats and policy makers did not understand what it was like 
managing on income support complaining that policies did not adequately meet 
their needs and were designed to address an agenda that did not always match with 
their own.  In this chapter, I respond to these complaints by setting out the important 
policy matters that mothers see in their day-to-day lives.  I investigate how the 
participants in this study saw the key issues for themselves at the nexus of 
parenting, welfare receipt and employment.  Their articulation of the issues shapes 
this thesis.  I intersperse this discussion with quantitative evidence that describes the 
population of parents in receipt of income support and their circumstances.  This 
chapter focuses on the first two of Williams and Popay‟s levels of analysis: the 
welfare subject and the social topography of enablement and constraint.  The 
former, the welfare subject, includes people‟s accounting for and understanding of 
their own experiences, their identities and their agency (Williams and Popay 
1999:180-181).  The chapter explores how people view themselves and how they 
creatively negotiate their way.  Their capacity to do this is related to the second 
level of analysis, enablement and constraint – how risks, opportunities and resources 
are distributed throughout society.   
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This chapter begins the process of connecting mothers‟ personal experience with 
their environment: their employment opportunities, their caring obligations, their 
financial situation and the policies with which they engage.  I introduce the mothers 
I interviewed for this study and they explain their diverse understandings of good 
mothering and the importance of care.  Care, in all the senses described by Fisher 
and Tronto (1990) – caring about, caring for, caregiving and care receiving – is part 
of mothers‟ daily lives.  Mothers provide care differently and place different 
emphasis on different aspects of care, but the strength of their commitment to care 
underpins the other aspects of their lives.  I explore how their decisions about 
employment and study are underpinned by their understandings of care and how 
these understandings lead to what Duncan and Edwards (1999) term gendered, 
moral, rational decisions.  
 
Next, I draw together some of the evidence about Parenting Payment to present a 
more generalised picture of claimants, their backgrounds and their activities.  In 
particular, I examine levels of participation in employment, education and voluntary 
work, which are very high among Parenting Payment recipients.  For some, 
however, taking part in such activities is difficult, and I investigate the range of 
factors which might inhibit or facilitate mothers‟ participation.  At the end of the 
chapter, I draw on interviews with mothers to explore the matters they regarded as 
difficult or most needing change in their experience of Australia‟s income support 
system.  In doing so, I am pursuing an epistemological commitment to begin policy 
analysis with the everyday lives of mothers, adopting a methodology which asks 
how the policy problem is presented (Bacchi 1999) – here asking mothers to 
identify the policy problem.  The problems mothers highlighted were poverty, the 
„hassles‟ and confusion of bureaucratic requirements and the significance of 
personal interactions with staff for their experience of welfare receipt. 
Good mothering 
The mothers I interviewed had varied understandings of what constitutes good 
mothering.  Mothers‟ commitment to their children has both personal costs and 
profound rewards.  The love and pride they felt observing their children grow and 
develop was strong.  Erica said of her life with her son: 
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It‟s a good life, I must say.  It‟s a very satisfying life and it‟s good 
to see him doing well – the effort paying off despite a lot of hurdles. 
 
Like Erica, many other mothers spoke of the pleasure they took in their children‟s 
lives.  Pam told me that as a result of her son‟s involvement in a car accident six 
years before I met her, „I had to put my life on hold, basically, to help my son live 
independently like he is now‟.  Pam was proud of the independence her son had 
achieved and satisfied with the results of her work, while acknowledging that this 
had come at the cost of developing other areas of her life.  Naomi slowed her 
progress in her studies and reduced her income so that she could provide her son 
with more support when his transition from primary to high school proved difficult: 
 
So this year I decided I would be more available for him.  I stopped 
working weekends, because he just hadn‟t had me around on 
weekends.  And I‟ve done that and it‟s great. I had to get a tutor for 
him, I had to put more energy into him than anything, and it was 
absolutely worth it.  I mean it would be worth it if my studies took 
me another four years, I don‟t care, because this is fundamental, for 
a child to have a parent there.   
  
Part of the satisfaction these mothers felt in their children‟s development arose 
because they viewed parenting as work involving effort and skill.  Pam‟s son had 
been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), but his 
condition had improved over time, as had Pam‟s ability to help him during his 
„outbursts‟: 
 
You can tell he is a lot better, but once every month or once every 
two months there could be an outburst.  But I am able to calm him 
down a lot better than before.   
 
Pam developed skills specific to her son‟s needs.  She learned how to respond to his 
hyperactivity and which techniques and approaches best helped him to become 
calm.  She has acquired a particular set of skills tailored to her son.  The skills 
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required for mothering are deployed in a range of activities, from specific tasks to 
the labour involved in piecing together an entire patchwork of care (Balbo 1987:55; 
Fisher and Tronto 1990:41).  Like Pam, the other mothers in this study developed 
their parenting ability over time.  The time they felt they needed to mother their 
children and the time involved in refining relevant skills affected mothers‟ decisions 
about other activities in their lives.  This is apparent in the cases of Pam and Naomi 
above.  Both Pam and Naomi felt the need to be available for their children, but 
their understanding of what this meant was very different.  For Pam, it meant being 
at home full time; for Naomi, it meant being at home on the weekend.  
Mothers’ gendered moral rationalities 
Mothers‟ decisions regarding employment and study were informed by their 
understanding of what was best for their families and how they viewed good 
motherhood.
12
  In each family, different factors and different beliefs led to different 
decisions.  Parents have very different understandings of children‟s needs.  An 
Australian study of parents who were not in paid work in the late 1990s asked how 
old they felt their children would need to be before they returned to employment.  
The answers ranged from one year through to high school (Wilson et al. 1999:13).  
These responses reflect not only the differing interpretations of children‟s needs at 
different ages, but also the fact that some children require more care than others due 
to disabilities, problems at school, mental health issues and so on.  These differing 
understandings, which occur within the constraints and opportunities afforded by 
the social and economic environment in which mothers live, can be analysed in 
three clusters of mothering and employment orientations. 
 
For the first group, being a good mother involves being physically present for their 
children (Duncan and Edwards 1999:120).  In such cases, personally providing care 
is of such moral importance that it overrides any financial benefits which might be 
gained from employment.  Pam, for example, explained being available for her son 
                                                 
12
 As I explain in chapter four, among the mothers I interviewed, most of those who were working 
were already employed prior to the introduction of Australians Working Together, so the new policy 
did not feature in most of their employment decisions.  Some mothers entered into programs of study 
following their adviser meeting, but while Australians Working Together was a factor in these 
decisions, it did not carry the same weight as the women‟s understanding of good motherhood, their 
family‟s best interests and the benefits of employment. 
 57 
meant putting „her life on hold‟.  For Pam, her son‟s need for her as a mother 
precluded the possibility of employment.   
 
For the second group, employment forms a distinct part of their lives from which 
they derive personal satisfaction.  Cheryl, for example, said: 
 
I was working full time in school holidays, which I just didn‟t think 
was very fair to my children … they‟d already lost one parent, they 
didn‟t need to lose another one to a business.  So I ended up giving 
it up, and didn‟t end up working for six months at all. But I found 
that I‟m not that type of person.  I need to do something in my life 
to fulfil my life.   
 
Cheryl felt the need to be present for her children, so as not to be „lost‟ to them like 
their father who had died, but she felt she needed employment to feel personally 
fulfilled.  Eventually she found she could accommodate both needs by taking up 
dog-minding, a job she could do in her own home, and house-cleaning, which she 
could do when her children were at school.  Cheryl could be understood in Duncan 
and Edwards‟ (1999:120) terms as „primarily [a] worker‟.  By this Duncan and 
Edwards do not suggest that those who are strongly oriented towards employment 
are any less committed to their parenting, but rather that it is important to them to 
retain a sense of themselves as workers in addition to being mothers.  They have a 
dual moral commitment to the well being of children and the well being they 
personally derive from employment. 
 
A third group are those who feel that their own training and employment is 
beneficial for their children and therefore part of their responsibilities as parents.  
Mothers who see employment as an important element in their parenting are 
described by Duncan and Edwards (2003:313) as „mother/worker integral‟.  They 
seek to offer an example to children either as employee role models or as financial 
providers – or both.  A number of mothers I interviewed had studied while receiving 
welfare payments to ensure they would have access to good employment (and a 
good income) in the future, something which they felt they and their children 
needed.  Belle, for example, studied from first-year university through to the 
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completion of a PhD while receiving Parenting Payment.  She told me how she felt 
after her graduation when she worked full time for a semester, supporting herself 
and her son with her earnings: 
 
For me I was pleased that I could at least support myself, and I had 
worked towards that.  And on my own too.  Not like waiting bloody 
tables or doing something, not sacrificing myself or my child, but 
trying to make sure that we both prosper, spiritually and 
intellectually and as a family.  And for me that has been the most 
important thing and Parenting Payment, bless our system, permitted 
me that.  And it allowed me to pursue and to reach towards another 
kind of life.  I mean it wasn‟t easy, it really wasn‟t easy, but I‟ve 
got somewhere.   
 
All the parents I interviewed showed evidence of being guided by „gendered moral 
rationalities‟ in their decisions about employment, education and income support.  
The good of their children, however they understood it, was at the heart of these 
decisions.  The high value which parents place on care is evident in quantitative 
studies, too. Among Parenting Payment recipients, 83 per cent say that the child 
care they provide is the most important activity they do, in comparison with 
employment, education, other forms of care and other unpaid activities (Saunders et 
al. 2003:66).   
Parenting teenagers 
Mothers‟ understandings of their children‟s needs were informed by the particular 
circumstances of their children.  For the mothers I interviewed, this meant taking 
account of the specific care needs of teenagers.  Many mothers observed that 
parenting teenage children posed unique challenges, due to the significant 
transitions which occurred for this age group, such as starting high school and going 
through puberty, and also because there was a risk that teenagers might, as Pam 
described it, „go off the rails‟.  Belle said, „A kid hits puberty and it‟s like handling 
a two-year-old [but] with vocabulary, and testosterone as a boy.  They are as needy 
as small ones are.‟  Erica perceived that Australians Working Together contained: 
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… an assumption that a child that age is less work.  Now I can tell 
you, maybe, but not necessarily so … A child that age is less work 
in terms of, you know, the basic feeding and that type of thing, but 
we are dealing with adolescents, my god, adolescents! 
 
Mothers‟ commitment to parenting shaped their decisions about employment and 
study.  Cheryl, for example, said: 
 
Ultimately I would actually like to go back to university and 
become a child counsellor.  That‟s my ultimate goal.  I‟m waiting 
for another year or two, till my son‟s gone through that rebellious 
stage, which is normally about the 15/16-year-old mark that you 
generally find your child loses the plot a little bit, and I want to be 
there to pull him back into tow. 
 
Belle‟s son‟s needs as a teenage boy were part of the reason she worked in casual, 
part-time jobs: „I am still available to the child, and you need to be‟.  Erica, by 
observing her son‟s peers, felt that her son had benefited from the time she spent 
with him rather than in employment. 
 
A lot of his form friends at primary school, well that is an 
exaggeration, a decent percentage of them, have fallen apart ... 
We‟re talking drugs, we‟re talking truancy, we‟re talking total 
messes.  And the common denominator I see in all of it is parental 
involvement or lack thereof.  And they may be a lot better off 
financially than I am, but you know, I made the right decisions. 
Additional care responsibilities 
Many mothers care responsibilities extend beyond the ordinary day-to-day care 
needed by teenage children.  For some, health poses particular additional 
challenges.  As already indicated, a number of the mothers I interviewed had 
children with special health or support needs.  These ranged from behavioural 
problems and ADHD to intellectual disability, depression and diabetes.  Helen‟s son 
was diagnosed with diabetes a few months before I first interviewed her.  When I 
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met her again nine months later, she explained the enormous effect it had on their 
lives. 
 
The first year was hell … The first six months is horrendous and 
then the following six months is still pretty hard and then after a 
year you can kind of, you know, they can live normally.  But it 
takes about that long for your lifestyle to [adapt] and it is just a big 
change.  And definitely for the first six months there is no way I 
could have done anything else. 
 
For others the additional needs of their children were ongoing.  For example, Ana‟s 
18 year old daughter required her mother‟s support due to intellectual disability, and 
Erica‟s son, who has ADHD, would not eat or complete homework without her 
supervision.  As lone mothers, they largely managed their children‟s needs alone. 
 
Many also needed to manage their own poor health or disability.  Nearly all the 
mothers in this study had current or recent health problems.  Alia has severe asthma 
which has stopped her from attending English classes because, with no private 
transport and too little money for public transport, she cannot endure the long walk 
to class.  Grace and Helen had depression when I interviewed them; Nicole has had 
depression and is wary it might re-emerge.  Kumiko said she was „tired all the time‟, 
her doctors could not find a cause but suggested that it could derive from the stress 
of managing on her own after leaving a violent relationship, and her almost daily 
use of chemicals in her art course.  This fatigue has not stopped her full-time study, 
but it makes it hard.  Margaret had stopped work while she received treatment for 
her recently diagnosed cancer.  Mary attends counselling to manage the ongoing 
consequences of the trauma she experienced as a refugee: leaving her homeland 
where her husband died and her house was burned down while her family was in it.  
Fleeing the country she lost contact with two of her children, before spending years 
in refugee camps where she felt unsafe.  Only four of the 16 mothers in this study, 
Tara, Naomi, Caroline and Cheryl, did not need to manage difficulties with their 
own health or that of their children.   
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Ill-health and disability are common among Parenting Payment claimants, 
particularly among sole mothers. Butterworth (2003:26) found that nearly half of all 
Parenting Payment Single claimants have problems with physical health or 
disability and the same proportion reported mental health problems (see table 1 
below).  Also, nearly half had experienced sexual or physical violence.  These 
incidences are much higher than among mothers in general.  Parenting Payment 
Partnered claimants faced these issues at rates only slightly higher than among non-
claimant mothers.  Parenting Payment Single recipients are also considerably more 
likely to face a combination of problems (mental health issues, substance abuse, 
physical ill-health or disability, and experience of violence) than other mothers 
(Butterworth 2003:27-28).   
 
Table 1. Incidence of mental or physical ill-health and disability, and experience of 
violence among mothers 
 
 Parenting Payment 
single claimants 
(%) 
Parenting Payment 
Partnered 
claimants (%) 
Non-claimant 
mothers 
(%) 
Mental health 
problems 
47 27 22 
Physical condition 
or disability 
47 33 32 
Physical or sexual 
violence 
47 23 21 
Source: Adapted from Butterworth 2003:26 
 
In addition to caring for their immediate family, some mothers also provide care for 
extended family.  Erica and Cheryl cared for family members as well as their own 
children.  Erica‟s mother, who lived in interstate, was admitted to hospital.  This 
placed sudden demands on Erica.  She explained: 
 
So I am in that position where I have got an 84 year old mother and 
a son who is still at school … I am not day-to-day caring for my 
mother, but I am sort of her closest in terms of that [everyday care], 
so it is a bit odd.  It is actually difficult doing it by distance … 
Emotionally difficult, but it is also expensive, it‟s terrible. What a 
position to be put in, „Sorry Mum, can you ring back after 7pm? It‟s 
cheaper‟.  You can‟t do that, you‟ve just got to speak.   
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Saunders et al. (2003:34) report that four per cent of Parenting Payment Single and 
nine per cent of Partnered claimants were engaged in the care of an adult during the 
fortnight they were surveyed.   
 
In summary, the mothers receiving Parenting Payment who participated in this 
study placed a very high value on the care they provided to their children and were 
strongly committed to these responsibilities.  Their understandings of how to be a 
good mother and how to provide good care varied considerably, but the lives of all 
the mothers I interviewed revolved around care.  The kind of care they provided 
also varied, partly because of their different understandings, but also because of the 
particular care needs of their children and sometimes those of other family members 
too.  Most of the mothers I interviewed had problems with ill-health or disability 
and many also had children with high care needs.  Taking care of their own and 
their children‟s health was time consuming and demanding.  Sometimes most of a 
mother‟s energy and time was used in the provision of such care. 
 
The availability of Parenting Payment makes a mother‟s decision to put care first a 
viable one, as she can supplement any employment income with income support.  
Erica goes so far as to say that financial support from Parenting Payment 
contributed to her ability to parent as well as she could: 
 
So it is helpful to think I have done the very best, but I couldn‟t 
have done it without Parenting Payment help. 
Parenting Payment claimants 
I did not directly ask mothers about stereotypes of welfare recipients or lone 
parenthood, but several of them identified what they described as widespread 
assumptions or generalised attitudes.  Helen, like a number of mothers, spoke of a 
very specific Parenting Payment stereotype:  
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There‟s also that mentality about Charlene in the western suburbs 
[of Sydney] having 12 children so that she can get 30 dollars a 
fortnight more.  I mean, give me a break.   
 
Tara discussed the same image: „They think all single mothers are living in the 
western suburbs and having children with lots of men.‟  Cheryl said people regard 
her as „just a single mum.  You know, “You‟re not doing anything for yourself, to 
better yourself.”‟  The stereotypes these women identified depict Parenting Payment 
claimants as single; with large numbers of children; wanting to claim income 
support in preference to employment, and even deliberately having children in order 
to increase their level of payment; unmotivated; and not seeking to improve their 
prospects for financial self-reliance.  There is a class element too, as working-class 
families have traditionally been associated with the western suburbs of Sydney and 
Charlene is seen as a stereotypical working-class name. 
 
Familiarity with national rhetorics which stigmatise lone motherhood and income 
support claimants is widespread among sole mothers (Duncan and Edwards 
1999:42-45).  The interview extracts presented above make reference to several 
elements of this national stigmatising language.  Australian conservative 
commentary has expressed concern about the high cost of sole-parent families 
resulting from rising numbers of income support claimants (Reekie 1998:63).  
Parenting Payment is presented as encouraging women to have children, and 
therefore both costly to the state and supportive of morally problematic behaviour.   
 
So who are the parents who claim income support?  There is considerable evidence 
available in Australia providing basic demographic descriptions of Parenting 
Payment claimants and establishing their rates of employment, study or other 
occupations: the kinds of employment-oriented activities sought under Australians 
Working Together.  There is much less evidence on the nature of mothers‟ 
employment, the benefits that work does or does not provide, the other unpaid work 
in which mothers engage and parents‟ perspectives on the needs and aspirations of 
Parenting Payment claimants.  I will set out some of the evidence on mothers‟ 
employment and other activities here and then, throughout the thesis, drawing on 
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my own research and that of others, I paint a picture filling some of the gaps in 
evidence. 
A demography of Parenting Payment  
The popular perception that most parents receiving income support are women is 
accurate.  Most Parenting Payment claimants are mothers and the majority are lone 
mothers.  In 2003, slightly less than three-quarters of claimants received Parenting 
Payment Single and close to 29 per cent received Parenting Payment Partnered 
(FACSIA 2006:56,58).  Women made up 92 per cent of the first group and 90 per 
cent of the second group.   
 
The common belief that parents on income support have large numbers of children 
was identified by several interviewees.  It was connected to myths about teen 
pregnancy.  However, most Parenting Payment recipients have just one or two 
children: the average number of children aged less than 13 living with Parenting 
Payment Single recipients is 1.4 (Barrett 2001:14).  Parents whose youngest child is 
in their teen years form a small proportion of claimants.  The largest proportion has 
children who are preschool-aged.  Far from being teenagers, claimants are most 
commonly aged in their early thirties (FACSIA 2006:52).   
 
The majority of Parenting Payment recipients are locally born.  Australia is the 
country of birth for 80 per cent of Parenting Payment Single claimants; five per cent 
of these are Indigenous (Barrett 2001:14; FACSIA 2006:57).  A much smaller 
proportion of Parenting Payment Partnered recipients were born in Australia, just 64 
per cent (FACSIA 2006:53).  Sole parents born overseas most commonly 
immigrated from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Vietnam and Lebanon; 
partnered parents came from Vietnam, the UK, Lebanon and China (FACSIA 
2006:57,59).   
 
In the financial year 2003-2004, Parenting Payment Single was paid to nearly 
450,000 claimants (FACS 2004:table 48).  This was an increase from 313,500 sole 
parents who claimed assistance in June 1994 (FACSIA, 2006:56).  In contrast, the 
number of partnered claimants declined each year after Parenting Payment 
Partnered was created, from 236,550 in June 1998 to 181,500 in June 2003.  Paul 
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Henman and Julia Perry (2002) have demonstrated that the number of social 
security claimants rose due to a complex of demographic and policy reasons.  
Widespread demographic changes have led to more single person or single-parent 
households in Australia, so that more individuals are eligible to claim assistance.  In 
addition, income support policies have introduced equity measures so that both 
members of couple households can claim support, rather than the male „head‟ of the 
household claiming for his partner.  Finally, welfare rules were amended to allow 
more people to combine employment and income support.  These measures were 
intended to encourage a higher employment rate among recipients, in the belief that 
it would lead to financial self-reliance, and to address the high rates of poverty 
among welfare claimants, including Parenting Payment recipients.   
Education and voluntary work 
Parenting Payment claimants are engaged in a range of activities in addition to 
caring for their children and other family members.  Among Single claimants, this 
activity is most commonly employment, whereas Partnered claimants are most 
likely to be doing voluntary work (see table 2).  I will focus here on parents‟ 
education and voluntary work and explore employment and job search in detail in 
the following section. 
 
Table 2. Activities of Parenting Payment recipients in one fortnight 
 
 Single (%) Partnered (%) 
Paid work 35.1 16.6 
Self employment 7.4 12.3 
Job search 22.7 11.8 
Study 15.7 9.8 
Volunteer work 22.7 30.1 
Sample: Single n=208, partnered n=204. Source: Saunders et al. 2003:34 
 
As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, for some mothers, entering into education 
was a way to further their own and their children‟s wellbeing.  In their 1998 study, 
Saunders et al. (2003:34) found that fortnightly activities included study for 16 per 
cent of Parenting Payment Single and 10 per cent of Partnered recipients (see table 
2.2 above).  They spent an average of 31 hours in study each fortnight (Saunders et 
al. 2003:46).  More than half of the group were studying towards an undergraduate 
or postgraduate degree and a quarter towards a pre-vocational qualification 
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(Saunders et al. 2003:54).  Like the mothers in my research who were studying, they 
were motivated by a desire to improve their employment prospects (56 per cent) or 
to attain a better qualification (34 per cent).  Another study found that very high 
proportions of Parenting Payment claimants who were not employed or studying at 
the time they were surveyed said they would like to participate in education.  More 
than half of the Partnered claimants and more than a third of the Single claimants 
said they would „like to be studying now‟ (Carlile et al. 2002:136). 
 
A number of Parenting Payment claimants volunteer their services each fortnight.  
This is most common for Partnered recipients, among whom nearly a third engaged 
in voluntary work, while just over a fifth of Single recipients volunteered (Saunders 
et al. 2003:34).  Parenting Payment recipients spent an average 12 hours in 
voluntary work each fortnight (Saunders et al. 2003:46).  This was far higher than 
among non-claimant parents who averaged three to four hours per fortnight (Carlile 
et al. 2002:139).  Often their voluntary work takes place at schools or other 
educational institutions (45 per cent), but they also work for welfare and community 
organisations (21 per cent) and sports and recreation groups (19 per cent) (Saunders 
et al. 2003:55).  Unlike education, their voluntary work was rarely motivated by a 
desire to improve their employment prospects.  Only one in ten said they 
volunteered for the employment experience.  Instead, most parents volunteered to 
help out in the community and help other people (69 per cent), out of personal 
interest (35 per cent) or as a way to keep active and meet people (26 per cent).  
These data show that the level of motivation and participation in study and 
voluntary work is high among Parenting Payment recipients, in contrast to the 
stereotypes outlined above.    
Employment  
While the stereotypical lone mother described by Tara and Helen was not in 
employment, evidence shows that rates of maternal employment, including lone 
mother employment have increased.  From 1983 to 2002, lone mother employment 
rose from 32 per cent to 48 per cent; partnered mothers‟ employment increased from 
42 per cent to 63 per cent (Gray et al. 2003:1).  Despite following the same trend 
towards greater rates of employment, lone and couple mothers have entered 
different types of work.  Mothers in couples have increased both their rates of full-
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time and part-time employment, whereas for lone mothers the majority of their 
increased employment has been in part-time jobs (Gray et al. 2003:3).  These 
employment rates rose in a period when there were no compulsory employment-
oriented requirements for mothers claiming income support.   
 
Tara, Erica, Naomi and Caroline are examples of mothers in employment.  All have 
long employment histories.  They, like many mothers, and like many lone mothers, 
have found employment they can maintain while also caring for their families.  Tara 
worked selling tickets at the races for 27 years, but when her sons started school, 
she took other work so that she could be near them, and now combines a job in 
after-school care with work as a teacher‟s aide.  Erica works for a consultancy firm 
from home.  Naomi was starting her own business when I last met her, but before 
that she had worked in a nursing home while completing her university studies.  
Caroline has worked cleaning houses for many years and recently started in a 
position in a nursing home. 
 
These mothers are part of the large proportion of Parenting Payment recipients who 
are engaged in paid work.  The HILDA survey shows that in one week in 2004, 33.5 
per cent of Parenting Payment recipients were employed and 46 per cent had been 
employed sometime in the previous financial year (HILDA, my analysis, see 
appendix three).  These figures are supported by other research findings.  For 
example, in just one fortnight 35 per cent of lone parents receiving Parenting 
Payment were employed, as were 17 per cent of partnered claimants (Saunders et al. 
2003:34,46).  Parenting Payment Single claimants are employed at a higher rate 
than any other category of income support recipients in Australia.  The partners of 
Parenting Payment Partnered claimants are also connected to employment.  Just 
under half of Parenting Payment Partnered recipients have a partner who is earning 
a very low income (43 per cent) and a similar proportion have a partner who is 
seeking work and receiving unemployment benefits in the meantime (46 per cent) 
(FACSIA 2006:53). 
 
There is evidence that the labour market is not providing the employment 
opportunities that parents are seeking.  Parenting Payment Single claimants who are 
employed work for an average of 26.5 hours per fortnight (Saunders et al. 
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2003:34,46).  Many would like to have more work.  Twenty per cent of lone 
mothers working part time would prefer to be working full time, whereas for couple 
mothers the equivalent figure is just eight per cent (Gray et al. 2003:17).  Gray et al. 
(2003:17) suggest that, when considered alongside the decline in the rate of full-
time employment among lone mothers in the decade to 1996, this preference 
demonstrates that many lone mothers are not finding the full-time employment for 
which they wish, and are taking part-time employment as a second option.  Lone 
parents work hours which they consider to be insufficient for a long time; the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics calculated that lone parents had been underemployed 
for a mean period of 98 weeks, a median of 43 weeks (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2004:15).  Many of these would receive Parenting Payment to supplement 
their income.  It is common for Parenting Payment Single recipients to spend long 
periods of time combining stable employment with receipt of income support 
(Flatau and Dockery 2001:56,58).   
 
Casual employment is more common than permanent employment among Parenting 
Payment beneficiaries than it is among other parents.  Forty-four per cent of 
Parenting Payment recipients were working in casual jobs in 2004, compared to 26 
per cent of other mothers and just seven per cent of fathers (HILDA, my analysis, 
see appendix three).  Belle is one such person.  Since completing postgraduate 
studies she has been seeking a permanent academic position, without success.  
Instead she has worked in a series of casual, part-time jobs, which offer fewer hours 
and less security than she would wish.  She explained that „the worst period is 
December, January, February‟ because there is little work available outside of the 
academic year.   
Unemployment and barriers to employment 
Among those Parenting Payment recipients not in employment, many are seeking 
jobs.  Close to two-thirds (63 per cent) of the Parenting Payment Single claimants 
who took part in the pilot Australians Working Together program would have 
preferred to be in employment and 40 per cent had looked for a job in the previous 
two months (Carlile et al. 2002:115).  All participants were selected for the study 
because they were not then working.  Nearly half (48 per cent) of Parenting 
Payment Partnered claimants wanted employment and almost a third (32 per cent) 
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had been seeking it.  A 1998 survey sought information about job search among 
Parenting Payment recipients in the previous fortnight.  Twenty-three per cent of 
Single and 12 per cent of Partnered recipients reported recent searches for 
employment (Saunders et al. 2003:34).  HILDA data show that in the survey week 
in 2004, 11 per cent of Parenting Payment claimants were unemployed, compared to 
3.8 per cent of other mothers and 1.6 per cent of fathers (HILDA, my analysis, see 
appendix three).  This indicates that Parenting Payment recipients who are not 
employed are looking for work at a far higher rate than their non-claimant 
counterparts.  They are looking for jobs and not finding them.   
 
A lack of employment experience and training is frequently regarded by Parenting 
Payment recipients as an impediment to their employment.  Dockery and Strombeck 
(2004:438), reporting on an evaluation study of the pilot Australians Working 
Together program, found that 50 per cent of claimants who were not employed said 
that they did not have the necessary work skills to find a job.  Mothers who claim 
Parenting Payment are more likely than other mothers to have no employment 
experience at all.  Four per cent of those receiving Parenting Payment Single, six 
per cent of mothers claiming Parenting Payment Partnered and just one per cent of 
non-recipient mothers had never been in paid employment (Butterworth 2003:26). 
 
The level of education completed by Parenting Payment recipients tends to be lower 
than among mothers in general.  The Social Research Centre (2005a:5) reports that 
nearly two-thirds of Parenting Payment claimants with children aged 13-15 had not 
completed secondary school.  Pam, Helen, Ana, Zahra and Alia all fit within this 
group, and Ana and Pam said they had no formal education at all.  Twelve per cent 
had completed high school and a further 13 per cent had a vocational or trade 
qualification (Social Research Centre 2005a:5).  Erica, Naomi, Grace and Belle are 
all tertiary educated; a level of qualification held by 14 per cent of Parenting 
Payment claimants (Social Research Centre 2005a:5).  This improves their 
employment prospects.  On the other hand, mothers who left secondary school 
before they were 17 are less likely to be in the labour force; that is, they are less 
likely to be either employed or looking for employment than mothers who stayed 
longer in education (Gray et al. 2003:11).  Both solo mothers and partnered mothers 
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who have post-secondary qualifications are more likely to be in employment than 
mothers who have spent less time in education (Gray et al. 2003:12).  
 
English language proficiency is very closely tied to labour force status for both 
couple and solo mothers.  In both groups, mothers with poor spoken English skills 
are far less likely to be in the labour force.  Gray et al. (2003:11) estimate that fifty-
seven per cent of couple mothers and 73 per cent of solo mothers with poor English 
ability are not in the labour force
13
 (see table 3 below).  There were also very high 
rates of unemployment among mothers from non-English speaking backgrounds.  
At six per cent, couple mothers who speak English poorly are nearly three times as 
likely to be unemployed as those who speak English as their first language.  The 
unemployment rate for solo mothers is 16 per cent for those who speak English 
poorly, even higher at 20 per cent among mothers for whom English is their second 
language but who speak it well, and only ten per cent among sole mothers for whom 
English is their only language.  This shows that many mothers from non-English 
speaking backgrounds are seeking employment, but they are often not successful in 
their search.   
 
Table 3. Predicted labour force status of solo and couple mothers by language 
proficiency, 1996 
 
 Full time Part time Unemployed Not in 
labour force 
Couple mothers     
Speaks English only 24.7 40.4 2.0 33.0 
Speaks English well 28.6 30.6 3.1 37.6 
Speaks English 
poorly 
20.9 16.5 5.8 56.8 
Solo mothers     
Speaks English only 20.6 29.4 10.4 39.6 
Speaks English well 13.6 17.3 19.7 49.5 
Speaks English  
poorly 
0.6 9.9 16.1 73.4 
Source: Gray et al. 2003:11, tables 1 and 2. 
 
A large proportion of Parenting Payment recipients are not in the labour force.  In 
2004, in one week, 55 per cent of claimants were not in the labour force, compared 
                                                 
13
 The authors note that the numbers of sole mothers with poor spoken English are small and suggest 
that these estimates be treated with caution (Gray et al. 2003:14). 
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to 34 per cent of mothers as a whole and eight per cent of fathers (HILDA 4.1, my 
analysis.  See appendix three).  Alia is one such mother.  She has three children, 
aged 13, 14 and 17.  All are studying and all live with her and her husband.  She and 
her family moved to Australia from Iraq two years ago.  In Iraq, Alia studied up to 
the equivalent of year nine and since she arrived in Australia has focused on 
learning English.   
 
While Alia has never had employment either in Australia or Iraq, she believes that 
taking a job can be good for women who would otherwise be confined to the home.  
When I asked Alia about her employment prospects, she told me: 
 
If there is suitable work, I will work.  But I think I will have 
problems with the language and veil.  In [my local area], yes, but in 
the city I don‟t think I would find work [because of my veil].  
 
Alia thought that factory work would be a viable option, but is concerned she will 
experience discrimination as a Muslim woman if she leaves her local area.  Like 
Alia, the other women I interviewed who were not employed and not seeking 
employment, found that their ability to seek or take a job was limited by language, 
education, literacy, and their own and their children‟s health. 
 
Mothers such as Pam and Tara felt that they were subject to age discrimination 
when seeking employment.  Pam, who was 42, said, „the older you are, it‟s harder to 
find a job‟.  Tara was concerned the casual work she had hitherto relied upon would 
become less easy to secure, as „Fifty-four is not a very employable age‟.  Age-
related discrimination interacts with gender discrimination to create „gendered-
ageism‟ (Industrial Relations Victoria 2004:ch2,17).  As a result older women are 
less likely to be successful when applying for employment than other candidates.   
 
The high unemployment rates and high rates of women not in the labour force 
suggest that many, perceiving how unlikely they are to find employment, may 
become disheartened and decide to search less frequently, if at all.   
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Among Parenting Payment recipients who are seeking employment, 38 per cent of 
single claimants and 49 per cent of partnered claimants think their job prospects are 
poor (Carlile et al. 2002: 130).  They attribute this to a combination of reasons 
related to the labour market (no jobs, or no suitable jobs), their own skills (lack of 
relevant skills, no recent employment experience, limited English language ability), 
and also the market‟s inability to accommodate them due to their age, family 
responsibilities, ill-health or disability and employer attitudes (see table 4 below).   
 
Table 4. Parenting Payment recipients looking for work and rating their changes as 
poor: Reasons for rating chances as poor 
 
 Single (%) n=83 Partnered (%) n=306 
Do not have skills 45 43 
Own age/too old 30 33 
Family responsibilities 30 20 
Transport problems 25 15 
Too long out of work 24 20 
No suitable jobs 20 22 
No jobs at all 17 12 
Employer attitudes 11 11 
Own illness/ill-health 10 12 
Own disability 2 6 
Language barrier 1 10 
Other reasons 15 35 
Source: Carlile et al. 2002:131 
 
In sum, the majority of Parenting Payment claimants want employment.  There is a 
considerable body of evidence to demonstrate that their rate of employment is high, 
particularly in contrast with other claimant groups.  Those who are working are 
labouring in jobs with shorter hours than they would prefer.  There is also evidence 
that among those who are not in employment, a considerably higher proportion than 
among mothers as a whole are seeking but failing to find paid work.  In this group, 
the unemployed and those who are not in the labour market, there is evidence that 
mothers‟ ability to undertake employment is affected by discrimination on the basis 
of age and gender, limited employment experience, shorter time in education and 
training, their own and their children‟s ill-health, and other caring responsibilities.  
As Parenting Payment Partnered claimants more often come from non-English 
speaking backgrounds, they are more likely to face language barriers to employment 
than Single claimants.  As a result, many mothers have a low opinion of the 
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likelihood of finding paid work.  Nonetheless, three out of four lone parents have a 
job or look for employment at some time each year (Whiteford 2001:83).  This 
stands in stark contrast to the stereotype of the unemployed mother described earlier 
in this chapter.  It also calls into question government officials‟ depiction of 
Parenting Payment claimants as being unwilling to take employment and thereby 
setting a bad example for their children, as I detail in chapter three. 
Key policy issues for mothers claiming Parenting Payment 
I focus now on problems and difficulties the research participants identified with 
regard to welfare and employment.  Given their beliefs about motherhood; their 
activity in employment, education and voluntary work; their ambitions; and the 
constraints they face, as outlined above, what did they consider to be the key policy 
issues?  I do not mean to give the impression that mothers regarded their situation as 
essentially problematic.  Generally they did not.  Rather, I focus on the difficulties 
they discussed to uncover the primary needs mothers identified with regard to 
Parenting Payment.   
Parenting Payment Poverty 
Sole parenthood for most mothers in this study placed substantial limitations on 
their ability to engage in employment.  While most of the mothers were committed 
to employment, if they were to mother in the manner they wished, they had little 
time available in which they could fit paid work.  Naomi, for example, said: 
 
Being a single parent, for most, well, for thirteen years, it‟s meant I 
haven‟t been able to earn.  And not that I have minded not having [a 
partner], it‟s not that.  I mean whether I had a partner or not, I 
would have always wanted to be a mum, because I think it‟s what 
having a child is about – being a parent.  It‟s not as if I wanted to 
run away from my parenting duties, but I appreciate having had the 
pension to support me to help me be able to do that.  But it‟s 
poverty!  Absolute poverty! 
 
As a mother, Naomi wanted to be available for her son but she also wanted to study 
to improve her employment prospects.  By claiming income support, she was able to 
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study and to parent while earning little or no income.  However, the money she 
received barely covered the costs of her household expenses and university fees.  
 
Parents were strongly aware of the resources required to provide care for their 
children: the time, material resources, knowledge and skill identified by Fisher and 
Tronto (1990:41).  Money was the most frequently mentioned of these.  Many 
commented on how much teenagers eat.  The cost of children for low-income 
families rises as children age.  At 2002 rates, the cost of a child aged 13-15 years 
was estimated to be between $43 and $75 per week higher than it was for a child 
aged less than 5, and yet the total combination of Parenting Payment and other 
family assistance for a solo parent with a teenage child was only $1 higher than the 
payments to parents of younger children (Davidson 2003:4-5).  Parents received 
almost the same level of benefits, despite the higher costs of older children. 
 
Alia struggled to care for her family with the Parenting Payment she received, 
although, as she explained, she was grateful that any assistance was available at all. 
 
I like how Centrelink gives payment to families.  But the payments 
are not enough, especially when the children are studying.  Thank 
god they are giving money.  Maybe we are not worthy for a 
payment, in other countries they don‟t give payments. 
 
Alia compares her situation to those of other women in other countries.  She has 
personal experience of this, having migrated to Australia from Iraq just two years 
before we met.  She feels lucky in comparison to women in Iraq and grateful for 
Parenting Payment, but finds the money she receives does not stretch far enough. 
 
Parenting Payment is targeted towards families with the lowest incomes.  Sole-
parent families are amongst the poorest in Australia.  In Australia in 2000, 22 per 
cent of sole-parent families were experiencing poverty; nearly twice the proportion 
of couple families, at 12 per cent
14
 (Community Affairs References Committee 
2004:247-248).  More than half of all Australians who live in poverty live in 
                                                 
14
 Measured at 50 per cent of average income before housing (Community Affairs References 
Committee 2004:223). 
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families that are primarily dependent on government payments as their main source 
of income (Harding and Szukalskz 2000:4).  The Australian Senate Community 
Affairs References Committee (2004:227) found the low value of income support 
payments was partly responsible for the high rates of poverty among sole-parent 
families.   
 
Among the mothers I interviewed, five combined employment with their income 
support payments.  Two of them, Belle and Tara, received an income high enough 
to prevent them claiming Parenting Payment at the time I met with them.  However, 
Belle‟s employment was intermittent and Tara‟s jobs were casual and at times 
unpredictable.  Both relied on Parenting Payment when paid work was insufficient 
or unavailable.  Among the mothers who were not employed when I interviewed 
them, few had any additional source of income: only some received Child Support 
from their children‟s fathers and one received rental income from a small flat in her 
backyard.  It is, then, highly likely that these mothers and their children were living 
in or close to poverty.  This was reflected in their discussions about maintaining 
finely tuned weekly budgets in which every cent counted.  As Nicole put it: „I stress 
week to week‟ about money.  Margaret argued against what she considered a 
stereotypical perception that parents receive generous amounts of income support: 
 
Certainly anyone within the department or anywhere in the universe 
who thinks that it is easy, and that people are having a high time 
and whooping it up on Centrelink payments, haven‟t a clue.  It ain‟t 
easy.  You barely survive.  You are constantly saying to your kids, 
„No, I am sorry, I can‟t afford that.‟  It ain‟t easy. 
 
The difficulty of managing from week to week on a low income is particularly 
marked for families relying on income support.  Analysis of Australian Bureau of 
Statistics data shows that in one year, among families claiming income support, 
two-thirds of lone parents and nearly two-thirds of couple parents could not pay 
their bills on time or needed to seek financial assistance from friends or family 
during the previous year (Bray 2003:7).  Slightly less than half of the lone parents 
and one-third of the couple parents went without heating or meals, or had to sell or 
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pawn their possessions, or sought assistance from community organisations because 
they had insufficient money. 
Reporting income and other Centrelink ‘hassles’ and confusions 
Gendered moral rationalities led some mothers to seek, study towards or take 
employment in response to their very low incomes.  As a result, they were 
constantly balancing the needs of their families with those of their education or paid 
work.  Those who found employment which accommodated their family observed 
that combining a job with income support substantially increases the paperwork and 
reporting for parents.  Some saw the complexity and hassle of welfare rules as the 
policy and implementation area most requiring improvement.  Just prior to my first 
interviews, the requirements for income reporting by Parenting Payment recipients 
changed.  Previously parents had been obliged to present a quarterly income 
statement if they had any earnings.  The new rules asked parents to report their 
earnings every fortnight.  As a recent modification, this rule featured in the 
interviews of a number of those who were employed.  It was not only the new 
system but the complexity of income reporting that parents wanted to discuss.  This 
issue featured strongly in my conversations with Erica. 
 
Erica worked from home and her income changed from week to week depending on 
the hours of work that were required of her.  For Erica, reporting her income to 
Centrelink formed a large part of her relationship with the organisation.  It 
illustrated for her the complexity of the rules, the frequency with which they were 
changed and the capacity of the organisation to be flexible.  This subject arose when 
I asked if her hours of work changed frequently.  Erica described her experience of 
many years of changing income reporting requirements.   
 
Under the fortnightly reporting system, Parenting Payment claimants reported the 
gross pay they expected to receive based on the hours they had worked in the 
previous fortnight, whether or not they had yet been paid.  This posed difficulties in 
situations where the pay period did not match the Centrelink reporting fortnight and 
for those whose hours of employment changed from week to week (Pearce et al. 
2002:43).  Both were a problem for Erica.  She was paid monthly and so needed to 
estimate her pay for Centrelink and call back with adjustments if she had calculated 
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incorrectly.  This worked for a while, but then Erica‟s life became a lot more hectic.  
Her boss, with whom she had been employed for many years, went into hospital.  
The firm was very small, composed of just a few people, and without her employer, 
Erica‟s job was at risk.  Her hours fluctuated more than they had previously and she 
was uncertain if she would have ongoing employment.  In addition, Erica‟s mother, 
who lived interstate, became very unwell and Erica often flew to visit her while also 
trying to manage her care remotely by telephone.   
 
It wasn‟t too much trouble at first and then when my income was 
going all over the place – and I didn‟t even know, depending upon 
my boss‟s health, what was happening – it became quite an issue ... 
you have to do it on a certain day, so if something had come up, 
which it did several times – like I have got an elderly mother and all 
the rest of it – you are doing other stuff and you think, „Oh, I 
haven‟t reported,‟ you know.   
 
Eventually, Erica contacted Centrelink to ask what she could do to make it easier to 
report her income. 
 
Erica:  I phoned them up and said, „Look, um, blah, blah blah,‟ and 
they said, „... it‟s because you are not on a regular income.‟  So, in 
the end I negotiated with my employers – it wasn‟t anything 
Centrelink did – [and we arranged] that we go back to something 
that we did ages ago.  That is, work out an average of what I would 
be earning, get paid a [regular] wage, but still report my hourly rate 
and at the end of three or six months, renegotiate the hours.  And 
they accepted that and they put me on I think it is $70 I get now, 
something like that, but it just takes a great load off. 
 
Megan:  So does that mean you don‟t have to report to Centrelink? 
 
Erica:  No, not at all, not until I renegotiate.  At the moment I am 
being underpaid for the value of the work I am doing ... and at the 
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end of maybe six months we‟ll either negotiate an increased hourly 
rate or increase my hours or whatever.   
 
Erica‟s circumstances are not unusual among Parenting Payment claimants.  Many 
work in jobs in which their income changes frequently, many work for small 
businesses that are vulnerable to their employers‟ circumstances and many care for 
family members, particularly elderly parents, in addition to their children.   
 
Perhaps what is unusual is Erica‟s assertiveness.  She was not willing to accept a 
complex and inconvenient arrangement.  Instead, she negotiated for something 
different.  What remains for Erica, though, is her impression of dealing with 
Centrelink throughout these years.  Her story, as she relayed it to me, was designed 
to illustrate the complexity, inflexibility and inconvenience of interactions with 
Centrelink.  Any alternative that might improve these relations was initiated by 
Erica, not Centrelink. 
 
For Caroline, reporting her income was just another hassle she could do without:   
 
It annoys me.  It‟s just that – no they haven‟t been too bad I suppose 
-it‟s just the fact that you have to report back to them with all your 
earnings, it‟s a bit of a nuisance ... you have ring up every fortnight 
and I just find that a nuisance, because I forget half the time.  You 
know, I‟ve got other things on. Well, I go to TAFE Mondays and 
that‟s my day I have to ring up and you have to do it each fortnight. 
 
Margaret was frustrated by the many letters she received which presented 
conflicting information about her income:  
 
What annoys me about them is that quite often you get five letters 
within three days all saying different amounts … They don‟t get it 
right the first time.  It will take four or five letters before they 
actually sort it out …  
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Many mothers found Centrelink rules and requirements confusing.  This extended 
beyond income reporting to many other elements in their day-to-day contact with 
Centrelink.  Often this related to the large volume of correspondence they receive 
from Centrelink: letters, booklets and brochures explaining rules, announcing new 
requirements, stating or questioning entitlements, or requiring confirmation of their 
current circumstances.  Grace, when I asked her about the Centrelink materials that 
explained Australians Working Together, remarked, „Booklets – huge books! Yes, a 
new encyclopaedia to add to my collection.‟   
 
Caroline was overwhelmed by the large number of items which arrived in her 
letterbox and so did not read them closely but relied on a friend to digest and 
explain Centrelink requirements as they changed: 
 
Oh, they are always giving you booklets. You‟re always getting 
stuff in the mail.  I just don‟t look at them, I just have a bit of a flick 
through … It just takes too long to read them.  I just don‟t read 
them.  I‟ve got a friend who, she‟s also on Centrelink payment, 
cause me and her have both got a child the same age actually … 
and she reads everything that comes … She tells me all that‟s in it.  
So I get the information there. 
 
Cheryl felt that she kept up to date with the ever-changing requirements, but 
worried for others who could not read as well as her. 
 
They constantly change their policies so much we don‟t know 
where we stand.  And you are getting so much paperwork and little 
fine print.  A lot of it‟s worded that – I mean I had a good 
education, so I‟m quite flexible with the words … I can read the 
policies and understand them.  A lot of other women can‟t. 
 
In their review of social security penalties, Pearce et al. (2002:27-28) identified the 
complexity and overly technical nature of much of Centrelink‟s written 
correspondence as a problem for income support claimants.  The Senate Community 
Affairs References Committee (2002:20) similarly found that claimants often 
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misunderstand or are confused by the information and letters they receive.  As a 
result of these investigations, Centrelink undertook to review its communication 
with regard to the administration of penalties (Commonwealth Ombudsman 
2002:xiv-xxii).  At the time I interviewed Parenting Payment recipients, this review 
may not yet have led to revised letters and brochures, but their experience highlights 
the importance of easily understandable information.  This is especially the case 
when a failure to comprehend Centrelink requirements could lead to penalties.  The 
expansion of breaches for which penalties could be applied under Australians 
Working Together made parents vulnerable.  The penalties for non-compliance were 
a reduction of benefits by 18 or 24 per cent for six months or no income support at 
all for eight weeks. 
 
Some Parenting Payment recipients face particular difficulties in reading and 
understanding Centrelink communication.  Those with limited literacy, reading 
disabilities, visual impairment or little knowledge of the English language are 
highly likely to misunderstand Centrelink letters or not to read them at all (Pearce et 
al. 2002:27).  The high proportion of Parenting Payment recipients who have not 
completed high school and the large group of Parenting Payment Partnered 
recipients from non-English speaking backgrounds outlined in the previous section 
suggests that many may face such problems.   
 
The mothers I interviewed who were from non-English speaking backgrounds 
struggled with communication from Centrelink.  Mary, who requests an Arabic 
interpreter every time she has contact with Centrelink, usually receives letters 
written in English.  Speaking through an interpreter, she told me: 
 
Normally I just receive my letters in English.  If I say I need an 
interpreter that is when I receive it in Arabic. 
 
It is only directly after communication with Centrelink in which Mary has advised 
them of her need for an interpreter that she receives letters written in Arabic.  
Telephone calls also take place in English.  Mary explained how these conversations 
usually run: 
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If they call me they will say, „Are you, maybe, Mrs Smith?‟  Then 
if I hear my name I say, „Yes.‟  And they say, „This is Centrelink.‟  
That‟s it. 
 
Sometimes that is the end of the conversation.  Other times, if they are at home, 
Mary will ask one of her children to listen to the Centrelink officer and explain what 
they are calling about.  When her children are not available, Mary requests an 
interpreter.  However, even when Mary spoke with Centrelink officers through an 
Arabic interpreter, either in person or over the telephone, she was sometimes unsure 
if she properly understood, because the interpreters often speak an unfamiliar form 
of Arabic.  She explained: 
 
When I go to Centrelink, I get a Lebanese interpreter.  And you 
know, the Arabic they speak is a little bit different.  And sometimes 
from Syria.  They bring a Syrian [interpreter]. And it‟s really very 
hard for me to understand.  So sometimes you don‟t get it.  They 
repeat, repeat.  Sometimes you pretend you get it, but you don‟t 
really get it. 
 
To be polite, Mary sometimes pretends she understands what she is being told.  This 
places her in a very vulnerable situation in which it seems highly likely she will 
unwittingly fail to comply with a Centrelink requirement and receive a penalty as a 
result.  Ana also struggles with Centrelink communication.  Ana has never learned 
to write in Arabic and was just learning to read and write in English when I met her.  
She found Centrelink letters written in English impenetrable.  If Ana or Mary were 
to receive a penalty, there is little chance that they would understand that they could 
appeal the decision or understand the processes that such an appeal would involve.   
 
The extent of misunderstanding to which language can lead is demonstrated by 
Zahra.  She came to participate in my study with her friend Alia.  Both knew that 
the study was about Parenting Payment.  Zahra, like Alia, had very limited English 
language proficiency.  Zahra had a youngest child aged thirteen and she knew that 
she received „the pension‟.  When I asked her for more details, Zahra could not tell 
me what kind of pension it was.  She showed me her Pensioner Concession Card 
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and I discovered that Zahra was not receiving Parenting Payment, but the Disability 
Support Pension.  It is easy to imagine that mothers like Zahra would misunderstand 
Centrelink requirements, since she did not even know the name of the benefit which 
she received. 
Interactions with Centrelink staff 
Another commonly perceived problem when contacting Centrelink offices lay with 
interactions with staff.  Parents enlisted a range of strategies to manage these 
interactions.  Belle, for example, said 
 
I have had to learn to wheel in my temper, to put aside my insight 
into the absurdist kind of organisation, or lack thereof, in the place, 
and reconcile myself to the fact that every time I go there, there will 
be a new system in place and I won‟t know what it is ... And so I 
have just made it my personal goal to get the person I have to deal 
with, first of all, to smile, and then to laugh.  And so I always go in 
and I say, „Hi, how are you!  Isn‟t it hot, or, aren‟t you glad it‟s 
nearly the weekend or nearly four o‟clock?‟  I just crap on like that 
and I am just annoyingly pleasant. 
 
Others suggest „just doing what they tell you‟ or going armed with as much 
information as possible, gleaned from friends, brochures and the web, or being well 
organised.  Overwhelmingly, parents stressed the importance of being polite.  These 
strategies are a response to two related issues raised by parents: the heavy workload 
and perceived lack of staff training at Centrelink offices; and the pervasive 
stereotypes of welfare recipients that they encountered in and outside of these 
offices.  By smiling, being polite and having all the necessary paperwork on hand, 
parents could avoid making what they regarded as an already stressful day for the 
staff even more difficult, thus increasing their chances of a good outcome.  By 
smiling and being polite, especially when coupled with demonstrating their 
commitment to employment or training, parents could avoid being regarded as „dole 
bludgers‟ by staff.   
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Parents did not believe that all or even most staff would respond in this way – in 
fact, most said their contact with Centrelink was positive.  Nevertheless, many felt 
that derogatory treatment was an eventuality for which they needed to be prepared, 
because they knew it happened occasionally.  Pam, for example, took this approach, 
despite saying she had never encountered negative attitudes at Centrelink.  She 
explained to me: 
 
Pam:  Some people there are okay but there are some people, they 
look down at you because you are on a family payment, if you are 
on the pension ... There are some people that think, „Oh, well I am 
working, you should be.  Why are you on the pension?  You should 
be working too.‟ 
 
Megan:  At Centrelink? 
 
Pam:  Yeah, at Centrelink.  Some people can give you that 
impression.  Not all, but some people can come across that way ... I 
haven‟t come across anyone else like that. 
 
Megan:  Oh, you haven‟t? 
 
Pam:  No. But I know there are people like that.  Sometimes you go 
into Centrelink and you will be in line and you are waiting to be 
served and that, and you see how other people are talking to other 
clients and everything.  I‟ve been lucky so far it hasn‟t happened to 
me, but if it does I can pick it up straight away. 
 
Interactions varied according to which office mothers attended or which staff 
member they saw.  This was Margaret‟s experience: 
 
I myself have actually on occasions, when I have been depressed 
and had to go and say, „Look I need to go on the pension again‟, 
just burst into tears, you know, in their office, because the questions 
seemed so pointless, and when you didn‟t bring this piece of paper, 
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or you know.  Occasionally you would get the odd person that 
makes you think the money is coming out of their income or 
something.  You know, that you feel like you practically have to 
kiss their boots.  Those feelings are awful ... [but] when we first 
moved to [another] office I was absolutely delighted at the 
treatment there, the people were fantastic.  Everyone I saw there 
was being treated politely.  I actually wrote to them and said, 
„Congratulations.  This is great, pleased to see this, keep up the 
good work.‟   
 
Mothers‟ sense that they were being treated with suspicion arose in a context of 
heightened scrutiny of all beneficiaries.  In the year 1999-2000, Centrelink 
conducted 2.3 million „customer entitlement reviews‟ designed to uncover fraud and 
error in payments
15
 (ANAO 2001:24 note 13).  The reviews were intended to find 
underpayments as well as overpayments, but it is nonetheless understandable that 
many parents felt they were being treated with suspicion, given that the number of 
reviews was equal to more than half of the 4.3 million income support payments 
made that year (FACSIA 2006, my calculation).  In the year that more than two 
million reviews were conducted, only 2,881 convictions were made for fraud 
(ANAO 2001:24).  
 
Low-income parents have mixed experiences of support services.  They most value 
the services which offer non-judgemental, respectful and practical assistance (Attree 
2005:335).  Parents fear being judged by service providers and this can stop them 
seeking assistance.  When they have no choice about attending a service, as is the 
case with Centrelink, it is not surprising that some approach the interaction with a 
degree of caution, attempting as much as possible to maintain control over it.  So 
they offer an idealised impression, and in doing so give a performance which is 
„moulded, and modified to fit into the understanding and expectations of the society 
in which it is presented‟ (Goffman 1959:35).  That is, knowing the expectations of 
                                                 
15
 The Australian National Audit Office (2001:76) notes that Centrelink does not generally pursue an 
overpayment as fraud, even if the claimant had a legislative obligation to provide certain information 
and has been overpaid because he or she failed to do so.  More commonly, payments are cancelled or 
reduced and penalties incurred. 
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staff, parents present a particular impression of themselves as polite and respectful 
claimants.  This is not a cynical act, but rather an attempt to be treated with respect.   
Conclusion 
Mothers were guided in making decisions about their family lives by gendered 
moral rationalities (Duncan and Edwards 1999).  They made decisions that were 
rational for their families, given their understanding of good mothering and of the 
care needs of their children and other family members.  As I have demonstrated, 
their understandings varied widely.  Some felt the need to be physically available 
for their children for many hours each week and so had little, if any, space for 
employment or education.  Some felt that study or employment were elements of 
good mothering, as these activities would better their family‟s circumstances, most 
notably in terms of higher weekly incomes, but also to provide a good example to 
their children.  Some understood their mothering responsibilities as separate to their 
need to maintain employment or education for their own good.  A strong 
commitment to care underlies all of these different perspectives on motherhood. 
 
Mothers‟ commitment to employment, education or other activities means that 
Parenting Payment recipients are actively engaged in the public sphere at high rates.  
They are employed at a higher rate than any other beneficiary group; they study to 
increase their qualifications; and they volunteer.  There is considerable evidence, 
however, that the labour market is not providing the jobs which Parenting Payment 
claimants need.  Some work for long periods of time in jobs which do not offer the 
hours of work mothers would prefer.  Being unable to work enough hours to be self-
sufficient, mothers claim Parenting Payment to supplement their income.  Others 
seek employment without success; the rate of unemployment among Parenting 
Payment claimants is high compared to other mothers.  Age discrimination, 
inappropriate hours, insufficient jobs, and a lack of positions which accommodate 
family responsibilities make it hard to find a suitable job.  In addition, Parenting 
Payment recipients experience disadvantage at a higher rate than other parents and 
this affects their capacity to participate in paid work.  Ill-health or disability among 
mothers or their children, limited English language skills and problems with literacy 
make finding employment difficult for some and almost impossible for others.  As a 
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result, some mothers have been out of the labour market for quite a while, so they 
do not have recent employment experience or up-to-date skills.  This means that 
even if their health, language or literacy improves, finding employment continues to 
be difficult.   
 
Mothers negotiate social security policy in the context of their diverse 
interpretations of what it means to be a good mother, their strong commitment to 
care, and their high rates of employment, study and voluntary activity.  The issues 
that mothers identified in their experience of social security policy and practice 
relate to three areas.  Their most important concern related to their ability to be good 
mothers for their children.  This encompassed the best balance between employment 
and being at home to care for their children as well the importance of finding 
enough money.  Parenting Payment recipients experience high levels of poverty and 
manage tight budgets.  Mothers were highly attuned to their weekly incomes.  Their 
second area of concern was the complexity of welfare rules which seemed to be 
endlessly changing.  Mothers who were employed raised this issue in particular, as 
reporting their earned income often complicated their dealings with Centrelink.  
Mothers found Centrelink letters and brochures confusing and some were 
overwhelmed by the high volume of correspondence they received.  Mothers from 
non-English speaking backgrounds particularly struggled to understand Centrelink 
communication, especially letters written in English, but spoken English, even when 
interpreted, could be difficult to comprehend.  The third area mothers identified 
related to creating respectful relations with agency staff.  Mothers were on constant 
alert for the stigma and disapproval as sole parents and welfare recipients, which led 
them to approach staff carefully, attempting to manage interactions with them to 
maximise the likelihood they would be shown respect. 
 
The mothers I interviewed felt able to draw on social security in order to arrange 
their lives in they way they felt was best for their children.  Some chose to stay at 
home full time, some to draw on income support while studying so as to improve 
their employment prospects, some to supplement income from the part-time or 
intermittent jobs which they could combine with parenting.  These were constrained 
choices.  The decision to study to improve one‟s chances of better employment was 
partly driven by an understanding that it would be impossible to support a family on 
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a single low-wage job.  The decision to combine part-time employment with income 
support arose partly because of a lack of family-friendly arrangements in full-time 
employment, the assumption on the part of some employers that primary carers are 
less reliable, poor employment conditions in part-time jobs and the very low levels 
of cash assistance available through Parenting Payment.  The level of care that 
parents feel they should provide to their children is dictated partly by the particular 
needs of their children and the limited formal care services available for teenagers. 
 
In the next chapter, I explore government perspectives on the key policy issues as 
articulated in arguments promoting Australians Working Together.  I find that 
mothers‟ perspectives on the key issues in income support policy are generally 
different to those espoused by officials.  There were similarities, for instance, in the 
importance placed on employment.  However, for mothers, employment and study 
revolved around the best interests of their children.  Mothers did not uniformly 
assume that being employed as a parent was best for their children.  Children and 
family lay at the heart of mothers‟ thinking, in contrast to the almost peripheral 
place of care in Australians Working Together policy.  
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Chapter three 
‘Welfare Dependency’, ‘Mutual Obligation’ and the need for 
employment 
The representation of welfare reform by Australian officials 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the transformation of Parenting Payment under Australians 
Working Together to set out the „institutional and discursive context of policy 
formation and implementation‟ (Williams and Popay 1999:179).  Viewing care as a 
form of labour invites an analysis of the conditions under which it is conducted and 
the role of the welfare state in mediating and setting these conditions (Daly and 
Lewis 2000:285).  Recognising the gendered norms and obligations which underpin 
the provision of care invites an exploration of the language of parental obligation as 
the state challenges or reinforces norms of care.  I now begin this analysis of the 
welfare policies with which the parents I interviewed lived and the government 
rhetoric that surrounds that policy.  I study how policy and governments construct 
parents in receipt of welfare: that is, how they speak of mothers and fathers, welfare 
and welfare claimants.  This allows me to explore the fusions and fissures in the 
Australian welfare regime, between policy, mothers‟ interpretations and research 
evidence. 
 
In the previous chapter I examined how mothers presented the key policy issues at 
the juncture of parenting, employment and welfare; in this chapter I examine how 
public officials present that problem.  I begin by investigating how the concepts of 
„welfare dependency‟, „mutual obligation‟ and „customer service‟ are articulated by 
the representatives of the Australian Government when discussing the need to 
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implement changes to the welfare system.  To do so I review what Bessant (2002) 
describes as „official talk‟, as it occurs in speeches, reports, white papers and other 
official pronouncements, in order to examine how social security is represented as 
„problem‟ and the solutions which are offered to address that problem (Bacchi 
1999).  In arguing the need for change to the Australian welfare system, government 
representatives claimed that policy had to address entrenched problems with welfare 
recipients and the welfare system.  The former was commonly expressed in terms of 
„welfare dependence‟, the latter in the context of a need to reframe the relationship 
between welfare claimants and the welfare state through „mutual obligation‟ 
implemented in a „customer service‟ model (C Howard 2006; Yeatman 2000).   
 
In the second half of this chapter, I interpret the concepts of „welfare dependency‟ 
and „mutual obligation‟ and their place in Australians Working Together policy by 
drawing on two strands of welfare regime analysis.  The first is the male-
breadwinner/female-care-giver model and its transition to an adult-worker model.  
The second is a gendered understanding of citizenship.  These analyses reveal the 
policy logics or „the assumptions, principles and premises‟ which underpin and 
inform policies developed by welfare regimes (Lewis 1997:6).  Gendered policy 
logics are reflected in welfare policy in multiple ways, including assumptions about 
how caring for children and employment are shared by mothers and fathers and the 
basis on which parents, as citizens, can make claims on the state for support.  All 
these have implications for the kinds of policies which are developed and the lives 
of those the policies affect.  Policy logics have shifted throughout the twentieth 
century; no longer do welfare regimes tend to view women primarily as wives and 
mothers unlikely to participate in the workforce; instead they increasingly expect all 
adults to engage in paid work (Lewis 1997:6).    
 
This chapter provides a backdrop against which welfare recipients‟ experience of 
income support can be understood.  The environment in which they live will no 
doubt affect how parents perceive themselves and their relationship to the state as 
citizens, parents, welfare recipients and workers.  There may be, as Pfau-Effinger 
(1998) suggests, tensions between the gender culture and the gender order; that is, 
the expectations and intentions of parents may not match those of the state and the 
possibilities offered by the labour market.  An analysis of the texts of welfare 
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change is most illuminating when accompanied by an analysis of how official talk is 
embedded in practice (Harris 2001:23).  Throughout the remainder of the thesis, I 
will explore how the rationalities set out in this chapter are operationalised and 
implemented in the practices of social security administration and the experiences of 
parent claimants.  
 
In concluding this chapter, I offer Ruth Lister‟s social justice agenda as a means by 
which to address the discordance between mothers‟ and policy makers‟ 
interpretations of the policy problem.  This agenda, which resonates with the 
concerns of mothers outlined in the previous chapter, would involve: 
 
 public acknowledgement of the role played by benefits in 
tackling poverty 
 public discussion of the value accorded to different kinds of 
work – both paid and unpaid 
 the more general involvement of those experiencing poverty 
in the politics of poverty (Lister 2001:69-70). 
Rationales informing policy change: ‘welfare dependency’, ‘mutual 
obligation’ and customer service 
‘Welfare dependence’ 
In 1999, Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Family and Community Services, 
announced her intention to establish the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (see 
appendix two for a list of Howard Government ministers active in social security 
reform).  It was one year after the Liberal/National Coalition Government had been 
elected for their second term in office.  The Minister was setting out her 
government‟s position on the need for welfare reform.  She described her concern 
with the current state of affairs as follows: 
 
… there are examples around Australia where job opportunities are 
available and our entrenched culture of welfare dependency has 
meant that certain members of our community are not only 
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prepared, but feel entitled to exploit the social safety net instead. 
(Newman 1999b) 
 
The Minister depicted a „culture of welfare dependency‟.  This „culture‟ she argued, 
led to some beneficiaries refusing to accept available jobs, thus deliberately 
exploiting the social security system.  In describing „welfare dependency‟ as a 
culture, the Minister gave the impression that electing to claim benefits rather than 
take employment is a mode of exploitation that is fairly widespread, something that 
is part of the condition of being a beneficiary.  In her reference to „welfare 
dependency‟, the Minister conflates two different registers of meaning.  The first is 
the dependence of one person on another, or on an institution, for subsistence: in 
this case receipt of social security.  The second is a moral and psychological state of 
excessive neediness and lack of will (Fraser and Gordon 1994:6).  It appears, then, 
that by being dependent financially on income support, claimants also exhibit moral 
and psychological dependency.  This reference to the pathological mode of 
dependency invokes the term‟s other most common contemporary use: drug 
dependency.  The connection has been made explicit by some, for example, in the 
book titled Australia’s Welfare Habit and How to Kick It (Saunders 2004).  In this 
depiction of welfare, claimants are „addicted‟, prepared to do anything to maintain 
their „habit‟.  The „problem‟ is blamed on benefit claimants who lack the moral 
gumption to do the right thing and on the welfare system for allowing people to 
languish in a „culture of dependency‟. 
 
Minister Newman described „welfare dependence‟ as a large and growing problem, 
demonstrated by the rising numbers of people claiming social security: 
 
Let me give you some feel for the extent of welfare dependency.  
While we have record levels of employment, there are now around 
2.6 million people of workforce age on government income support 
payments – around 1 in 5.  Ten years ago, the figure was around 1.5 
million people, or around 1 in 7.  The number of children in 
workless families is disturbingly high.  Some 900,000 Australian 
children are in households with no adult in paid work. (Newman 
1999b) 
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In this statement the Minister claimed that even though employment levels had 
increased, more people were in receipt of income support than ever before, 
implying, in tandem with her previous statement, that this was because people on 
income support were refusing the jobs available to them.   
 
Not only was Jocelyn Newman concerned about the number of welfare recipients, 
she also drew particular attention to the „900,000 Australian children‟ of people who 
are not employed.  Six years later in 2005, as Minister for Employment and 
Workplace Relations, Kevin Andrews (2005a:3) made very similar claims: 
 
At a time of sustained economic growth and unemployment at 29-
year lows, it is unacceptable to have 2.5 million or 20 per cent of 
working age Australians on income support.  Of these, more than 
1.3 million people are in receipt of Parenting Payment or the 
Disability Support Pension and have few, if any, participation 
requirements.  It is also unacceptable to have 700,000 children 
growing up in jobless households, in which two or three generations 
of Australians may not know what it is like to have a job, let alone 
steady employment and regular income. 
 
I note in passing that in the six years from 1999, when Jocelyn Newman presented 
her statistics, to 2005 when Kevin Andrews presented his, there appears to have 
been a fall from 2.6 to 2.5 million people in receipt of income support and an even 
steeper decline from 900,000 to 700,000 children whose parents were not employed.  
If these figures can be taken as accurate, it would appear that Australians Working 
Together, which started in 2002-2003, could perhaps have been considered to have 
had some success.  The Minister made no mention of this.  Instead, once again, it 
was implied that welfare recipients refuse employment and that the many children 
whose parents did not have jobs are the children of Parenting Payment and 
Disability Support Pension claimants.   
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A key concern regarding the children in families without employment was 
„intergenerational welfare dependency‟.  Larry Anthony, the Minister for Children 
and Youth Affairs, said: 
 
Parents, both partnered and single, who remain out of the work 
force and on income support for long periods of time often face 
great difficulty in returning to the work force later on when the 
children are older.  This is due to a lack of recent experience, skills, 
contacts and/or confidence. This can create a significant risk of 
poverty and long-term welfare dependency for both themselves and 
their children. (Anthony 2002:2310) 
 
The transfer of „welfare dependency‟ between generations again treats „dependency‟ 
as pathological.  It further suggests that parents who rely on income support are 
failing in their duty as parents to act as positive role models for their children.   
 
In Anthony‟s statement, and in the others above, welfare receipt and employment 
are presented in opposition to one another, describing a situation in which parents 
receiving welfare were not employed and those who were employed did not receive 
welfare.  Contrary to the evidence presented in the previous chapter of the large 
proportion of people who claim Parenting Payment while in employment, parents 
were regarded as being either in work or in receipt of social security benefits.   
 
Anthony saw the cause of parents‟ difficulty returning to employment in the parents 
themselves.  They lacked „recent experience, skills, contacts and/or confidence‟.  He 
made no mention of the labour market: the availability of jobs or location of jobs in 
local areas; the gendered nature of employment; prejudice against older women, 
lone parents and mothers by potential employers; a disinclination on the part of 
employers to take on new staff who do not have recent employment experience; or a 
lack of training provided by government or employers to equip parents returning to 
employment with appropriate skills (Wilson et al. 1999:19-20).  Any of the above 
could affect mothers‟ employment prospects.  Under Australians Working Together, 
policy rhetoric was concerned with the need to transform parents so as to increase 
employment rates; it was not concerned with labour markets. 
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During Australians Working Together debates, the government described 
employment as the best means to address the poverty of parents and their children 
(Yeatman 2000:172).  By taking employment, parents would increase their income 
and their long-term financial security and raise the material wellbeing of themselves 
and their children.  Making the argument that employment is a parental 
responsibility implies that Parenting Payment claimants are breaching the norms of 
parenthood by being out of work.  This was apparent when the Family and 
Community Services Legislation Amendment (Australians Working Together and 
other 2001 Budget Measures) Bill 2002, was introduced into the House of 
Representatives.  Anthony (2002:2310) explained why the policy was developed 
with increasing requirements as children age: 
 
The introduction of a part-time participation requirement will 
encourage and help parents prepare to return to work as children 
grow older, the usual situation for most parents with school-aged 
children.  
 
The Minister presented the policy as „encouraging‟ Parenting Payment claimants to 
adhere to the „usual‟ trajectory for parents with children.  It is important to note that 
the Minister spoke of „parents‟, not mothers, although, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, nearly all Parenting Payment claimants are women.  Australian mothers do 
tend to increase their hours of employment as their children age, but Australian 
fathers do not follow this pattern; instead, most fathers work full time throughout 
their children‟s infancy and schooling (Gray et al. 2003:11).  The Minister was 
really referring to mothers.  So the policy was intended to help claimants meet 
community norms regarding mothering and maternal employment. 
 
In sum, ministers argued that the welfare system was in need of repair because of 
rising numbers of claimants, many of these being parents.  Income support 
claimants were described as lacking the motivation to seek employment, thus 
voluntary measures were no longer considered effective.  „Welfare dependency‟ was 
regarded as pathological, with advocates of reform professing concern about the 
detrimental effects of long-term benefit receipt (Shaver 2001:279-280).  People who 
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were „welfare dependent‟ were not considered capable of acting in their own best 
interests.  They needed the state to step in to help them break the „habit‟.  As 
„welfare dependent‟; they were not viewed as being the best judge of their own 
circumstances or needs (Shaver 2001:341).  They were depicted as needing the 
explicit guidance of the state, in what Yeatman (2000:158) has described as a new 
version of Rousseau‟s social contract, in which individuals must be forced to be 
financially self-reliant.  Claimants must be helped to make appropriate choices; that 
is, helped to know that they should choose employment (Yeatman 2000:163).  The 
proposed solution to „welfare dependence‟ was mandatory activity requirements.  In 
Australia these have been conceived as part of a new relationship between the 
citizen and the state, termed „mutual obligation‟. 
Mutual Obligation 
„Mutual obligation‟ was a principle introduced early in the Howard Government‟s 
rule, but it was not the first Australian welfare policy to invoke obligation.  The 
previous Labor Government had implemented Reciprocal Obligation, under which 
unemployed people were obliged to take advantage of an expanded range of 
programs and assistance, and faced penalties if obligations were not met 
(McClelland 2002:216).  The Howard Government‟s Mutual Obligation16 placed far 
less responsibility with government and much more with the welfare recipient 
(McClelland 2002:218).  Mutual Obligation was first put into practice by the 
Howard Government with the introduction of the Work for the Dole program in 
1997.  Work for the Dole required those young unemployed people who were 
directed to the program to engage in community work in order to remain eligible for 
income support.  The government plan for welfare reform was the expansion of the 
principal of Mutual Obligation to other groups of income support claimants.  
 
Early in the government‟s program of reform, Prime Minister Howard explained 
Mutual Obligation: 
 
                                                 
16
 I have capitalised „Mutual Obligation‟ where it refers to a particular set of policy initiatives 
implemented by the Howard Government.  I do this to distinguish the term as it was used in a policy 
sense, which focused on the obligation of the welfare recipient, from its commonplace meaning 
according to which the mutuality of obligation might be considered to be stronger.   
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We have a solemn obligation to help those in our community who 
are deserving of help. Equally we have a right, as a responsible 
community, to ask of those who are receiving help, where it is 
reasonable to do so, that they do something in return for that 
assistance and something that is commensurate with the help and 
their own circumstances. And that is the principle of mutual 
obligation. (J Howard 1997) 
 
In this statement, John Howard made reference to several key discursive themes of 
his government‟s welfare agenda.  Firstly, he noted a „solemn obligation‟ to help 
those who „are deserving of help‟.  In doing so, he suggested that there may be some 
who were not deserving and that those who were not deserving should not be 
helped.  This is an allusion to a long-running rhetorical association between welfare 
and the deserving and undeserving poor (Bessant 2002:18).  The undeserving are 
seen to contribute to their difficult circumstances through their own moral failings; 
those who deserve support are those who find themselves in difficult circumstances 
despite their own concerted efforts to improve their lot or despite their impeccable 
morality (Dwyer 2000:64,198; Edwards 2006:421).  Secondly, Howard posited that 
it was the community‟s right to ask welfare recipients to „do something in return‟.  
This is the notion that by accepting income support, claimants have exercised a right 
which generates obligations upon them: by fulfilling those obligations people can 
become deserving welfare recipients (Moss 2001:5).  In this way, Mutual Obligation 
„balances‟ the rights and responsibilities of welfare recipients; the contention was 
that there had previously been too much emphasis on rights, while responsibilities 
had been neglected (Yeatman 2000:156).  Thirdly, this concern with the rights and 
responsibilities of government, the community and welfare recipients was often 
discussed in terms of a need for „balance‟ and „fairness‟ (Harris 2001:20).  For 
example, it was said to be „only fair‟ that welfare recipients give something to those 
who have made sacrifices through their labour and taxes in order for the government 
to provide income support (Barns and Preston 2002:22-23; Moss 2001:5).  Social 
security claimants were set in opposition to „taxpayers‟, regardless of the taxes they 
paid on their income support or on goods and services (Cass and Brennan 
2002:251). 
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The Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000) in its final report recommended 
extending the application of Mutual Obligation beyond Work for the Dole: 
payments to all unemployed people, parents and people with disabilities were to be 
informed by this principle.  In its interpretation of Mutual Obligation, the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform, unlike Howard, also focused on the obligations of 
employers, the community and governments (Moss 2001:8).  For the Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform, Mutual Obligation was the obligation of the whole of 
society to assist those in need and the obligation of those in receipt of income 
support to take advantage of the opportunities available to them (Reference Group 
on Welfare Reform 2000:34).  Nonetheless, the obligation largely rested with social 
security claimants, as they would face financial penalties for failing to meet their 
obligations.  This was not the case for business, communities or governments (Moss 
2001: 7-8). 
 
When implemented in Australians Working Together, Mutual Obligation gave less 
consideration to the obligations of businesses, governments and communities than 
had been sought by the Reference Group on Welfare Reform.  For example, 
Centrelink (2002a) told social security claimants that: „Mutual Obligation is about 
you giving something back to the community which supports you.‟  This statement 
implied that the community was already supporting the welfare recipient (through 
the provision of cash transfers) and had no further responsibilities; Mutual 
Obligation referred narrowly to what the welfare recipient gave in return.   
 
Parents were a central target of Australians Working Together.  Parenting Payment 
claimants were included in the general web of rhetoric about welfare receipt, but a 
particular language was directly applied to this group.  For example, Jocelyn 
Newman (1999b), the Minister for Family and Community Services noted that: 
 
Parenting Payment for parents, partnered or separated, represents 
the Government‟s recognition that raising children, especially 
young children, is an important and valuable role.  This in itself is a 
form of Mutual Obligation.  It is critical to give children the best 
start in life.  However, raising children is only part of a lifetime.  
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Parenting Payment doesn‟t last forever, and the best approach to 
long-term security is getting a job. 
 
At first glance, the Minister appeared to recognise the importance of the care work 
of parents, describing the care of children as „important and valuable‟ and in itself „a 
form of Mutual Obligation‟.  As a Mutual Obligation activity, care would be a form 
of labour and also a means by which parents contributed to the community.  
However, the Minister quickly qualified and contained this acknowledgement by 
stating that care work was only „part of a lifetime‟.  The solution, for the Minister, 
was „getting a job‟.  The Minister portrayed employment as an essential element of 
good parenting because through employment parents could provide for the long 
term (presumably financial) security of their families.   
 
Mutual Obligation was one aspect of the solution to the problem of „welfare 
dependency‟ put forward by the Australian Government.  The other part of the 
problem, as set out at the beginning of this section, was with the welfare system 
itself.  Newman (1999b) explained that the Australian Government intended to 
„modernise‟ the welfare system.  She presented the social security system as 
outdated and inadequate: 
 
The modern conservative approach to welfare emphasises three 
main objectives. The first is to assist people appropriately when 
they are in genuine need, to provide an adequate safety net. The 
second is to stop people becoming dependent, to the extent possible. 
The third is to help people move to independence as soon as 
possible … The social security system has, however, contributed to 
the growth in welfare dependency, by placing too little emphasis on 
the second and third of these objectives. While it redresses short-
term poverty by meeting immediate needs, it does not have a 
sustained focus on helping people move beyond reliance on income 
support to self-sufficiency. (Newman 1999a:7) 
 
Mutual Obligation was the framework through which the second and third of the 
Minister‟s concerns, discouraging „dependence‟ and encouraging „independence‟, 
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would be addressed.  The „sustained focus‟ the Minister called for would be 
implemented through a new model of „individualised service delivery‟, as 
recommended by the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000).   
Individualised services for rational customers 
When the Howard Government responded to the Reference Group on Welfare 
Reform in 2001, it agreed there was a need for a new approach.  Centrelink would 
institute individualised services: 
 
If people are to participate effectively, whether in paid jobs, 
voluntary work, or undertaking caring responsibilities, they need to 
have access to services focusing on their particular circumstances 
and to be linked to opportunities appropriate to their aspirations … 
Centrelink will remain the main gateway to the participation 
support system, and will manage income support assessment, 
payment and compliance. (Australian Government 2001:5) 
 
This approach tailored services to the individual circumstances of claimants.  
Centrelink was to work one on one with beneficiaries to aid in their participation 
and also to ensure their compliance.  Combined with the function of benefit 
assessment and payment, Centrelink became a „one-stop-shop‟ (Bessant 2002:17).  
In keeping with the language of „shopping‟, social security claimants were re-
labelled „customers‟ (Fairclough 2000:167).   
 
At the same time that income support claimants were depicted as pathologically 
„dependent‟ and therefore incapable of making informed decisions about their 
circumstances, they were also, in some government debate, depicted as rational 
individual actors.  Redefining claimants as customers – people who shop around for 
the best deal – was part of this.  It is questionable whether someone who needs to 
claim social security benefits because they have no other source of income is 
actually in a position to look elsewhere for the kind of service Centrelink provides.  
Nonetheless, Centrelink adopted the new service delivery approach with gusto.  The 
Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink said that to reinforce the new „customer 
service‟ model: 
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… we introduced the „Customer‟ everywhere - customer service 
officers instead of counter assessors; customer service centres 
instead of regional offices; customer segment teams instead of 
policy or program branches. (Vardon 2000:4) 
 
Centrelink‟s customers would receive one-on-one service provision through 
personal advisers (Yeatman 2000:165).
17
 
 
It was in relation to financial incentives to employment that the idea of the 
beneficiary as rational actor was most prominent.  Welfare recipients, in this view, 
acted rationally if they elected to remain on income support rather than taking a job 
which offered little additional financial return.  Here it was the welfare system 
which required fixing.  This was a key issue raised by the Reference Group on 
Welfare Reform (2000).  Together, „incentives and financial assistance‟ were one of 
the five areas in which it made recommendations. 
 
The messages from government on this subject were conflicted.  One the one hand, 
when introducing Australians Working Together into Parliament, the Minister for 
Children and Youth Affairs, Larry Anthony (2002:2309) said: 
 
There are a large number of jobless families and jobless 
households.  Many households of working age rely heavily on 
income support, and there are inadequate incentives and rewards for 
self-reliance … The working credit will make a real difference to 
working age customers who are trying to get into the work force. It 
will give incentives for them to try out a job …  
                                                 
17
 The Job Network, which was newly created by the Howard Government to provide a competitive 
market to deliver employment services to beneficiaries, was another key feature of the customer 
service approach to individualised delivery.  Initially a network of more than 300 providers, from the 
public, private and community sectors, were contracted by the Federal Government to provide 
individualised employment services (Considine 2001:123).  While unemployed beneficiaries were 
obliged to take a referral to the Job Network as part of their Mutual Obligation requirements, this 
was not the case for Parenting Payment claimants, who would only be referred if they wished.  It was 
intended that unemployed „customers‟ would select the Job Network member in their area which 
would best meet their job search needs.  However, in practice, the options were limited and there was 
little if any information available to claimants on which to base a decision (Considine 2001:126). 
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In his conception of how to address a need for greater „self-reliance‟, incentives and 
rewards were critical.  Indeed the first policy measure announced in Anthony‟s 
second reading speech was the „Working Credit‟, designed to delay the effect of 
taper-rates on income support payments by temporarily raising the earnings 
disregard.  Under the Working Credit, recipients acquire „credits‟ which give them 
the opportunity to earn some income without affecting their benefits.  Each Working 
Credit is equivalent to one dollar.  During periods of time in which a claimant is in 
receipt of income support but earning less than $48 per week, they receive Working 
Credits (Centrelink 2006a).  Beneficiaries can accumulate up to 1000 credits or until 
such a time that they earn more than $48 in a week.  Earnings above $48 reduce the 
Working Credit balance.  So someone with 1000 Working Credits could earn $1000 
before their income support payment rate is reduced.  The Working Credit scheme 
was designed to allow individuals to ease into their employment income, without 
immediately facing high effective marginal tax rates.  Effective marginal tax rates 
are the rate at which a claimant who earns an extra dollar through employment loses 
some of their extra earnings in taxes and benefits.  This is an issue I will explore and 
explain in more detail in chapter five.  Working Credit was designed to provide 
motivation for recipients who made rational, calculated decisions about 
employment. 
 
A different perspective was offered by Amanda Vanstone, the Minister for Family 
and Community Services, during the same stage of the Australians Working 
Together debates.  Vanstone (2003:25) dismissed the notion of effective marginal 
tax rates, „a term that suits economists‟, as misleadingly implying that people in 
receipt of social security pay more tax when they work than other taxpayers.  The 
Minister continued:   
 
Those who choose not to work – because they lose welfare dollars 
by earning their own – have an entitlement attitude … I am certain 
that many people don‟t dismiss work as an option just because they 
lose welfare payments when they earn some money for themselves.  
For them this is an issue of right and wrong.  They are aware this is 
someone else‟s hard-earned money, not their own.  They make a 
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conscious effort to work through the income zone where they are 
replacing taxpayer dollars with their own dollars because they can 
see what‟s on the other side. (Vanstone 2003:25) 
 
The Minister considered that it was attitudes more than financial incentives that had 
to be improved so that social security recipients would take employment.  She was, 
without using the term, invoking the notion of „dole bludger‟, someone who lives, 
or „bludges‟, off „someone else‟s hard-earned money‟.  In doing, so Vanstone was 
positioning welfare recipients in opposition to employees or „taxpayers‟, which, as 
noted above, was a recurring theme in Australians Working Together debates.  For 
Vanstone, employment decisions were moral decisions.  Someone who knows the 
difference between „right and wrong‟ will „make a conscious effort‟ to increase their 
income despite very high effective marginal tax rates because, although the 
financial gains may not be large, the moral advantages are sizable.  Someone who 
does not take employment is demonstrating their „dependency‟, their inability to 
know for themselves how to choose the correct course of action.  
 
Penalties for non-compliance were an additional „incentive‟.  To ensure compliance 
with Mutual Obligation requirements, the government expanded the system of 
penalties to include Parenting Payment claimants.  This is a logical extension of a 
policy understanding that welfare claimants need obligations to be mandated.  This 
requires some mechanism by which to enforce compliance.  Vanstone (2002:7974) 
argued that penalties, or „breaches‟, were necessary because „if you do not have 
some sort of penalty for not doing what you are meant to do, you end up with a 
system that does not have integrity and credibility‟. 
 
The key rhetorical elements of these policy transformations were welfare claimants‟ 
obligation to employment for their own sake and for that of the community; parental 
obligation to employment as an element of good and „normal‟ parenting; the need to 
ensure compliance through mandated activities tied to penalties for non-compliance; 
and a new, individualised service delivery system.  There was some talk of rational 
individuals weighing the financial benefits of employment versus income support, 
but talk about income support which saw claimants as „dependent‟ and requiring 
Mutual Obligation was a far stronger discursive trend.  Nonetheless, the Working 
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Credit and the importance of financial incentives was an important element of the 
government program of reform.  In official talk care and gender rarely appeared. 
 
In championing new directions in welfare policy, the Australian government drew 
upon language and concepts with long histories and strong community resonance.  
Exhorting parents to engage in paid work echoed notions that welfare recipients 
were lazy: not employed because it would involve too much effort (Grover and 
Stewart 2000:237).  Discussions of „intergenerational dependency‟ on welfare 
referenced notions of „bad mothers‟, particularly bad single mothers, whose lack of 
connection with the labour market and „dependency‟ had powerful and negative 
effects on their children (Grover and Stewart 2000:239-240).  The descriptions 
made employment and welfare receipt oppositional, creating a sense that one was 
either a social security claimant or an employee, and not, as was the case for many 
people, both employed and claiming income support at the same time.  Finally, and 
very significantly, it was assumed that „work‟ was paid market work, and unpaid 
care went largely unrecognised as a form of work (Rake 2001:212). 
 
The political use of these terms and concepts resonated because they „contain[ed] 
sedimented traces of past usages and function as vehicles through which the past 
influences the present‟ (Fraser and Gordon 1994:4).  They drew upon previous 
understandings and prejudices, but were inscribed anew.  Old stereotypes of 
immoral single mothers and lazy unemployed people fused into the notion of single 
mothers who acted immorally by refusing employment, setting a poor example for 
their children as well as wronging the community. 
 
This language resonated with the public.  During the first three years of the 
Coalition government, community opinion shifted considerably towards a belief that 
people were unemployed through a lack of commitment to finding employment, and 
that people in receipt of benefits were „fiddling‟ the system18 (Wilson and Turnbull 
2001:401).  Three years of sustained government commentary on the unworthiness 
of unemployed people, willingly relayed by sections of the media, reinforced public 
                                                 
18
 The percentage agreeing with the statement „Around here, most unemployed people could find a 
job if they really wanted to‟ increased from 39 per cent in 1996 to 49 per cent in 1999 (Wilson and 
Turnbull 2001:401).  The percentage agreeing that „Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way 
or another‟ increased from 20 per cent to 27 per cent. 
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opinion, especially among working class voters (Wilson and Turnbull 2001).  At 
this time, these beliefs were primarily directed towards the unemployed; there was 
not the same degree of mistrust towards sole parents.  Shaun Wilson and Nick 
Turnbull (2001:403) speculated that the extension of compulsory programs to other 
claimants would prove unpopular among those in lower socioeconomic positions 
because of their „clear interest in preserving welfare‟.  However, welfare change has 
extended considerably beyond the unemployed.  During those early years, negative 
government rhetoric was targeted particularly at unemployed people, especially 
young unemployed people.  Since then, Parenting Payment recipients and people 
with disabilities have come within government focus and been subject to the kinds 
of language outlined in this chapter.   
From a male-breadwinner model to an adult-worker model and 
from citizen mother to citizen worker: Implications for care 
One of the most notable absences in Australian social security policy language is 
care.  Paid market work receives greater recognition in government rhetoric than 
unpaid care work.  The lack of much explicit discussion of care work in Australian 
welfare policy talk positions care as a secondary responsibility of parents.  
Concentration on paid employment obscures unpaid care work, leaving it 
unconsidered and undervalued (McDowell 2005:372).  This is a marked change of 
direction for welfare policies, which had previously provided income support to 
mothers in recognition that the provision of care could be a valued full-time task.  
Hilary Land‟s observation that „current welfare policies in Britain both devalue and 
obscure activities within the home which, until recently, were regarded, if not as 
work, at least as giving rise to legitimate claims on the state for support‟ applies 
equally to Australia (Land 2002:28). 
 
The lack of recognition of care and its importance to mothers is related to a lack of 
recognition of gender.  Policy rhetoric rarely acknowledges that the majority of 
parents in receipt of income support are mothers.  The gender-neutral language of 
„parents‟ obscures the gendered reality of parental care, most of which is provided 
by mothers.  As Mary Daly (2004:143-144) has described it, „Concepts like work, 
citizenship, and parenthood are increasingly utilized in a generic rather than gender-
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specific way.‟  This creates the impression that both men and women can operate as 
atomised individuals without care-giving responsibilities (Brennan and Cass 2005).  
Similarly, arguments for the value of employment for all citizens or the obligations 
of all social security claimants to be in paid work appear, at face value, to be non-
discriminatory; that paid work is something that society should be able to expect 
from all its members (Yeatman 2000:162).  But these arguments ignore the different 
care obligations and gendered opportunities of men and women.  The invisibility of 
gender and care in Australian welfare policy rhetoric can be better understood with 
reference to the two primary threads of feminist welfare regime analysis: the 
transition from a breadwinner/carer to adult-worker model of family in policy; and 
the gendered nature of citizenship. 
Who provides care in a welfare regime designed for adult workers? 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Australian policy was underpinned by an 
assumption that households contained a male breadwinner and a female care-giver 
(Mitchell 1998:26-28; Shaver 2002a:333).  The model describes a policy 
assumption that the primary responsibility of men is to earn and of women to care 
(Lewis 2001:153).  Although at times and for some groups this has been close to a 
description of social reality
19
, the model is rather intended as an analytical tool 
which can reveal the gendered assumptions and prescriptions of social policy and a 
gender-differentiated view of citizenship.  Policy assumed a strict division of labour 
between men and women:  as wives and mothers, women cared for the family; as 
breadwinners, men provided for the family (Sainsbury 1994:152-153).  Care work 
was largely unpaid and mostly done by women in the private sphere.  The male-
breadwinner policy framework was predominant in Australia in the early twentieth 
century, but by the late 1990s, Australia, like other liberal welfare regimes, had 
generally come to espouse a preference for a dual-earner household (O‟Connor, 
Orloff and Shaver 1999; Shaver 2002a:340).  Or, as Susy Giullari and Jane Lewis 
(2005:1) term it, policy development has moved towards assuming an „adult-worker 
model‟, one in which all adults engage in the labour market.  In Australia at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, Prime Minister Howard described the 
„typical‟ family towards which the government directed policy as composed of a 
„policeman and a part-time shop assistant‟ (Cass and Brennan 2003:52).  Social 
                                                 
19
 For middle-class families in the post World War II, period for example.  
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security policies reflect this shift.  Australians Working Together obliges women to 
strive to be part-time workers.  Although there is some policy recognition of gender 
and care responsibilities, the adult worker envisioned is overwhelmingly gender-
neutral and relatively free of care-giving duties.   
 
The gender-neutral adult worker in policy language stands in contrast to the 
gendered reality of home, welfare and employment.  As mothers, women have 
gendered orientations to care; as employees they face a gendered labour market.
20
  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, women constitute the majority of all 
parents receiving income support, provide the majority of all unpaid child care and 
are far more likely to work in low-wage part-time jobs than men. 
 
Normative policy assumptions will not always fit the social reality; this was true of 
male-breadwinner model assumptions, just as it is true of adult-worker model 
assumptions (Giullari and Lewis 2005:1).  The tensions of this misfit have been 
identified by Pfau-Effinger (1998:150-151) as arising from the friction between the 
„gender culture‟ and the „gender order‟.  Gender culture is the „uniform assumptions 
[which] exist about the desirable, “correct” form of gender relations and the division 
of labour between women and men‟; gender order is gendered institutions and 
structures.  In making a distinction between gender culture and gender order, Pfau-
Effinger (1998:156) draws attention to potential tensions and lags between them.  
There may be a degree of mismatch between the work and family arrangements 
being encouraged through policy, the preferences of families and the social context 
in which they live.  This occurs, for instance, where mothers are keen to enter 
employment or increase their hours but find this difficult because of a lack of child 
care or quality part-time work.  As Duncan and Edwards (1999) demonstrate, such 
tensions differ according to geography, class, age and ethnicity.
21
  
 
                                                 
20
 Fathers caring alone for their children also experience problems due to gender.  Employers often 
assume, for example, that they can disregard their male workers‟ parenting obligations (Connell 
2005). 
21
 This discordance emerges in policy, too.  In Australia, two different transfer policies sought to 
support different behaviour for high- and middle-income mothers compared to low-income mothers.  
At the time I was interviewing mothers, the Family Tax Benefit Part B was structured so as to 
discourage maternal employment in couple families (Cass and Brennan 2003:58; Shaver 2002:340).  
At the same time, Australians Working Together mandated employment or employment-oriented 
activities for women in families on low incomes, those who were eligible for Parenting Payment. 
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The disjuncture between policy assumptions and the reality of many people‟s lives 
has led Deborah Mitchell (1997:23) to describe Australia as in a transitional stage 
between a breadwinner and an individual model of welfare.  She has termed current 
circumstances as a hybrid „partial individual model where women are stranded 
between the breadwinner and individual models and may be subject to the worst 
features of both‟.  Lone parents, at least when claiming income support, fall outside 
of both the male-breadwinner/female-care-giver and the dual-earner/carer family 
type.  This is also true of partnered parents receiving Parenting Payment, if their 
joint income is so small they are eligible for the benefit.  These particular cases 
make apparent the assumptions about families which inform policy.   
 
The Australians Working Together requirement that mothers combine employment 
or some other employment-oriented activity with income support indicates a shift 
away from a policy presumption that mothers are occupied full time by their care-
giving and house-keeping duties.  Instead, mothers are exhorted to be both earners 
and carers.  However, as demonstrated by Australian Government policy arguments 
outlined above, care was rarely specifically mentioned.  Despite policy rules 
allowing time for unpaid care work, care is „given practically no recognition in the 
rhetoric‟ (Skevik 2005:56).  Australians Working Together policy as it was 
discussed did not examine the importance of care or the circumstances in which it 
occurs; rather it focused on the need for mothers to engage in employment. 
 
In response to persistent policy neglect of care, feminist theorists have advocated 
the adoption of a new model of adult workers which incorporates care, in 
recognition that we all need care, give care and receive care (MacDonald 1998:20).  
Such an approach would see policy encouraging fathers to engage in care as well as 
encouraging mothers to engage in employment.  In this way, the gender dimensions 
of employment and care would be acknowledged by policy.  It could not then be 
assumed, because care happens without specific policy attention, that care should 
not be supported by policy.  Nor could policy ignore the fact that women are most 
often the ones providing care.  Nor would it impose a male model of employment 
upon women (Giullari and Lewis 2005:21).  Instead of focusing only on low-
income women‟s supposed low employment rates, policy would also focus on the 
low rates of care provision among men.  Arguing this point, Giullari and Lewis 
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(2005:21) advocate policy which supports all members of society to provide care 
and engage in employment; a new policy norm of a „universal carer/worker-
worker/carer model‟. 
Mothers’ citizenship 
Skevik (2005:43) argues that citizenship provides a more useful framework for the 
analysis of welfare regimes than the male-breadwinner/female-carer models because 
of its focus on the relationship between the citizen and the state, a relationship 
particularly important for mothers who rely on state income support.  There are two 
significant threads in current debates about citizenship as it relates to welfare 
reform.  The first is the transformation of social citizenship such that one no longer 
receives welfare support by right, instead, for most forms of assistance, rights are 
tied in new ways to responsibilities; mostly a responsibility to engage in paid work.  
This has implications for all beneficiaries, including mothers.  The second thread is 
concerned with citizenship status and the grounds upon which someone is conferred 
with the full benefits of citizenship.  In the liberal model, this is classically someone 
who supports themselves financially through market work.  As a result, feminist 
analyses of citizenship have sought to investigate the status of women as citizens, 
considering the implications of labour market participation, mothering, or marriage 
for women‟s citizenship (see for example, Lister 1993; Lister 1997; O‟Connor et al. 
1999; Shaver 2002b; Siim, 2000; Skevik 2005).  The concept of citizenship that 
exists in the Australian welfare regime has become narrowly focused on paid labour 
as the primary realm of responsibility.   
 
The increasing emphasis on paid work for mothers can, in part, be situated within 
broader welfare regime changes regarding the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship.  The nature of social citizenship has changed (Shaver 2002a).  Now 
many income support recipients must demonstrate that they are worthy of 
continuing support by showing a commitment to finding and keeping a job.  
Promoted by the OECD, new approaches to the provision of income support term 
themselves „active‟, in contrast to supposedly „passive‟ programs of the past (Lewis 
2003:178; Shaver 2001:30-31).  Australians Working Together was designed to 
implement this principle.   
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Income support policy presents participation in market work as the moral duty of all 
adults, including parents; a responsibility to themselves and the community as a 
whole (Shaver 2002a:325,326).  This is evident in the Australian Government 
rhetoric; for example, in welfare changes which „recognise the importance of paid 
employment, whether full time or part time, to Australia‟s prosperity and each 
individual‟s own wellbeing‟ (DEWR 2005b:1).  Shaver (2001:282) sees this as a 
shift from citizenship as membership to citizenship as participation; participation in 
paid employment becoming the citizen‟s prime obligation. This has been at the 
expense of other forms of contribution, most notably the unpaid work of parents, 
especially mothers (Cass and Brennan 2002: 251).  Moreover, this re-articulation of 
the obligations of citizens implies that income support claimants, by virtue of being 
income support claimants, are failing in their citizenship obligations – that they 
claim the rights of citizens without fulfilling the obligations.  This happens because 
beneficiaries are considered not to understand what is best for themselves (Shaver 
2002a:341).  The response in Australia was Mutual Obligation, by which citizens‟ 
responsibilities are articulated and made mandatory.  Mutual Obligation is 
implemented though Personal advisers, who tailor service delivery to the individual 
„customer‟.  As a result, the relationship between the state and the citizenry has been 
redrawn as a series of individual relationships.  This leads to the possibility that the 
individualised nature of service provision might „open the lives and beings of 
vulnerable people to intrusion by potentially alien personal and cultural values‟ 
(Shaver 2002a:341). 
 
Focusing on the obligations of welfare claimants can serve to hide the responsibility 
of the state regarding employment and social security.  Similarly, renaming 
beneficiaries „customers‟ and social security „income support‟ serves to hide the 
previous implicit references to benefits as a social right (Shaver 2002a:341).  The 
rights of claimants are overshadowed by their obligations.  This includes the right to 
decent employment and the obligation of governments to ensure employment is 
available (McClelland 2002).  Government rhetoric contains little discussion of the 
labour market as a whole and its capacity to provide employment for parents.  
Australian programs focus on the supply side of employment: getting parents into 
jobs, rather than job creation programs (McClelland 2002:217).  The terms of 
reference for the Reference Group on Welfare Reform restricted its inquiry so that it 
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could not make recommendations on economic, tax, industry, wages, education or 
training policies (Cass and Brennan 2002:249) – despite a labour market which has 
changed considerably, resulting in a workforce polarised around wages, hours, 
opportunities and security (Hancock 2002:125).  The rhetorical focus on welfare 
recipients was matched by budgetary priorities, with little spent on labour market or 
demand-side measures when compared to other OECD countries (Shaver 
2002a:338). 
 
The repositioning of citizenship rights and obligations has particular implications 
for mothers.  In Australia, throughout much of the twentieth century, mothers met 
their obligations through their care work (Skevik 2005:45). Women, as mothers, 
fulfilled their roles as citizens.  There were many exceptions: unmarried mothers 
had limited eligibility for state assistance, and Aboriginal mothers were only 
eligible in some circumstances.  For much of the century fathers were not entitled to 
assistance on the basis of caring for children (Whiteford 2001:65).  There was a 
moral element to mothers‟ citizenship entitlements: those sole mothers regarded as 
deserving could claim assistance (Brennan and Cass 2005:6).  Caring for children 
was mothers‟ work, and by being good mothers women executed their citizenship 
responsibilities.   
 
Parents on income support have been increasingly encouraged to be both citizen-
workers and gender-neutral citizen-parents, not mothers.  This is a considerable 
change from the post-war period in which most women were expected to work as 
mothers and homemakers.  Citizenship based on care-giving is being eroded in the 
Australian welfare regime and replaced by citizenship based on market work.  Part-
time employment is advocated as the ideal minimum for mothers as it allows them 
to combine mothering with employment.  Mothers are constructed as part-time 
worker citizens. 
 
Positioning participation in paid employment as the key responsibility of citizens 
has specific implications for care.  The paid work of citizenship is regarded as a 
gender-neutral responsibility, but this ignores the gendered nature of unpaid care 
work, and in doing so, simultaneously fails to pay attention to and increases the 
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opportunity costs of care work (Rake 2001:226).  More than that, it ignores the 
value of that unpaid care.   
 
Finally, recasting parents as citizen workers and citizens as customers also raises 
questions about recognition.  Might a system of individual relationships with the 
state translate in practice into individual questioning of claimants‟ decisions and 
actions?  What does lack of recognition of the unpaid care work mean for mothers 
claiming welfare support?  As citizens‟ responsibilities change together with their 
relationship to the state, what autonomy will parents have to determine their own 
and their family‟s activities?  I begin to answer these questions of recognition 
below, and further develop this line of inquiry in the following chapter, when I 
examine welfare changes by drawing on the experience of mothers who are 
affected. 
Conclusion 
The Australian welfare regime has a history of support for the care responsibilities 
of mothers.  However, at the time when I interviewed mothers claiming Parenting 
Payment, the regime was changing, developing a far stronger commitment to 
employment as the primary citizenship responsibility, one which should be 
undertaken by all claimant types.  The mothers‟ commitment to care was at odds 
with the regime shift away from it.  It was not that there was no room for most 
mothers to continue to care as they wished – most were already doing all that would 
be required by the new policy – but the discursive emphasis had shifted towards 
paid work, with a resulting shift away from support for unpaid work.  In addition, 
the shift from treating benefits as a right to treating them as conditional, „violates 
the presumption that all citizens are equal in status, dignity and worth‟ (Shaver 
2002a:343).  As a result, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, some 
mothers felt the new welfare-to-work policy did not satisfactorily recognise their 
care commitments. 
 
The policy which was implemented for parents under Australians Working Together 
reflects the political framing of the policy.  It imposed obligations on parents, in 
order to „balance‟ their right to support, coupling the obligations with the threat of 
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penalties to ensure compliance.  It enforced a trajectory from full-time parenting to 
part-time employment, supposedly shaping the lives of claimants in the same 
manner as those of mothers not seeking assistance.  It introduced Personal advisers 
who would act as the pivotal point of interaction between parents and the state. 
 
Under Australians Working Together, parents were compelled to take paid 
employment or to undertake study or voluntary work with a view to paid 
employment for the first time.  This was a marked change from previous approaches 
which had prioritised the unpaid care work of parents.  Employment was strongly 
advocated and, as will be apparent in later chapters, strongly pushed by welfare 
administrators; nonetheless, the Mutual Obligation rules allowed parents to continue 
to spend considerable time on unpaid care work.  Only parents of high-school-aged 
children faced this obligation and they needed to spend just over six hours per week 
engaged in a compulsory activity.  Despite this, Australians Working Together 
rhetoric rarely made mention of care. 
 
The key policy concern of government officials outlined in this chapter was to raise 
employment levels by supporting a transition from welfare into work, seemingly 
based on the assumption that Parenting Payment recipients were not employed and 
unmotivated to be so.  This position does not acknowledge the considerable 
evidence available about the high levels of participation in employment and job 
search already being undertaken by Parenting Payment claimants (as outlined in 
chapter two).  It also largely ignores the complexity in the lives of those parents 
who were not in paid work and the resultant reasons why it might be difficult for 
them to find and maintain appropriate jobs: care responsibilities for children; high 
levels of disability; health problems; low levels of education, training and 
employment experience; limited English; and literacy problems.  It further ignores 
the labour market as part of the problem: the lack of appropriate part-time and full-
time employment; the availability of employment in local labour markets; and age 
and gender discrimination (Henman and Perry 2002:231-2).  
 
Mandatory programs were politically justified using derogatory characterisations of 
the circumstances and motivations of claimants.  Reliance on notions of „welfare 
dependence‟ and „mutual obligation‟ rather than evidence has been described as 
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typical of the Australian Government‟s broader welfare reform project (Howe and 
Pidwell 2002: 123-4).  Such an approach can lead to poor policy.  Commentators 
such as Bessant (2002) and Henman and Perry (2002) have argued that negative 
characterisations of the social security system and income support claimants 
demonstrate a failure by government to critically examine the evidence.  Bessant 
(2002:18) speculates that: 
 
This insistence in the face of such evidence reveals either an 
inability on the part of policy makers to understand the significance 
of the information; or a will to produce a punitive and coercive 
system despite the data that most jobless people actively contribute 
to their communities. 
 
Whether due to an inability to read the evidence or the intention to create a punitive 
system, the policy may be poorly targeted and consequently ineffective or even 
counterproductive as a result (Henman and Perry 2002:331).    
 
Criticism on this issue can be framed in terms of recognition (Lister 2002b:103-
104).  In pursuing a policy agenda using tough and derogatory language, Lister 
(2001:66) argues, the British Government „creates a negative image of the welfare 
dependent, which is damaging to the self-respect of those reliant on benefit‟.  As we 
have seen, the Australian Government has also been criticised for use of derogatory 
language (Bessant 2002; Henman and Perry 2002).  If it damages the „self-respect‟ 
of claimants, policy is disrespectful.  Honneth provides a means for a more fine-
grained interpretation of this misrecognition.  The form of disrespect described by 
Lister, and alluded to by Bessant, Henman and Perry above, belongs to the sphere of 
solidarity and social esteem.  The use of language which denigrates social security 
claimants undermines the social contribution which they make and the social-
esteem which they experience, thus a form of misrecognition which damages social 
esteem (Honneth 1995:134).  Such disrespect is „insulting‟ or „degrading‟ and 
erodes individuals‟ ability to regard themselves as socially valuable.  The effect can 
be deeply personally damaging by leading to a „loss of personal self-esteem‟ 
(Honneth 1995:134).   
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I would argue that policy is also disrespectful when it fails to attend to the evidence 
about claimants, their desires and needs.  The policy solution put forward in 
Australians Working Together – to mandate employment-oriented activity, would 
be unlikely to change the activities of those already engaged in employment or 
training.  If labour market problems are not addressed, mothers who for numerous 
reasons have trouble finding and keeping a job are unlikely to enter and sustain 
employment solely as a result of an annual meeting with an adviser and a 
compulsory activity requirement.  By ignoring the high value that many parents 
place on the loving care they provide for their children, policies may misconstrue 
the efficacy of financial incentives or penalties to employment (McDowell 
2005:372).  Furthermore, policies which compel mothers to choose employment 
over care could result in forcing mothers into action they believe is morally wrong 
(Barlow and Duncan 2000:38).  Australians Working Together policy fails or 
refuses to acknowledge the diversity of mothers as represented in research evidence.  
It is a form of misrecognition to develop policy for a stereotypical group of parents.   
 
To address the misrecognition she identifies in government welfare and poverty 
policy, Lister calls for use of a social justice agenda through which a welfare regime 
could still meet its policy imperatives but also accord respect to welfare recipients.  
This would involve acknowledging the importance of social security policies for 
poverty reduction, taking account of the value of both paid and unpaid work, and 
involving those who experience poverty in the politics of poverty (Lister 2001:69-
70).  Lister‟s social justice agenda has striking resonance with many of the issues 
raised by parents in the previous chapter:  living on low incomes, the importance of 
unpaid care work in the home and a desire to gain more recognition within the 
social security system.  All these were largely ignored in Australians Working 
Together.  If parents receiving income support were more involved in welfare 
debates, perhaps both these areas of concern and their concern with the complexity 
and inconsistencies of welfare administration could become part of the agenda, 
replacing the focus on enforcing the „responsibilities‟ of claimants. 
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Chapter four 
Enacting policy:  Australians Working Together adviser 
meetings 
 
Introduction 
A meeting between an adviser and a claimant lies at the heart of many welfare-to-
work programs (Considine 2001; Evans et al. 2003).  This was the case for 
Australians Working Together, which required annual attendance at an adviser 
interview for all Parenting Payment claimants whose youngest child was aged six 
years or more; those whose youngest child was aged 13 or more negotiated a 
Participation Agreement during the meeting.  These „street-level‟ interactions 
between clients and staff are critical to the implementation of policy. 
 
When I interviewed welfare claimants, it was clear that contact with Centrelink 
bureaucrats lay at the centre of their everyday experience of welfare policy.  The 
adviser meetings are the focus of this chapter because this aspect of their experience 
should not lie at the periphery of policy analysis, but be brought to the centre, in 
recognition of the effect of implementation and administration on how policy is 
constituted.  „Policy does not fully exist until the social actors who deliver and 
receive policy bring it into being‟ (Wright 2006:161).  The meaning of Australians 
Working Together more fully materialised for the mothers in this study when they 
had attended their adviser meetings.  When mothers discuss what it is like to claim 
Parenting Payment, they talk not about the fortnightly receipt of money into their 
bank account, or how it helps them to support their families, although these 
elements do feature, but of going to the Centrelink office and dealing with staff in 
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person or on the phone.  It is through these street-level bureaucrats that citizens 
encounter government (Lipsky 1980:3).  The ways in which street-level bureaucrats 
deliver services, the way they manage benefits and sanctions affects people‟s access 
to income support (Lipsky 1980:8-9).  Moreover, these interpersonal interactions lie 
at the heart of parents‟ experience of welfare policy.   
 
I begin my exploration of parents‟ experience of the adviser interviews by 
presenting a conversation between Cheryl and Nicole, two close friends who have 
children of similar ages (please refer to box below).
22
  Cheryl and Nicole strongly 
believed that Parenting Payment should require voluntary work on the part of 
parents.  They raised this issue in each of our three interviews, conducted before 
they had attended an appointment with an adviser and also after.  Their opinion 
aligns with that of many people in the community, but not with the opinions of 
many of the mothers in the study.  It is interesting that voluntary work was one of 
the activities allowed under Australians Working Together, but Cheryl and Nicole 
did not seem to understand this and continued to argue for its inclusion even after 
attending several adviser meetings.  Cheryl and Nicole‟s adviser appointments were 
shaped and constrained by many factors: relations of power between government, 
Centrelink, staff and claimant; the manner and effect of the interpellation which 
occurred in the appointments; Cheryl and Nicole‟s own response and performance.  
Broader matters such as community values of mothering, the local and national 
labour market and gender relations also helped shape their appointments. 
                                                 
22
 Cheryl and Nicole asked to be interviewed together. 
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Cheryl and Nicole 
 
At the time of this, our second interview, both Cheryl and Nicole had recently been to an 
appointment with an adviser.  Cheryl‟s was just before her youngest turned 13 and Nicole went with 
her as support.  At Cheryl‟s appointment, Nicole found out about a course at a technical college that 
interested her.  She enrolled and started studying about a month before she was called into Centrelink 
for her own interview.  Cheryl also applied for a course, but she was not accepted, which she felt, in 
the end, was for the best, because her mother-in-law had developed serious health problems and 
needed Cheryl to help care for her.  In the lengthy extract which follows, Cheryl and Nicole cover a 
lot of ground: their thoughts on the support Centrelink should offer to Parenting Payment claimants, 
child care, their experience of Mutual Obligation, the quality of Centrelink advice, and the nature of 
their Participation Agreement negotiations.  In this wide-ranging discussion, they touch on many of 
the aspects of Australians Working Together commented on by other mothers in this study.  This 
interview gives a sense of the constraints and possibilities offered at the adviser meetings.  
 
 
Nicole:  … I don‟t like the way that you have to go.  Like, „We‟ve made you this appointment, this 
day this time, you have to come or we‟re going to cut your payments off.‟  I think it needs, they need 
to be a bit more flexible.  I had a lot of hassle, because the day and time [of my adviser appointment], 
I was here [in a vocational course]. That‟s when I said I can‟t go.  And they didn‟t want to change 
my appointment … And that„s when I said, „Well I‟m sorry, we‟ve got to be so much in attendance 
or we‟ll fail.  I‟m not taking time off just to come and see you.‟  I was a bit rude but I was pretty 
frustrated.  As I said to them, „You know who I am, you‟re paying me a pension education 
supplement ... so obviously you know where I am, so make it for another day or I‟m not coming.‟  
They put it off for about a month … 
 
Cheryl:  And like Nicole said, they make you feel less than.  And that you have to come in on this 
day, it doesn‟t matter if you‟re going in for major heart surgery or anything, that‟s just tough cookies. 
 
Nicole:  They really hold it over you, because they have the control over your payments.  And I don‟t 
have any other income apart from what I get from them, so, I don‟t know, it shits me … 
 
 
Nicole:  Well, I‟m studying at TAFE [technical college], so I didn‟t understand why I had to go and 
discuss my options with a JET adviser when I‟m already exploring my options.  I‟m currently there.  
I just felt that it was a bit of a waste of time – for a start that I had to go ... So what I‟m doing at the 
moment is enough, so that‟s all right.  But then they kind of push you, as well.  „Like, okay so you‟re 
doing this now, so what are you going to do when this is finished?‟  And at the moment I‟m still 
getting my head around all this … I haven‟t decided whether I want to go and work in a salon, or 
whether I want to go and do more study.  So I don‟t actually know.  But I had to make an agreement 
with this lady that I‟m going to go and try and get into another TAFE course and a few different 
things that I‟ve had to agree that I‟ll definitely do, otherwise they cut your payments off … You have 
to make a decision there and then, because they punch it into the computer and they give you a print-
out. 
 
Cheryl:  It was good in informing you of things, but they‟re not realistic when you haven‟t been in 
the workforce for that long.  They think that you can just go in and get a job ... They didn‟t pressure 
me in any way, shape or form, but said when my son turns 13 then they will be looking at doing 
something ... She did kind of intimate that they would leave me alone while I‟ve got someone sick, 
but that‟s just a person saying that, that‟s not the system.  So I don‟t know, I walked out of there a bit 
– oh, I don‟t know – it was disappointment.  I thought that they were going to offer a little bit more.  
About getting back into the workforce, about showing you courses.  They did show us courses that 
TAFE offered, and explained that they would actually pay the fees and everything like that for you.  
That‟s how Nicole got into the course that she‟s doing.   
 
Nicole:  That‟s where I found out that I could go … But then there‟s no guarantee that you‟ll get into 
the TAFE course either. 
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Cheryl:  Well, I didn‟t. 
 
Nicole:  They don‟t specifically say, „Yes, you‟ll get in.‟  But they do sort of lead you to believe that.  
„Okay, right.  What do you want to do?  You can do this.  Okay, yep, you‟ll do it.‟  But it doesn‟t 
always work that way, because TAFE doesn‟t always let you in.  What I would like do after 
Christmas is study again for the first six months … but there‟s no guarantee I‟ll get into that.  And 
yet I‟ve had to make the agreement with these people that I will go. And if I‟m not accepted, I‟m 
breaking my agreement, so I‟ve got to go back and make another one then.  And that‟s through no 
fault of my own. 
 
 
Cheryl:  … And they weren‟t up to date with their TAFE courses, because yours were totally 
different, weren‟t they? 
 
Nicole:  Mine were different days, different hours and everything to the information that she gave us.  
So I applied for this course believing that I‟d be there certain days of the week, and I‟m not ... [She] 
totally mucked it around.  Had I already had a casual job, I would have had to drop out ... 
 
Cheryl:  They aren‟t kept up to date.  They‟re giving you old information basically. 
 
Nicole:  It‟s wrong information.  It can be very frustrating, very upsetting for some people.  I always 
get really frustrated when I‟m there … 
 
 
Cheryl:  It was a good interview, but in a lot of ways, I think a lot of it is unrealistic. 
 
Nicole: Very unrealistic 
 
Cheryl:  … And I thought that was a bit – whilst it was helpful, I felt that it made you feel that there 
was more potential in you than you thought possible, but it‟s not in a very realistic way.  Because 
you may feel that way, but an employer may not, because it‟s not practical experience, it‟s not work 
experience, it‟s life experience … What they‟re saying is these are things that I can actually do.  I can 
go out and get a job based on these things.  Which to me is so unrealistic … 
 
Nicole:  I can do my accounts, I can work out my budget, so I‟ve got bookkeeping experience.  I‟d 
like to know how you get bookkeeping experience out of running my household budget. 
 
Cheryl:  Yeah.  So they think we could go out and get a job on that.   
 
Nicole:  Menu planning, because we work out what we‟re going to cook.  I‟m just trying to think.  
There were a few things that really got me … And cooking, we could be chefs because we cook for 
our family. 
 
Cheryl:  Because we can open a tin and heat it up.   
 
Nicole:  I‟ve got down on my file that I‟m a qualified dressmaker, because I can alter clothes.  I can 
do hems and seams, I can, when I get around to it, I can make curtains, you know, basic, basic 
things.  I couldn‟t go and make an outfit for anybody who would go in public in it.  But yet they put 
down that I‟m a seamstress, a dressmaker or something.  It‟s just so not honest.  We would be 
dishonest if we did that in our résumé.  They‟ve done it on our file and that‟s okay.   
 
Cheryl:  It‟s like being a child.  It makes you feel like you‟re a child, basically.  „Oh look, I can do all 
these things, aren‟t I a good person?‟ But yet realistically they‟re just day-to-day activities, and you 
go into an employer and they‟re just going to laugh at you if you said, „Oh, but I cook for my family 
and I managed the budget in my household, so that‟s my bookkeeping experience and I answer my 
own home phone so I can be a receptionist.‟ 
 
Nicole:  … You can‟t make every little task that we do into a professional qualification, it just can‟t 
be done … Sometimes I feel like, „Yep, I can do this.‟  But then I go back down.  I suffer from 
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depression.  I take medication.  I don‟t need people stuffing around with my head.  And I feel that 
that‟s what they do. 
 
Cheryl:  And see I don‟t suffer from depression, but I went out of there thinking, „I‟m going to get in 
this course, I‟m going to change the world.‟ 
 
Nicole:  You can do anything you want. 
 
Cheryl:  … Because the way they explain things, you think that „Oh, you know, I can do anything‟. 
 
Nicole:  … It‟s a certain.  You feel like, „Yep!‟  Not „Oh, I can do it‟, „I am doing it!‟ 
 
 
 
The notion of interpellation provides a useful construct with which to interpret the 
experiences of mothers‟ visits to Centrelink offices.  Althusser (1977:163) 
characterises interpellation using the example of a police officer hailing someone, 
„Hey you!‟  The subject who thinks „Oh, that‟s me‟ and turns to the police officer in 
response has recognised themselves in the call and behaved accordingly.  In doing 
so, they simultaneously recognise that they are the subject of the summons and that 
they are subject to the person or institution that so summoned them.  Social security 
claimants are interpellated by policy, policy documents, interactions with staff, the 
space of the welfare office, as well as through the political language that I explored 
in the previous chapters.  They are hailed and they respond. 
 
Parents are not passive in this exchange.  They act and direct and shape the 
proceedings too.  In chapter two, I outlined mothers‟ belief that they had to manage 
relations with Centrelink staff strategically so as to attain a good outcome.  One of 
the mothers, Belle, described the interaction as involving a performance – a 
performance that she said was „Academy Award winning‟.  Other mothers spoke of 
monitoring themselves and their behaviour to maximise positive outcomes.  In this 
they were „presenting themselves‟, as Goffman (1959) termed it.  The adviser 
interviews were critical occasions for performance because: 
 
... often the interviewer will have to make decisions of far-reaching 
importance for the interviewee on the sole basis of information 
gained from the applicant‟s interview-performance (Goffman 
1959:225) 
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Here Goffman was analysing job interviews, but such a description applies equally 
to interactions between income support claimants and with Centrelink staff.  
Interviewees need to pay particular attention to their dress, their manner and their 
speech both to create a favourable impression and also to avoid making an 
unfavourable impression (Goffman 1959:225).   
 
Parents are interpellated in a number of different settings.  The process of making an 
adviser appointment was for most mothers the first „hail‟ they heard as part of the 
Australians Working Together adviser meetings.  The first section of the chapter 
examines this part of their experience.  Nicole found the process of setting an 
interview time to be inflexible and unaccommodating.  For most parents, including 
Nicole, it echoed the policy language described in chapter three: that of 
irresponsible citizens who needed compulsion and supervision if they were to do the 
right thing.  The second section follows mothers into the Centrelink office where 
they encountered another interpellating component of the policy language 
highlighted in chapter three: the claimant as customer.  Services were changed to 
encourage and require more „customer-like‟ behaviour from clients and more 
customer-service-like delivery.  As Mark Considine (2001:13) observed, however, 
„changing the service may also require an attempt at changing the identity of those 
involved‟.  The interpellation of parents is central to that attempt. 
 
In the central section of the chapter, I explore in detail the experience of three 
mothers:  Caroline, for whom the adviser meeting and its results were very positive; 
Erica, for whom the meeting was a mixed experience; and Ana, for whom the 
meeting was largely negative and very worrying.  When parents sat down with their 
advisers they were at the hub of welfare-to-work implementation; the core of 
Australians Working Together policy was implemented and mediated by the adviser 
in conversation with the parent.  It was this aspect which Cheryl and Nicole 
repeatedly described as „unrealistic‟.  They felt the adviser was „nice‟; like most 
mothers they were not objecting to the personal manner of the adviser.  However, 
Cheryl and Nicole were ambivalent about the nature of the information they 
received, which they varyingly saw as useful, inaccurate, excessive or insufficient.  
At the adviser meetings the welfare concerns of parents came face to face with the 
policy intent.  Parents came to the meeting with their desire to prioritise care for 
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their children, worry about their finances, commitment to employment and 
education and wariness of how they might be treated by Centrelink staff.  Parents 
also brought to the table their employment experience, or their inexperience and 
uncertainty regarding employment.   
 
In the following two sections of the chapter, I explore some of the reasons why 
mothers experienced the interviews the way they did.  In the fourth section, I focus 
on how parents‟ decision to disclose or withhold information from the adviser 
affected what the adviser understood of their situation and what was accommodated 
in their agreement.  Family and personal care matters were sometimes the most 
difficult to disclose, but these matters often had the most profound affect on the 
activities a parent might engage in.  I explore reasons why parents might elect not to 
disclose information to advisers, the contexts in which they might be comfortable to 
disclose personal information or feel compelled to do so, and the reasons why care 
responsibilities may not have been adequately explored in adviser meetings. 
 
In the fifth section of the chapter I examine the meetings from the point of view of 
the adviser.  Advisers came to the meetings bringing policy directives and their 
personal approach to their job in the context of Centrelink workplace culture and the 
broader social and political environment.  Cheryl and Nicole‟s adviser, for instance, 
did not have access to the accurate information about the TAFE course that Nicole 
enrolled in.  Research shows that large workloads and heavy time pressures affect 
advisers‟ ability to maintain good networks with other organisations and to ensure 
the information they have at hand is kept up to date (C Howard 2006).  The personal 
approach of advisers, the environment in which they worked, the policy directives 
they had to follow, the workloads they carried and the time pressures they faced; all 
affected the way in which they implemented Australians Working Together. 
 
The adviser meetings were the location for important flows of information: from the 
adviser, information regarding the program and employment and training 
opportunities; and from the parent, information regarding their circumstances, 
history and future plans.  These flows affected what was written into the 
Participation Agreements that parents carried with them when they left the adviser 
meetings.  By June 2004, 58,109 Parenting Payment Single claimants and 15,534 
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Partnered claimants had entered into a Participation Agreement (DEWR 2005a:30).  
The nature of those agreements is documented in the sixth section of this chapter:  
the activities which the agreements included and whether or not they were new or 
existing activities; the effect of the interpellation parents experienced and the 
manner in which they and their advisers interacted regarding the items which were 
or were not included in the agreements.  Cheryl and Nicole, for example, despite 
their commitment to voluntary work and their belief that it could help them find 
paid employment, felt unable to suggest this as an activity they could potentially 
engage in to meet their activity requirements.  Instead, they both found themselves 
engaged in what they saw as a farcical conversion of household tasks into 
employment skills. 
Receiving notification of the appointment 
Contact between a parent and an adviser started when the parent received a letter 
from Centrelink notifying her that an appointment time had been made.  One mother 
I interviewed gave me a copy of her letter which explained the subjects that would 
be discussed at the appointment and when it would occur.  She was informed that 
her attendance was required under the Social Security Administration Act and that a 
different appointment might be made if she could not attend at the prescribed time.  
These last pieces of information, written at the end of the letter, were presented as 
follows: 
 
Under the terms of the Social Security Administration Act 1999, 
you must attend this appointment to discuss options for further 
assistance.   
 
Your Parenting Payment may be stopped if you do not come to this 
interview.  Please phone us on 131021 if you can not attend.  If this 
time does not suit you, we may be able to arrange a different time.  
 
When explaining to me how their appointment was set, mothers tended to focus on 
this final aspect of the letter – the requirement to attend and the loss of payments if 
they did not.  Most understood the requirement to attend an interview as Belle did: 
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„They make you an appointment and you just have to drop everything and go and 
attend it.‟  Although Belle knew she could change the appointment time if she 
needed to, she said, „Quite often it‟s easier to just try and go when they want you 
to.‟  Some mothers attended their appointments even when it was inconvenient for 
them to do so, because they did not feel that they really could ask for a different 
time.  Pam, for example, went to an interview when her son was sick and at home 
from school.  She left him at home and went to Centrelink because she felt that 
changing the appointment time would be too difficult. 
 
Some mothers did seek to change their appointment time.  Nicole, as she explained 
above, was informed she should meet with an adviser at a time when she was 
scheduled to attend her vocational course.  She knew that her course met the 
Parenting Payment participation requirements.  She had advised Centrelink about 
the course and had received a Pensioner Education Supplement, so she knew that 
Centrelink was aware that she was studying.  Her course had an attendance 
component; if she was not in class for the required time, she could fail the course.  If 
she failed the course, she risked not fulfilling the Parenting Payment participation 
requirement.  But when Nicole called Centrelink to explain that she needed to be in 
class on the day of her appointment and to arrange a more convenient time to see 
her adviser, the officer she spoke to „didn‟t want to change my appointment‟.  She 
felt she had to be assertive and „a bit rude‟ for the officer to agree to reschedule the 
appointment. 
 
While Nicole believed that her studies indicated that she was already putting a plan 
for the future into action and that her enrolment at TAFE should therefore exempt 
her from the requirement to attend the adviser interview, what really frustrated her 
was being told that she had to attend the interview at a prescheduled time or risk 
losing her payments.  Although Nicole‟s letter had informed her that she could 
change her appointment time, when she called, the Centrelink officer was unwilling 
to reschedule.  Only after Nicole really pushed her point did the officer demur and 
set a new time.  This experience reinforced Nicole‟s sense that she was taking part 
in a process to which she was expected to submit. 
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Grace attended an adviser interview when she was extremely upset.  She had been 
diagnosed with depression, and it was bad on that day.  Despite how terrible she had 
felt before setting out to Centrelink, Grace did not feel that she could call and 
postpone the interview.  Grace knew that she could change the appointment time in 
advance if it was inconvenient because she had already done so a fortnight earlier:  
 
My washing machine was being delivered.  My washing machine 
had broken down.  I said [to Centrelink] „Oh look, I am not going to 
ring up and cancel [the delivery], I need my washing machine 
tomorrow.  I don‟t know, they won‟t tell me what time, it‟s some 
time between 7am and 12 noon.‟  And the interview was at 10am.  I 
said, „I don‟t know, I could make it, I might not be able to.‟  And 
she goes, „If you don‟t make it we don‟t pay. We‟re going to cut off 
your payments.‟  That was like sticking the knife in.  It was, like, 
how to inflict huge fear.   
 
When Grace called Centrelink, like Nicole, she was first warned that her payments 
could be stopped if she did not attend the scheduled appointment.  Like Nicole, 
Grace continued to assert her need to reschedule, despite a warning that was so 
strong it was like „sticking the knife in‟.  Grace persuaded the Centrelink officer to 
make a new time. 
 
So she reset it for 2 weeks later.  Well, in that 2 weeks a whole lot 
of things had gone wrong at home and I was just really depressed 
again.  And that morning I was particularly down.  And when I am 
talking about depressed I‟m talking about, you know, feeling quite 
suicidal, like, life‟s not worth living, I‟m not getting anywhere … I 
barely had got my kids off to school and I had to turn around and go 
to the Centrelink interview.  And he [the adviser] must have seen – 
I was in a state.  
 
When Grace was due to attend her new appointment, she was feeling very depressed 
and did not want to go.  However, given the serious warning of the consequences of 
not attending an appointment that she had received when she first changed the time, 
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she did not feel that she should try to change it again.  Facing the possibility that her 
payments would cease, Grace attended the rescheduled meeting despite her 
depression.  She cried in the interview and her adviser, saying it was obviously not 
the best time to meet, cut their meeting short.  Grace felt he was sympathetic but 
untrained to understand her depression. 
 
Nicole had also cried in an adviser meeting.  When she attended an earlier interview 
than the one I describe at the outset of the chapter, her partner had not long broken 
off their relationship.  She was extremely upset and not in the mood for a Centrelink 
visit.  When Nicole and her friend Cheryl discussed the appointment-setting 
process, they agreed that „They really hold it over you, because they have control 
over your payments.‟  I asked Nicole if she had considered not going to the meeting 
because she was so upset: 
 
Nicole:  No, they tell you that you have to go.   
 
Cheryl:  You‟ve got no choice. 
 
Nicole:  You don‟t have a choice, you get in trouble.   
 
Ana had her Parenting Payment stopped because she did not respond to the adviser 
appointment letter.  Between managing her Parenting Payment and her daughter‟s 
Youth Allowance, Ana went to Centrelink quite a lot, but she overlooked this 
appointment.  She did not explain why, but it seems likely she did not know she 
needed to meet with the adviser because she spoke very little English and could not 
read or write.
23
  When Ana visited the office she usually took an Arabic-speaking 
community worker with her or asked for a Centrelink interpreter.  On some 
occasions, however, when she felt she needed someone really assertive, she would 
take her older daughter.
24
   
                                                 
23
 When I met her she had not long learnt to write her own name, and she signed it very slowly, with 
a mixture of pride and embarrassment, on the research consent form that had been translated for her. 
24
 To demonstrate her daughter‟s assertiveness, Ana told me this story.  „Once I went to give them 
paperwork about a rent review.  They wouldn‟t accept the paper I took.  Said I had to go to another 
office, the one that deals with rent.  I couldn‟t believe it.  I said Centrelink is Centrelink, and besides, 
I can‟t get to the other office.  The next day, I took my daughter with me.  The same person was at 
counter. They accepted the forms.‟ 
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Once they stopped my payments.  My daughter went to ask why.  It 
was because I had forgotten to attend an interview … My daughter 
is very strong; she doesn‟t like Centrelink or anyone.  If she wants 
to talk she has to talk.  She has a strong personality.  They started 
the payment again straight away. 
 
With her Parenting Payment at risk and not knowing why, Ana wielded her trump 
card: her daughter.  It was not something she liked to do.  She preferred to visit 
Centrelink with her community worker because she liked her manner.  „I feel 
ashamed with my daughter.  I only take her when they have done something 
wrong.‟  Ordinarily, she felt the best method for dealing with Centrelink was to „just 
take the right forms‟ and be polite.  „You can‟t rely on Centrelink for payments and 
treat them badly.‟  So although Ana demonstrated that she could turn a situation 
around at Centrelink by involving her daughter, this was something she rarely did.  
In general, Ana‟s approach was one of polite compliance. 
 
Only one mother spoke with assurance about changing an inconvenient appointment 
time.  Kumiko felt that she could determine the timing of her interview.  I asked her 
if she could choose her appointment time: 
 
Kumiko:  Yes, yes. 
 
Megan:  So what happens, do they send you a suggestion, or? 
 
Kumiko:  I think you have to call them within two weeks to make 
appointment. 
 
Unlike other parents, Kumiko conveyed a sense of control over her adviser 
appointment time.  She did not feel threatened with the loss of her payments and felt 
that to schedule the interview for a convenient time would be a straightforward 
matter. 
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The response of the parents in this study to letters about adviser appointments is 
consistent with that of participants in the only other study I have found which 
examines this aspect of Australians Working Together: the Personal Adviser 
Evaluation conducted by the Social Research Centre (2004) for the Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations.  The researchers interviewed Newstart 
claimants who were refugees, Indigenous, homeless, dealing with major personal 
crises or recently released from prison.  The researchers found that the letters sent to 
claimants notifying them of their personal adviser meeting failed to adequately 
explain the purpose of the interview (Social Research Centre 2004:10).  While the 
evaluation participants were likely to face greater barriers to employment and to 
engaging with the personal advisers than the parents who took part in my research, 
they nonetheless had similar responses to the letters they received about their 
appointments.  There was considerable anxiety among some recipients who did not 
understand why they had been told to attend the interview.  The responses to the 
letter ranged from concern that they had „done something wrong‟ without knowing 
it, to resigned compliance: „You just do what Centrelink tells you to.‟  The reactions 
of the mothers I interviewed suggest that perhaps an additional cause of anxiety may 
have been the threatening tone of the letters, which warned that benefits would stop 
if claimants did not attend. 
 
A departmental policy maker explained the rationale for threatening to stop 
payments:
 
 
 
… a letter which gives them a time and tells them when to come in 
or their payments are stopped … acts as a push to make things 
happen.  They can always call and change the time of the 
interview.
25
   
 
In this view, the purpose of the letter is to motivate the claimant.  In chapter three, I 
showed that one of the core reasons given for the need for changes to the social 
security system was to combat „welfare dependence‟, described as a chronic 
problem arising from unmotivated claimants who did not recognise that 
                                                 
25
 Interview with Department of Family and Community Services policy maker, 22 October 2004. 
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employment would be in their best interests.  If parents were to make good 
decisions for themselves and their children, they needed to be propelled into action.  
The need for propulsion was deemed to be so great that a potential loss of income 
support was the preferred mechanism.  This approach to penalties was widespread 
in liberal welfare regimes at the end of the twentieth century; penalties were used 
less often as a form of punishment and more often as a form of motivation 
(Considine 2001:179).   
 
For most mothers the interview-scheduling process had two consequences.  First, it 
ensured that they understood that their Parenting Payment was at risk if they did not 
comply with Australians Working Together requirements.  Secondly, it positioned 
parents as subjects, subject to Centrelink direction. 
 
Their participation in the process was compelled.  To ensure Parenting Payment 
recipients‟ engagement, they were first threatened with a loss of income.  Before 
they had even reached the Centrelink office, they were made aware that their 
livelihood was on the line.  Most mothers I interviewed were highly sensitised to the 
possible loss of payments.  In part this stems from their experience.  Most could 
describe cases from their own or their friends‟ experience in which benefits had 
been stopped or withheld.  They knew it could be difficult to have the payments 
reinstated and they knew how stressful and worrying it could be.  As shown in 
chapter two, many Parenting Payment recipients lived below the poverty line.  The 
women I interviewed watched their money carefully, managing a tight budget from 
day-to-day, week-to-week.  They knew how hard it would be to manage without 
that income, even for a very short time.  So it is not surprising that they took very 
seriously the possibility of losing a significant part of their income.   
 
The letter advising parents of their appointment attempts to be helpful.  It starts: 
 
We have made an appointment for you with a Centrelink Personal 
Adviser to look at how we can help you reach your goals … You 
may already be doing some paid work, or other activities such as 
study or voluntary work.  But we would still like to talk to you 
about whether we can help you in any way. 
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Despite these helpful words, parents already highly conscious that their fortnightly 
income support relied on their compliance with Centrelink were very susceptible to 
the possibility that their payments could be stopped if they did not attend the 
appointment.  It was that aspect of the letter that they most strongly remembered.  
As Erica said, „It was a threatening letter I thought … “This is to remind you that if 
you do not report your benefits will be withdrawn”.‟   
 
The second consequence of the appointment-setting process was to position parents 
as participants in a process over which they had little or no control.  As mentioned 
above, only one mother I spoke to believed that she could arrange an interview for a 
convenient time.  A number of the others felt that changing the appointment would 
be more hassle than it was worth, to the extent that two mothers saw advisers when 
they were depressed, and cried during the interview.  Those who did attempt to 
change their appointments met with strong resistance on the part of Centrelink.  
They remembered the officers first reminding them that if they did not attend the 
appointment at the scheduled time their payments would be stopped.  It was only 
through determination and persistence that these mothers were successful in altering 
the interview time.  Even after this, they were aware that Centrelink officers would 
have preferred that they comply with original arrangements, despite the mothers‟ 
belief in the validity of their reasons for changing the appointment. 
 
Parenting Payment recipients were interpellated in their appointment letters as 
people needing help and as people who needed to be „motivated‟ to accept this help 
by the potential loss of benefits.  The hail that parents heard was perceived as a 
threat: if they did not comply with Centrelink requirements their payments would 
stop.  Adviser appointments made under the threat of cancelled benefits re-
established claimants in subjection to the state.  By recognising that the letter did 
indeed address them, parents were reconfirmed as subjects; they were already 
subjects, but they recognised themselves afresh (Althusser 1977:103-4).  They were 
not only reminded that the state held control over their income, but that they were 
subject to the requirements of the state, even when those requirements were 
inconvenient or seemed illogical.  The threatening requirement to attend an adviser 
appointment reinforced for Parenting Payment claimants their limited claim to 
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autonomy in this relationship.  They felt that they were denied the capacity to 
engage in even such a seemingly small act as rescheduling an appointment.  Parents 
were not encouraged to believe that Australians Working Together was designed to 
meet their needs, but rather that they ought to meet the requirements of the program 
regardless of their own needs. 
 
So, having been directed to attend an interview at a specific time and place, with a 
new understanding that they were subject to the requirements of the welfare system, 
mothers approached the Centrelink office: some with resignation, some with 
indignation, some with interest and hope; but few with a sense that they were part of 
system which they could direct.  When they arrived at the Centrelink office for their 
appointment, they encountered a very different interpellation. 
Walking into the Centrelink office 
The first thing that parents do when attending a Centrelink office is to walk through 
the doors and enter the building.  This may seem obvious, yet the physical space of 
public buildings is rarely addressed in policy analysis (Yanow 1995:417).  The 
facades and interiors of buildings that administer public services are designed to 
embody policy meaning (Yanow 1995:410).  New office designs have gone 
unmentioned in policy analysis of welfare reforms in Australia, despite the 
deliberate creation of new spaces for new policies.  The new offices were intended 
to facilitate interactions between staff and styled to enable one-on-one customer-
service relations.   
 
Prior to Australians Working Together, Centrelink began to redesign its offices by 
removing cubicles, closed offices and barriers in order to create open-plan offices.  
The photograph below shows one such space.  There are few barriers, so that it is 
possible to see many desks and therefore many workers.  The lines are curved and 
fluid, almost inviting the visitor to walk through the space. 
 
 131 
 
Centrelink Customer Service Centre.  Source: Vardon nd :25 
 
Helen explained how the modified layout of her local Centrelink office changed 
how she felt about being there:   
 
It used to be all sort of walled off and you had this feeling – like 
you would be standing there waiting for ages and they would be 
chatting.  You know, you would see people, the tops of their heads, 
chatting and wandering around –it was a kind of „us and them‟ 
divide.  And then I went in this time and it is all these open little 
islands.  It almost puts you on an even playing field with them, you 
know.  It makes you feel as though there is kind of respect for you 
… that seemed to have made a huge difference to me emotionally.  
It made me feel like, „Oh okay, this is kind of a business setting 
where they‟re, you know, seeing something positive and treating 
me well.‟  So that‟s a really good change. 
 
For Helen, changes in the office plan made her visit to Centrelink feel „much less 
threatening and bureaucratic‟ and, as she said, „more respected‟.  In the United 
Kingdom, where the Jobcentre Plus offices were renovated in a similar fashion to 
the Australian Centrelink offices, research found that people attending the new 
spaces remarked favourably on how the design made the spaces more approachable; 
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some felt that relations with staff were improved because the office was less 
intimidating and stigmatising (Davies et al. 2004:141-142).   
 
Modified office spaces are an element in a move by authorities to foster „customer 
relations‟ and the reshaping of interactions between „customer‟ and agency 
(Rosenthal and Peccei 2006:69).  At Centrelink, as the Chief Executive Officer 
explained, the organisation „remove[d] the symbols of unsympathetic bureaucracy‟ 
and „[took] down the high counters which hid our workplace, replacing them with 
colourful, dignified, open-plan offices‟ (Vardon 2000:8).  The old symbols of 
impersonal service in a benefits agency were exchanged for a new design that 
attempted to create „a more personal and relaxed atmosphere in which to do 
business‟ (Centrelink 2003:123).  It was more personalised, as accorded with one-
on-one service delivery.  It is the „force of reiterated convention‟ makes 
interpellation possible (Butler 1997:33).  In Centrelink, the new office design drew 
on conventional symbols of personalised customer-service in businesses.  The new 
space hailed its visitors as customers.   
 
The new office layout was so designed in an attempt to create the impression of a 
more level power relationship between staff and claimants.  Centrelink (2003:124) 
planned to have: 
 
… few physical barriers between staff and customers. The EOP 
[extended open plan] style ensures more direct customer contact 
and personalised service. EOP design helps Centrelink project a 
professional, corporate image and a caring and friendly 
environment. 
 
The personal adviser interviews were conducted in the large open-plan room at a 
wide low desk, curved in a way that reduced the strict formality of a typical 
interview setting.  Recipients could see the computer screen on which staff entered 
their information, the staff‟s work was more exposed, and the claimant could be 
more involved.   
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Although introducing a new and levelling relationship between staff and claimants, 
the new office designs continued to reinforce conventions of client/service 
relationships; otherwise clients might wander through the space claiming it as their 
own, using the photocopier, helping themselves to forms and information sheets, 
and sitting alongside rather than opposite staff.  While someone could walk from the 
street straight through the reception area to a staff member‟s desk, in the Centrelink 
offices I visited, people behaved as though the counter near the front door actually 
blocked access from the entrance to the rest of the office.  There was a sense of 
unease when someone broke with this convention and wandered among the desks 
seeking and calling for a particular staff member.  Uniformed guards monitored 
queues of beneficiaries in some offices, further reminding visitors of their position 
as clients seeking assistance rather than customers. 
 
Butler (1997:33) writes that interpellation inaugurates a subject while 
simultaneously citing convention.  It is inaugurating when a subject recognises 
themselves in the moment of interpellation, the interpellation is „introduc[ing] a 
reality, rather than report[ing] on an existing one‟.  This is achieved by drawing 
upon convention.  In responding to the hail the subject thinks, „That‟s me, I am one 
of those kinds of people‟.  When they walked into a Centrelink office for their 
appointments, parents were interpellated as customers.  The redesigned office was 
part of the process of „modernising‟ the welfare system.  „Customers‟ were to be 
„activated‟ in this new space where they met with advisers who would provide a 
personalised service. 
 
It is in this context, then, that many parents approached their adviser appointment.  
They carried their history of dealing with Centrelink, and the interpellation of the 
appointment letter and the office space.  On the one hand, parents were addressed as 
though they needed threats to ensure compliance; on the other, as customers 
choosing to engage with a service.  Parents were reminded that the state had the 
power to withhold their income, but they were also encouraged to perceive 
themselves as walking into a meeting in which power relations were equalised so 
that they and their adviser were two participants in a business transaction. 
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Meeting the adviser and negotiating a Participation Agreement 
In this section, I explore in detail three mothers‟ descriptions of their adviser 
meetings.  Caroline, Erica and Ana were three very different women who had very 
different experiences.  In detailing their interviews, I highlight some of the key 
issues raised by Australians Working Together implementation in practice.  These 
include: the nature of the „fit‟ between the adviser and the parent; the degree to 
which parents felt comfortable disclosing elements of their lives, particularly the 
care they and their children needed; and the pressures that parents perceived 
advisers operated under.  Parents were interpellated into particular positions in the 
meetings, just as they had been in the approach to the meetings.  At the same time, 
they were actors in the process, choosing the manner in which they would engage 
with the adviser. 
Caroline 
Caroline lived in a regional town in NSW with two teenaged boys, the youngest of 
her four sons.  Caroline said the adviser interview was designed to help her plan for 
future employment and financial self-sufficiency.  She explained: 
 
I had to go for an interview one time, that was late last year, and 
because they asked me what I was going to do and what my plans 
were and that sort of thing.  And I did tell her that I was doing part-
time work with [a] home nursing service, because I was just doing 
domestic work with them.  And then she said, „There is a nursing 
course coming up next year, would you like to do that sort of 
thing?‟  We discussed it and, well, actually, it was Centrelink that 
put me on to it, yes.  So then … when I saw the enrolments in the 
paper, well I thought I would go up and enrol in the course.  So I 
just went up and enrolled myself. 
 
Having discussed Caroline‟s current activities, the Centrelink adviser suggested that 
she might like to expand her skills by enrolling in a nursing course.  The idea 
appealed to Caroline and she later began that training.  For Caroline a number of 
elements aligned to make the interview a success.  She had worked in a few 
different jobs over the past five or six years and was committed to her employment.  
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Her youngest son would reach his sixteenth birthday six months after we met and 
she wanted to establish herself so that she could manage solely on her employment 
income once her Parenting Payment eligibility ceased.  In the meantime, Caroline 
was not particularly concerned about claiming income support, saying, „I might as 
well keep it while I can.‟  Caroline was already employed in work that she enjoyed 
and her adviser suggested training which would extend her skills in that area, taking 
her from a cleaner in a nursing home to a nursing assistant.   
 
I started TAFE this year because I knew I was coming off the 
pension next year and I thought, „Well I‟ve got this opportunity to 
do it‟.  And also Centrelink paid for the course for me, which was 
$360 or something.  So I thought, „Well I had better get in and get it 
done‟.  And I did work experience a few weeks back and they liked 
me that much they employed me, you know.   
 
Caroline found studying challenging, but she persisted and was proud to be near to 
completion and to have found employment already. 
 
It was a bit frightening to get back into study and classroom and all 
that sort of stuff.  But I have enjoyed it, I‟ve met nice people, got a 
job through it. 
 
Caroline‟s circumstances, her sense of herself and her plans for the future were well 
aligned with the purpose of the interview, the adviser‟s overall approach and the 
adviser‟s specific suggestion.  An evaluation of the New Deal for Lone Parents in 
the United Kingdom found that: „The quality of fit between the lone parent‟s needs 
and the nature and extent of support provided by the adviser appears to be important 
in explaining its effectiveness‟ (Lewis et al. 2000:81).  Reading Caroline‟s 
description of her decision to enrol in nursing training, we see that the advice about 
the course accorded so closely with Caroline‟s own interests, that at first she did not 
remember that the suggestion had come from her adviser.  This was an effect of an 
interpellation in which Caroline was „steered‟ in the „right direction‟.  In chapter 
three, I demonstrated that welfare reform in Australia contains a policy rationale 
that insists that paid work is essential to good parenting and good citizenship and 
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that income support claimants should seek to improve themselves and attain 
financial self-sufficiency.  The personal adviser mediated this interpellation by the 
state hailing Caroline with a call that fitted precisely.  For Caroline, the interview 
was a great success.  She undertook training in a new area; she proved herself 
capable of meeting a new challenge; she found she was a good student and a 
valuable employee; and she was confident she would be able to support herself once 
she could no longer claim Parenting Payment.   
Erica 
Erica‟s experience with her adviser was not so positive.  Mediated by a different 
adviser, the hail was different, as was Erica‟s response.  When she first mentioned 
the interview to me, she said, „I have been annoyed when I have come out of 
Centrelink before, but this time I went away feeling I needed a shower‟. 
 
Erica lived in Sydney with the younger of her two sons, aged 14.  Erica‟s 
employment was very important to her.  She took a great deal of pride in her work 
and was close to her employers.  She had worked part time with the same very small 
firm for more than ten years, but at the time of her adviser interview the business 
was barely operating because of her employer‟s ill-health.  As a result, Erica had 
been without paid work for about three months.  Like many unemployed workers, 
Erica was deeply uncomfortable with that status, so she bridled when asked about 
her history.  The way in which one question was asked particularly disturbed her:   
 
The that I told all my friends about was: „What have you done since 
you left school?‟  And here‟s this 20 years younger than me woman 
asking, at that stage a 50-year-old woman with a 31-year-old son, 
who‟s lived in other states and been involved in running her own 
businesses in WA, has lived, I feel sometimes, ten lives.  She 
showed me the sheet that she was doing it with and there was, you 
know, one or two lines [allocated for the answer]. 
 
Erica said she was expected to summarise her life since high school into one or two 
lines.  She felt this question, and the space allowed for the answer, assumed she had 
done very little since leaving school; that she had little employment experience 
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and/or was very young.  There were few other specific questions that offended 
Erica, but she felt the overall interview implied that she was not committed to 
employment.   
 
Maybe I was so supersensitive and ridiculous but I don‟t think so.  I 
just felt insulted.  I think there was a presumption in some of them 
that you are not wanting to do anything, you‟re a lazy person or 
you‟re a dole bludger … And like I said, there was not one question 
that you could pull out of there and say, „Look this is atrocious.‟ … 
It‟s a sequence of questions can give you that impression, not just 
one question in isolation.  And yeah, there‟s people out there who 
are like that, but hey, you don‟t base your interview on that.  As I 
said, I came away really, really angry … (her emphasis) 
 
Erica also commented that she felt as though she „had Tony Abbott‟s words on my 
shoulder the whole time‟.26  Erica was clearly aware of policy and media debates 
about welfare receipt and sole motherhood.  She mentioned Abbott several times, 
showing a familiarity with welfare governance which many other parents did not 
have.  The „words‟ sitting or weighing on her shoulder were probably those 
regarding social security for which Abbott is best known.  In 1999, as Minister for 
Employment Services, he accused unemployed people of being „job snobs‟ (The 
Australian 1999:3).   
 
Erica describes being interpellated: „You‟re a lazy person.‟ „You‟re a dole bludger.‟  
Unlike Caroline, Erica did not want to recognise herself in the hailing.  She said, „I 
felt cornered.  And this is when I was unemployed.‟  Erica recognised her socially 
constituted self (Butler 1997:31).  She could see that since she was not in paid work 
at the time, she would be regarded as unemployed.  Judith Butler contends that 
interpellation still occurs when the police officer calls but the subject protests.  Like 
Erica, the subject might respond, „That is not me, you must be mistaken!‟ (Butler 
1997:33).  Backed into a corner, Erica felt she had to „keep justifying myself all the 
time‟, but since she was unemployed, she felt that her defence carried little weight.  
                                                 
26
 Abbott held ministerial portfolios related to employment from 1998 to 2003, first as Minister for 
Employment Services, then as Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business. 
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She could not even detail her long work history, because the questionnaire did not 
allow for it.   
 
Erica also protested the characterisation of her parenting.  Her son has a disability 
and very early in his life she „decided to be hands on … With that Centrelink were 
part of my life.‟  For Erica, claiming Parenting Payment was a necessity because of 
her commitment to good mothering.  Prioritising her son‟s care precluded full-time 
employment.  Erica felt that the adviser interview, by stressing the importance of 
employment, devalued her parenting.  
 
I don‟t think my parenting now is valued as much and it‟s probably 
the same with any parent, I guess, whether they‟ve got a child with 
a disability or not … But somehow it is legitimate when you have 
got a child under five, but when you have got an older child then 
your parenting input isn‟t as valuable.  And that was being 
emphasised by this … by a lot of the underlying assumptions, I 
think, of the interview and what it‟s aiming to do.   
 
Erica‟s perception of how the state viewed her parenting resembles elements of 
government rhetoric identified in chapter three; in particular, recognition of paid 
work in the labour market and a lack of recognition for the unpaid work of 
parenting.  Erica faced a hail which sought to interpellate her as someone for whom 
parenting had receded in importance in comparison with paid employment.  Again, 
Erica demurred. 
 
However, while Erica did make some protest during her interview and collaborated 
with her adviser in creating answers to fit the computer-operated form, most of her 
objection was voiced afterwards when she telephoned friends.  Erica made sure that 
the adviser knew her son had a disability, but did not describe his care needs in 
detail.  „I insinuated, I made sure that the officer knew at least a reasonable context 
of my son‟s life and mine.‟  Erica is a private person and would not have been 
comfortable discussing her personal life with a stranger, telling me, „I actually never 
discuss my private situation with most people.‟  Nor did she disclose her ongoing 
health problems at the adviser interview. 
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For the same reason, it was not until the adviser sought to register Erica for 
voluntary work to learn basic office skills that Erica revealed that she dedicated 
more than the required six hours each week to unpaid work maintaining her 
employer‟s business.  Here Erica was most pleased with the results of her 
collaboration with the adviser. 
 
She was reasonable, she was very reasonable.  So, now what did 
she write in there?  She accepted that, she personally accepted that.  
But I could tell, because in fact she asked, staring at the computer, 
„How will we get this?‟ was her comment. „How will we put this?‟  
So I got the feeling that unless she did put it in a certain way it 
wouldn‟t be regarded as valid. [her emphasis] 
 
Unlike Caroline, Erica did not perceive the hail as emanating from the adviser, but 
instead from the policy itself and from Ministerial direction.  The adviser, prompted 
by Erica, communicated quite a different message: one of a joint effort to manage 
bureaucratic requirements.  This Erica could recognise herself in.  It was the 
approach she had adopted with Centrelink officers in the past as a way of coping 
with administrative requirements.  She invited them to help her find a better way.  
The risk in this strategy, which Erica acknowledged, was that officers might not be 
amenable – if they were sticklers for bureaucratic process, for example.  In this case, 
Erica was fortunate and they developed a Participation Agreement she was happy 
with.   
 
It is possible that with a different adviser, Erica may have developed the same 
agreement anyway, as her unpaid work met the activity requirements.  However, by 
feeling that she was collaborating with the adviser to reach a mutually satisfactory 
result, Erica felt that she and the adviser had a mutual understanding. Both 
recognised that the other needed to find a way to fulfil the bureaucratic 
requirements.  In doing so, they developed a degree of mutual respect.  Despite this, 
overall, Erica said: „In the end the questions … that wasn‟t me when I looked at it.  
Because of the type of questions that I had to be asked.‟  Beyond the level of her 
personal engagement with the adviser, Erica felt that Australians Working Together 
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addressed her wrongly.  The policy, as it unfolded through the adviser interview 
structure, could not recognise her.  Erica felt the questions she was asked were 
designed for someone else – not her, whose sense of self was so strongly centred in 
her work as a mother and her employment.  
Ana 
Ana has five children and lives with the youngest two, aged 15 and 18.  She 
migrated to Australia before her children were born and has been a sole mother for 
around twenty years.  With her attention focused on raising her children, Ana has 
learnt only a little English.  Her 18-year-old daughter required particular care.  Ana 
described her as „a bit slow‟. 
 
My daughter can‟t concentrate. She can‟t focus.  She never does 
anything.  We are both going to a flower-arranging course at [this] 
centre.  But my daughter can‟t remember what she has learnt.  She 
can‟t express herself properly.  
 
This daughter claimed Youth Allowance, so as well as managing her own Parenting 
Payment, Ana took responsibility for her daughter‟s payments.  At the time we met 
she was trying to arrange for her daughter to transfer to the Disability Support 
Pension, because she could not meet the requirements of Youth Allowance. 
 
Ana had been to two adviser meetings.  She was very worried about the end of her 
entitlement to Parenting Payment.  Ana told me that the adviser said, „You need to 
be prepared to look for a job.  The payment will change and it will be less.‟  Ana 
explained that she had told the adviser that she was sick and would not be able to 
hold down a job: 
 
I can‟t walk properly.  I have heart problems, a disk in my back 
causes pain.  [To me, in English, Ana expanded on how this 
affected her: „Walk slow, slow; not fast, fast.‟]  I get migraines.  I 
get dizzy.  I fall.  I have been taken to hospital … I took my 
medicine with me to show them, but they didn‟t look at it.  I took a 
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medical certificate; they said, „Everyone is giving us these.  It 
doesn‟t mean anything.‟ 
 
… I said to them, „Who‟s going to give me a job?  With my age, 
language barriers?‟ … „I can‟t even finish my housework, so how 
can I do tasks at work?‟ … I told them about problems reading and 
writing.  I felt they didn‟t care … I told them I need to care for my 
daughter.   
 
Faced with the end of her entitlement to Parenting Payment, Ana exposed the details 
of her life to Centrelink.  Ana revealed her ill-health, showing her medicines and 
doctor‟s certificate as proof; she exposed her limited English, her literacy problems 
and the care needs of her daughter.  Ana‟s strategy was to present herself as earnest 
and willing to take employment but faced with barriers which made it impossible.  
She felt the adviser‟s response was lacking in sympathy and respect.27  When the 
adviser told her that medical certificates had no meaning because „everyone is 
giving us these‟, Ana felt she was being treated as just another claimant who could 
not be trusted.  Here, Ana felt that her description of her ill-health, her language and 
literacy difficulties and her heavy care responsibilities was not believed or that these 
problems were not regarded as significant.  More than mistrust, Ana felt „they didn‟t 
care‟.  She felt belittled by a system which could not empathise with her 
circumstances. 
 
It was not clear to me if Ana entered into a Participation Agreement at her adviser 
appointment.  She had no knowledge of Australians Working Together, only that 
her Parenting Payment would cease when her son turned 16.  However, she was 
attending English language classes and a flower-arranging course, either of which 
could have qualified as agreement activities.  So it is difficult to know if she signed 
a contract agreeing to continue with these activities or if her adviser waived the 
activity requirement.  If the latter, Ana did not recall the adviser explaining about 
the activity requirements or that they had been waived.  If the former, Ana had no 
knowledge of having signed an agreement and so could easily have breached the 
                                                 
27
 Of course the adviser‟s response was constrained by Centrelink guidelines and practice, as I 
explore later in this chapter.  I do not mean that the adviser was unsympathetic, but that Ana 
experienced her actions as unsympathetic. 
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agreement without knowing she was doing so.  As a result she ran the risk of having 
her payments withheld or incurring a penalty, just as she had earlier when she 
unwittingly failed to attend an adviser interview and her payments were temporarily 
stopped.  
 
Ana‟s experience disrespect lies partially in a lack of sympathy, without which Ana 
and the Centrelink officer could not form a relationship of mutual respect.  
Sympathy can be conceived as the foundation for autonomy (Sennett 2003: 121).  
Sympathy, as Adam Smith understood it, takes place when someone endeavours „to 
put himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little 
circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer … in its minutest 
incidents‟ (cited in Sennett 2003:121).  In a sympathetic interaction we feel the 
experience of the other.  In an interaction that recognises autonomy, we understand 
that we might not fully understand the experience of the other (Sennett 2003:121).  
From Ana‟s perspective, the adviser who dismissed her concerns did neither.  Ana 
felt the adviser did not trust that she was telling the truth or sympathise with her 
circumstances.  Without a sense of trust or sympathy, there was no sense of respect.   
Disclosure and non-disclosure 
Decisions whether or not to disclose elements of one‟s personal life to the adviser 
are in constant operation in the adviser interviews.  In the negotiations about 
Participation Agreements described above, Caroline, Erica and Ana are deciding 
which aspects of their lives to present before the adviser and to what effect.  Erica, 
we saw, chose not to explain that she was unemployed due to her boss‟s ill-health 
until her adviser sought to place her in voluntary work.  It was only then that Erica 
revealed that she was already doing many hours of unpaid work each week to keep 
the business afloat.  In contrast, when it came to her son‟s health needs and her 
approach to parenting, despite preferring to keep such personal matters to herself, 
Erica thought it best that she alert the adviser to this aspect of her life.  Ana, in 
contrast, determined that it was best to expose all her circumstances, as she felt sure 
that this would elicit compassion and understanding. 
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Sennett observes that disclosing one‟s needs can be shameful.  Being needy or 
seeking help is not in itself shameful; in the private realm of relationships with 
family and friends, sharing and supporting each other‟s needs is an element of 
intimacy.  Nevertheless, if our lives are exposed against our will, we suffer from the 
„nakedness of shame‟ (Sennett 2003:117).   
 
Centrelink implemented what it describes as a „life events‟ model to service 
provision.  The Chief Executive Officer explained this approach:  
 
… customers will only need to tell us honestly about their 
circumstances – it is our job to tell them what benefits and services 
they may be entitled to and to explain as simply as possible what 
obligations are expected of them in return (Vardon 2001:8). 
 
In this model, claimants are encouraged to set out their circumstances before a 
Centrelink officer who then determines their entitlements and informs them of their 
responsibilities.  It is understandable and perhaps even desirable that, in the face of 
the highly complicated system of social security, claimants need not know their 
entitlements but only explain the circumstances which have placed them in need of 
support.  However, people‟s lives are complicated and full of detail which may or 
may not be relevant to a claim.  Beneficiaries may make mistakes when determining 
what aspects of their lives are pertinent.  In addition, interviews and tools designed 
to establish if a citizen has a legitimate claim for assistance can serve a dual 
purpose: finding those in need and providing the appropriate support, or treating a 
request for help with suspicion and seeking to reveal that a claim is not genuine 
(Sennett 2003:173).   
 
In chapter three, I showed that questioning the legitimacy of claims for income 
support was a key element of official talk about welfare; policy documents and 
politicians‟ statements about welfare referred to and brought together stereotypes 
about „dole bludgers‟ and „bad single mothers‟.  In chapter two, mothers‟ discussion 
of their interaction with Centrelink staff demonstrated that these suspicions appear 
at the level of implementation.  While they do not always encounter distrust from 
staff, most parents have at some point in the past been treated with suspicion or 
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have seen or heard this happening to other claimants.  Many approach every 
interaction with a Centrelink staff member with caution, anticipating a negative 
judgement.  As a result, mothers were also wary in their adviser interviews and 
tended to be strategic in what they chose to reveal about their lives.  They were 
honest about their circumstances but did not necessarily divulge everything. 
 
The nakedness of exposure was exacerbated by the open plan office.  Several 
mothers mentioned feeling constrained in their conversations due to the office 
layout.  Grace, for example, was surprised to be in such a public area, close to the 
highly used photocopier. 
 
I expected it to be in like a room … if you speak with one of the 
social workers they put you in a private interview room.  [Where 
we were] was in a part of Centrelink that was sort of to the back of 
the office, but it was open.  Like, it was this far from the 
photocopier.  It would have been say from here about 4 or 5 metres. 
 
In their adviser interviews, Helen and Nicole each sat close to other staff members 
with whom they had had negative experiences.  Nicole explained, „I was getting 
really upset because, as I was explaining to him, you know, “Look, that‟s the 
woman that won‟t put my paperwork through.”  And so that was making me cry 
even more.‟  This lack of privacy made revealing personal matters more difficult. 
 
Yet for the adviser interviews to be successful they rely on exposure.  Parents must 
disclose their employment aspirations so they can develop an agreement with the 
adviser to meet these aspirations.  They must also disclose any „barriers‟ to their 
fulfilment.  The question guide that advisers use in interviews assumes that barriers 
are more likely to be personal than social (see appendix four).  Under the section 
„Possible Issues‟, which asks, „Is there anything stopping you from achieving any of 
the goals or interests we have discussed so far?‟ eight of the tick-box items relate to 
structural issues, such as a lack of transport or care services, cultural attitudes, 
employer discrimination and „no suitable jobs‟.  The remaining nineteen tick-boxes 
relate to personal matters such as „low self-confidence‟, „lack of career direction‟, 
„lack of employment experience‟, „lack of money management skills‟, „unresolved 
 145 
legal issues‟, „low language, literacy and/or numeracy levels‟ and „poor motivation‟.  
It would be understandable if parents did not feel comfortable exposing these 
aspects of their lives. 
 
Admitting any of these things or asking for assistance with them need not be 
shameful, but revealing them before being ready to do so might well be shameful.  
As Sennett (2003:188) writes, „There‟s nothing inherently shameful about it [the 
statement „I need help‟], so long as it can be managed by the person who makes it.‟  
For some parents, the only way to „manage‟ the revelation of their need for help in 
their adviser interview was to choose not to disclose. 
 
As a result, some parents would have entered into Participation Agreements that did 
not take full account of the complexity of their lives.  The Social Research Centre 
(2005a:9) found that while 64 per cent of parents with teenage children said they 
were experiencing some form of difficulty (for example, financial, personal, 
relationship or accommodation difficulties) at the time of their adviser interview, 
only 36 per cent discussed a problem with their adviser.  On average parents were 
experiencing two difficulties, so it is likely (though not observable from the data) 
that some parents discussed some but not all of their problems.  The most common 
difficulties were emotional or stress related (42 per cent), severe financial problems 
(32 per cent) and problems which were being experienced by children (25 per cent).  
If parents did not divulge a problem that might make it difficult for them to meet 
their requirements, this issue could not be accommodated in their agreements.  
When they left the interview, they did so with a contract that would remain in place 
for six months.  While they could contact Centrelink to renegotiate if the activities 
proved unsuitable, most parents did not know that this was an option.  Alexander et 
al. (2005:79) discovered that only about a third of Parenting Payment claimants 
understood that they were entitled to modify their Participation Agreement if they 
needed to because they could no longer comply (Alexander et al. 2005:79).  Most 
did not know that they could change either the hours they spent on activities or the 
nature of the activities. 
 
Parents who chose to disclose the entirety of their difficulties relied on the officer 
and the system to treat their concerns seriously.  Ana tried to show a Centrelink 
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officer her medicine, „but they didn‟t look at it‟.  She acquired a medical certificate 
which detailed the nature of her ill-health, but the staff dismissed it.  She explained 
that she was only just learning to read and write, but „felt they didn‟t care‟.  She told 
of the high level of care her daughter needed, but because her daughter‟s disability 
was not recognised either, the care Ana provided was disregarded.
 28
  Ana did not 
feel that any of these revelations were treated respectfully.  She felt rebuffed as yet 
another claimant with excuses.  As a result she felt powerless.   
 
Margaret met with an entirely different reaction when she reported that she had been 
diagnosed with a serious illness. 
 
When I found out that I had the cancer, and I was on a part-pension 
at that stage … I rang that night and said, „Well look, this has 
happened and I now have to stop work altogether to have the 
operation and chemo and all of that.‟  And on the phone, the woman 
just said, „Fine, I will organise it all now.‟  I said, „I‟ve got a letter 
from my boss.‟  „Oh, look, we will sort out the paperwork later, 
don‟t even bother.‟ … So that has been really good and that 
happened very smoothly.   
 
In contrast to the officer that Ana spoke to, this officer did not even seem to require 
the correct paperwork to exempt Margaret from any activity requirement 
immediately.  The „smooth‟ way in which this was handled allowed Margaret to 
concentrate on her health and her family without the additional stress of meeting 
administrative requirements in order to continue to receive income support.  This is 
an example of a respectful interaction.  Margaret‟s depiction of her circumstances 
was believed, unlike Ana‟s, which was belittled.   
 
In Honneth‟s (1995:114-120) account of the sphere of legal recognition, respect is 
the recognition of a person‟s responsibility to act according to the law.  It is 
recognition of each party as autonomously responsible persons who will act 
according to moral and legal norms.  The problem for Ana was that this assumption 
                                                 
28
 Ana had been trying unsuccessfully to have her daughter transfer from Youth Allowance to 
Disability Support Pension. 
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was not granted to her; her adviser assumed that she was not telling the truth and by 
doing so denied Ana recognition as a responsible member of society.  In legal 
recognition, two operations happen simultaneously: while on the one hand we 
presume knowledge of legal obligations, on the other hand we must judge in any 
given situation whether we are dealing with someone who has the qualities which 
make these obligations applicable (Honneth 1995:112-113).  Honneth draws on 
Marshall to argue that in modern societies the development of universal human 
rights invests all of us with the moral responsibility to be granted legal recognition.   
 
The difficulty for Ana and other income support claimants is twofold.  On the one 
hand, they are making a claim for support in a political environment which has 
undermined the legitimacy of such claims.  As we saw in chapter three, welfare 
recipients have been assumed to be irresponsible precisely because they are drawing 
on income support.  Since a morally responsible adult is deemed to be one who 
supports him or herself through employment, anyone without employment is 
therefore either immoral or irresponsible.  In appearing to assume that Ana was not 
telling the truth, her adviser enacted a policy assumption that Ana, as a welfare 
claimant, would not act responsibly unless forced to do so.  The rejection of her 
medical certificate was not an uncommon one.  In the year from 2002-2003, 
Centrelink refused to accept 46,321 medical certificates, more than twice as many 
as the year before (Karvelas, 2004:1-2).  Ana‟s adviser was acting within specific 
institutional guidelines in a political and social climate of mistrust of people who 
receive welfare payments.
29
 
 
On the other hand, Ana was dealing with an individual.  Her adviser may have been 
having a bad day; things could have been personally difficult for her before or after 
she arrived at work.  She may just have uncovered serious fraud which made her 
doubt the integrity of all claimants.  She may have worked in an office environment 
which bred mistrust, she may have just been informed that she was too lenient and 
that she should treat claims of illness with more caution.  There are many reasons 
why Ana‟s adviser, as a worker, may have acted the way she did.  An enduring 
feature of mothers‟ experience with Centrelink, as pointed out in chapter two, is that 
                                                 
29
 I discuss the institutional constraints on advisers in more detail later in this chapter. 
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the nature of their dealings depends on individual staff members.  Margaret said the 
supportive response she received when she reported she was stopping employment 
while she treated her cancer was „fantastic‟, but she immediately added that such a 
reaction was an „odd occasion‟.  Individual staff members are important in a system 
which relies heavily on the actions and decisions of street-level bureaucrats. 
 
These mothers‟ experiences of the adviser interviews show how a „work-test‟ 
pushes citizens seeking income support towards greater exposure.  More of their 
lives needed to be presented before the benefits agency to prove their entitlement to 
assistance.  That exposure is ongoing.  By being required to expose their lives to the 
scrutiny of the agency, claimants „are being judged as whole human beings – now 
an adversarial judgment in which the party judged feels naked‟ (Sennett 2003:173).  
The degree to which parents comply with this demand affects the success and 
appropriateness of a process which relies on claimants to make their whole lives 
available, or to at least know which aspects of their lives they should reveal. 
Family and personal care 
Mothers, as seen in chapter two, had very particular ideas about good mothering; 
about what was best for their children and themselves and how they wanted to 
achieve this.  This involves varying strategies that require different combinations of 
spending time at home, in paid work and study.  Despite this, few of the mothers 
told me that they discussed their family‟s care needs at their adviser interviews.  
Those who did were either assertive like Erica or felt that full exposure might be in 
their family‟s best interests, like Ana. 
 
Of the fifteen questions in the adviser interview, two relate explicitly to family care 
(see appendix four).  In contrast to parents, who commonly place their families at 
the forefront of any discussion of their activities, in the adviser meetings, talk of 
family comes after nine questions relating to employment, work skills, interests, 
transport, health and literacy.  Parents are then asked an open question, „Can you tell 
me something about your family situation?‟  Followed by a tick-box question, „Who 
is most responsible for the care of your children?‟  Neither of these questions would 
necessarily elicit information about the care needs of children.  The former might, 
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especially if the parent felt the child‟s care needs warranted particular discussion, 
but it is possible to imagine that the question related more to family structure than to 
care; how many children a mother had, for example, or whether she was married or 
divorced.  Parents have other opportunities to raise their children‟s care needs.  The 
first two questions, which ask about activities over the last few months and interests 
provide „caring‟ options in their checklists, alongside other options such as looking 
for work, studying or sporting activities.  The final question, „Is there anything 
stopping you from achieving any of the goals or interests we have discussed so far?‟ 
provides for the possibility of ticking „family reasons and responsibilities‟, „lack of 
appropriate childcare‟ or „lack of respite care‟. 
 
The status of care concerns in the Participation Agreement process is clear from 
these questions.  Firstly, the two items which specifically refer to family were raised 
near the end of the meeting, after considerable discussion of education, employment 
and health.  Secondly, the question which refers explicitly to care asks about who 
provides the care rather than the nature of the care provision.  And thirdly, only one 
question, the one about family situation, allowed a free-text response to be recorded; 
the other questions all only offered checklists to tick.  The low status of care in the 
adviser meeting reflects the low status it was given in policy documents and 
political statements about Australians Working Together, as discussed in chapter 
three.  Barely mentioning care would have aided the interpellation of mothers as 
workers, not carers. 
 
In research about adviser meetings conducted by the Social Research Centre 
(2005a:12), just 20 per cent of parents with children aged 13 and over said that they 
discussed child care with their adviser.  This was in response to a multiple choice 
question in which child care was the only option which related to children‟s needs, 
except for, potentially, the option „personal problems or issues‟.  So parents may 
have discussed their children, but not child care.  Regardless, this is a very low 
figure.  Especially since, at the time of their adviser interviews, a quarter of parents 
with 13 to 15 year old children said that their children were having problems (Social 
Research Centre 2005a:9).  Presumably, it would not only be those parents of 
children who were having difficulties who might wish to discuss their children‟s 
care options. 
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The majority of the mothers I interviewed told me of some difficulty which their 
children faced, these were most often due to disabilities or illness, but also 
emotional problems or issues connected with school such as poor attendance or 
difficulties with school work (as outlined in chapter two).  Those who did not report 
any health or behavioural problems for their children were still centrally concerned 
with the care needs of their children.  Many felt that the teen years required 
particular and new forms of parenting, supervision and support.  Despite strong 
feelings about the care needs of their children, this was one aspect of their lives that 
some mothers were reluctant to disclose, even if their children were experiencing 
difficulties that required greater parenting support.  I asked Belle, whose son was 
diagnosed with depression in the year before her adviser interview, if this was 
something she raised with her adviser.  She said was not sure she would have.  
When I asked why, she replied: 
 
Because mostly when you are talking to people about things like 
that they are not well informed enough not to have prejudices. 
 
Similarly, Helen, whose son‟s behavioural problems became worse when she tried 
paid work, said that she would not discuss this with an adviser.  For her, a lack of 
privacy in the interview setting affected this disclosure:  
 
The open plan thing works on business-like level, but it wouldn‟t 
work for something confidential like that. 
 
Even if there were an expectation on the part of policy makers that the care needs of 
children when they reached their teens would be fairly straightforward, it seems 
there was little or no time to discuss the diverse forms of everyday care which 
mothers provide.  Caregiving, caring for and caring about, the elements of care 
identified in Fisher and Tronto‟s (1990:42-43) typology, were not given equal 
weight in the interviews.  The adviser interviews provided for a limited 
understanding of care; when it was considered at all care was primarily regarded as 
caregiving – the hands-on labour of completing care tasks.  The coordinating and 
managing elements of caring for someone were less evident, and the love and 
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affection of caring about their children was perhaps given even less room.  Of 
course individual advisers would have probed about care differently and different 
parents would have insisted on discussing care, but the structure of the interviews 
did not provide for care of children to be interwoven into parents‟ activities or a 
base on which family arrangements were built. 
 
Parents were not required to undertake activities outside school hours (Alexander et 
al. 2005:2).  So perhaps it was felt that if parents completed their activities during 
the school day, and could be at home after school with their children, then no 
additional consideration for care needed to be made.  Despite this provision, 
Alexander et al. (2005:88) found that half of the parents did their activities after 
school hours.  Interestingly, many of those parents were not doing new activities 
but, prior to signing their Participation Agreement, had already chosen to engage in 
work, study or volunteering at times when their children were not in school.  It was 
parents who were employed who were most likely not to be home when their 
children were not at school.  In general, parents made informal arrangements so that 
someone else, another parent, a sibling and less commonly a grandparent, relative or 
friend looked after the children.  A few parents took their children with them.  None 
used formal care arrangements.  In their study, five children of the 21 whose parents 
were engaged outside of school hours were left alone at home. 
 
In my study too, a few children spent time alone at home while their parents worked 
or studied.  Kumiko and Naomi were both already far exceeding the activity 
requirement when first required to sign an agreement.  Both regularly left their 
children at home alone.  Kumiko felt that this was good for her sons as it would help 
them develop independence and maturity and she praised the greater responsibility 
they took for household tasks now that she had less time for such work.  Naomi had 
been working on weekends, but stopped when her son started high school because 
she felt he needed more of her attention and time.  She was confident about his 
capacity to manage at home alone. 
 
Nicole also left her children at home alone while she engaged in her Participation 
Agreement activity.  She worried about it but felt she had no choice.  Nicole had 
decided to enrol in a TAFE course when she accompanied Cheryl to her adviser 
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interview.  The adviser, having waived Cheryl‟s activity requirement, provided 
Nicole with information on the types of courses available, enrolment procedures, 
assistance with fees and the times that the classes were on each week.  Nicole 
explained that when the course started she discovered that the classes did not occur 
at the times she had been told they would.  She continued with the course, but was 
very worried about leaving her children at home on their own. 
 
I stress substantially, because there‟s three hours.  Now I don‟t have 
a car.  I have a panic, „What if something happens?  I can‟t get 
there.‟  It would be great if they could go somewhere, but there‟s 
nowhere that‟s really safe.  
 
Not only was Nicole worried about the safety of her children at home, she was also 
worried about the implications for her status as a responsible mother.  This was a 
sharp concern for her:  her youngest child was removed from her custody when she 
was a toddler and now lives elsewhere.  Nicole was very worried that if something 
happened to her children while she was not at home she could again be accused of 
being a neglectful parent.  A limited ability to explore her family‟s care needs in 
detail with her adviser and a belief that the Participation Agreement could not be 
changed meant that Nicole felt locked into this arrangement. 
Street-level bureaucrats 
Interaction with Centrelink staff members was a central component of mothers‟ 
experience of Australians Working Together.  Although some of them had heard of 
the policy beforehand and all had received a written notice of the requirement to 
meet with their adviser, it was during the time that they sat face to face, discussed 
their circumstances and drew up their Participation Agreement that the policy 
became visible.  Furthermore, despite the longer term implications of the policy 
after the meeting, notably in the form of the six-month-long contract, it was the 
meeting itself that represented the policy in action for parents. 
 
Earlier in this chapter I explored how parents were interpellated by policy in their 
adviser meetings through the mediation of the adviser.  If Caroline‟s experience of 
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being encouraged to take up new study that both appealed to her and provides her 
greater employment security can be taken to be an example of a successful meeting, 
then it seems that a convergence between the adviser‟s and the parent‟s 
interpretation of the parent‟s circumstances, interests and needs provides the 
greatest chance of success.  „Success‟ which arises from an interaction that suits the 
parent, meets the adviser‟s requirements and the policy intentions.  However, as we 
have seen, the meetings could not always be considered successful in those terms.  
This is perhaps not surprising given the constraints that advisers and parents faced. 
 
The advisers were working in a context; the way they did their job was shaped by 
their local office culture, policy rules, quotas and targets, workloads and time 
pressures.  The high caseloads of Centrelink staff are especially significant.  In his 
ethnographic study of Centrelink offices, Cosmo Howard (2006:148-50) found 
individual staff members were commonly responsible for over 1000 clients, and this 
in a service delivery system that was intended to match each client with a particular 
staff member in order for the service to be more tailored to the individual.
 30
  Others 
estimated that personal advisers would have a caseload of around 700 people 
(Ziguras and Flowers 2003:41).  Even if JET Advisers, the advisers who met with 
Parenting Payment recipients with teen children, had fewer clients due to the 
expectation that they were to engage more intensively with the people they met, it 
seems likely that they were nonetheless responsible for hundreds of claimants each.  
Only an extraordinary person would be able to remember and personally engage 
with such a large number of people, especially when they were unlikely to meet 
with most of them more than once or twice per year.  A few of the staff in Howard‟s 
(2006:149) study said they felt that they were able to develop a rapport with some 
clients, but most felt the large caseloads and infrequency of meetings made such a 
relationship impossible. 
 
The JET advisers who I interviewed were each solely responsible for parents from 
multiple Centrelink offices.  James, for example, interviewed parents from four 
different office catchment areas.  He rotated between three offices each week; 
parents from the fourth office, which did not have space to accommodate him, came 
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 C Howard observed three Centrelink offices in 2000 and 2001. 
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to whichever other office was nearest to where they lived.  In the Social Research 
Centre (2005c:27) personal adviser study, which interviewed nearly all of the 
advisers working in Australia in June 2004, 100 people were JET Advisers, the 
remainder were personal advisers (Social Research Centre 2005c:3,27).
31
  There 
were 321 Centrelink offices serviced by those 100 JET advisers, so it seems James‟ 
situation in which he had responsibility for four offices would have been common 
(Centrelink 2005: 12).   
 
The time pressures that advisers faced would have affected the way that they chose 
to interview clients.  Howard (2006:150) found that staff tended to adhere to set 
procedures in order to complete required tasks in the time they had available.  
Sharon Wright (2002:239-241) in her study of front-line interactions in United 
Kingdom benefits administration found that time pressures led many staff to 
eliminate all but what they regarded as the most essential aspects of the jobs.  An 
interaction which was intended to support job search as well as ensuring the 
continuation of payment for unemployed clients was reduced to the minimum 
needed to ensure benefit payment; job search was routinely overlooked.  One staff 
member depicted the consequences of limited time, saying they had to concentrate 
on „processing cases rather than assisting people‟ (Wright 2002:242).  As a result, in 
implementation, „active labour market policies, recreated by front-line staff, became 
much less „active‟‟ (Wright 2002: 249).  Australian advisers meeting with Parenting 
Payment claimants would also tailor their meetings to accommodate the large 
number of clients and the limited time available by focusing on the aspects of the 
interaction which they saw as most essential: drawing up a Participation Agreement 
as was required in all meetings.  Advisers might spend less time on subtler, less 
measurable aspects of their jobs which might lead to more meaningful and 
understanding engagement with parents. 
 
Centrelink staff are obliged to act according to the rules of the organisation and the 
direction of their funding departments, Family and Community Services, and 
Employment and Workplace Relations.  When Ana‟s medical certificate was 
dismissed with „It doesn‟t mean anything‟, the Centrelink officer was reflecting a 
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trend in government policy.  In 2004, the rate at which medical certificates were 
rejected had more than doubled since the previous year.  The then Acting Minister 
for Family and Community Services explained: 
 
This represents a deliberate government approach to ensure that, 
instead of where the old (system) just accepted a medical certificate 
as gospel and didn‟t take into account any other individual 
circumstances, under the new system an individual‟s case is looked 
at more closely (Andrews, cited in Karvelas, 2004: 1-2).  
 
While it might have seemed that Andrews was arguing for a holistic approach to 
individuals‟ circumstances, it would not be necessary to reject a medical certificate 
in order to take other aspects of people‟s lives into account when determining 
whether or not they might be able to seek employment.  Many people who engage 
in paid work have disabilities or illnesses, but this remains an element of their lives 
that should be considered.  Instead, Andrews rejected the validity of medical 
certificates as a „deliberate government approach‟.  Staff were working in an 
environment in which they were instructed to disbelieve claimants.  Even a medical 
certificate was not taken as sufficient evidence that someone had a genuine health 
problem. 
 
In addition, staff were required to meet performance targets.  The targets shift and 
change over time and can affect the way that staff operate and the kind of service 
that claimants receive.  James, a JET adviser, worked under performance targets 
which included the number of people he referred to particular types of service, such 
as language classes or the Job Network.  He was aware that this target could 
potentially influence his interaction with parents, and led him to refer people to 
services which did not fully meet their needs or at a time which was not appropriate.  
He said he attempted to operate without consideration for the targets, believing that 
he would meet them in the long term. 
 
Well I try not to let it [affect the way I work], because I don‟t want 
to be seen to be pushing a particular barrow.  I would prefer to refer 
the clients to where they want to go, where they‟ve mentioned that 
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they want to go … for instance, I had a lady this morning [who used 
a] Mandarin interpreter.  She can speak some English, so I 
mentioned the language program for her.  Her problem at the 
moment is, her son is still very young, so she doesn‟t want to leave 
him alone over the school holidays while she does this.  So we 
made arrangements that, come school going back, we‟ve got 
another appointment and she wants to be referred to the language 
program because she wants to improve her English. 
 
While James tried not to let his approach to his work be influenced by the system of 
targets, this is very much a decision made by the individual staff member.  The 
targets were in place precisely because they were designed to influence staff‟s 
decisions about how they work.  A stark example of how staff‟s service delivery, 
and therefore clients‟ experience of the service, can be affected by targets comes 
from patterns of breach penalty rates in the years just prior to the start of this study.  
The number of penalties given to claimants for failing to comply with requirements 
increased by 250 per cent in just a few years (NWRN and ACOSS 2000:3).  
Reviewing this trend, the Independent Review of Breaches and Penalties in the 
Social Security System observed that „many Centrelink officers with responsibility 
for breach decisions felt under considerable pressure to increase breach rates‟ 
(Pearce et al. 2002: 16).  The rate at which penalties were applied fell after policy 
changed and officers were instead urged to engage in a thorough investigation 
which took into account extenuating circumstances.  When the measure of good 
performance changed from the number of penalties to the quality of the 
investigation, officers applied the penalties less often. 
 
The mothers I interviewed nearly always had kind words to say about the advisers 
personally.  At the very least most felt that the advisers were just doing their job.  
The Social Research Centre (2005a:11) survey of this group of Parenting Payment 
claimants also found high levels of positive reporting about the interviews.  Nearly 
all agreed that the adviser had explained the purpose of the interview clearly and 
that they were treated as individuals.  Most said the information they received was 
useful and that the adviser understood their situation.  Advisers were also generally 
positive about the perceived effects of the interviews, especially with regard to 
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parents who attended under compulsion.  The advisers considered this group of 
Parenting Payment claimants as the one which most benefited from their services, 
more so than parents who attended voluntarily or unemployed claimants (Social 
Research Centre 2005a:8).  Primarily, this was because they felt parents benefited 
from the information advisers could provide, because they were seen as receptive to 
the advice offered and because they were regarded as responsive to the kind of 
encouragement and motivation which were proffered in the interview.  At each 
appointment, regardless of their style and approach, the advisers were required to 
draw up a Participation Agreement with the parent. 
The Participation Agreements 
Parents walk away from their adviser meetings with a contract: a Participation 
Agreement which they have developed with the adviser and which they sign, 
committing themselves to engaging in a particular activity for six months.  As noted 
at the beginning of this chapter, in the year to June 2004, 58,109 Parenting Payment 
Single claimants and 15,534 Partnered claimants entered into Participation 
Agreements (DEWR 2005a:30).  Only a few exemptions were granted, 316 to 
Parenting Payment Single recipients and 122 to Partnered. 
 
Among the women who participated in this study, education was the activity which 
was most often written into agreements.  Nine mothers committed to study, five to 
employment and two to voluntary work.  Four received exemptions due to health 
problems or because of significant care responsibilities for other family members 
and two were unsure of the nature of their agreement.   
 
Many of the women I interviewed were already working or studying at the time of 
their adviser interview.  They included those existing activities in their Participation 
Agreements (see table 5).  Of the fifteen mothers, seven signed agreements in which 
they committed to continuing in an activity they were already undertaking; one of 
them, Margaret, was later exempt due to health problems.  Another two mothers, 
Alia and Ana, both of whom were studying English, were so unsure about the nature 
of their Australians Working Together requirements that it was unclear whether this 
was a new activity or if they were already doing it at the time of their adviser 
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interviews.  Two mothers started new activities: both Caroline and Pam entered 
part-time study as a result of the adviser interview.  Pam had been exempt from 
activities at the time of her first adviser meeting, but was not at the time of her 
second meeting, despite believing that her health status had not changed.  It seems 
that Centrelink had investigated her health in the meantime and had perhaps 
concluded that it did not warrant an activity exemption.  Helen committed to a new 
activity that she had wanted to begin; she took her plan to the adviser meeting and 
asked the adviser to give her information to help her implement it.  Nicole started a 
new activity, but as a result of attending a friend‟s adviser meeting, so she was 
already studying part time when she was called to attend her own meeting.  
 
Table 5. Mothers‟ Participation Agreement requirements 
 
Name Activity Nature of Agreement 
Alia Part-time study Unsure 
Ana Part-time study Unsure 
Belle Intermittent employment Existing activity 
Caroline Part-time study New activity 
Nicole Part-time study New activity 
Cheryl Exempt due to care responsibilities Exempt from activity 
Erica Voluntary work/part-time employment Existing activity 
Grace Exempt due to ill-health Exempt from activity 
Helen Study towards self-employment New activity 
Kumiko Study/voluntary work Existing activity 
Margaret 
Part-time employment/later exempt due to 
health 
Existing activity, 
exempt from activity 
Mary Part-time study Existing activity 
Naomi Part-time study/part-time self-employment Existing activity 
Pam Exempt due to health/part-time study 
Exempt  from activity, 
a new activity 
Tara Full-time employment Existing activity 
Source: Interviews with 15 income support recipients with activity requirements. 
 
It was to be expected that many Parenting Payment claimants would be able to fulfil 
their participation requirement with existing activities.  Before the introduction of 
Australians Working Together, there was strong evidence of the high rates of 
employment, education and volunteering among Parenting Payment recipients in a 
number of studies (as shown in chapter two).  The evaluation of the pilot program 
for expanding activity requirements also concluded that most parents would be able 
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to fulfil the activity requirements by continuing the activities they were already 
undertaking (Pearce 2000).   
 
It is not surprising then that the two studies which examined Parenting Payment 
Participation Agreements in detail also found that most parents incorporated 
existing activities into their agreements.  Both of these studies were funded under 
the Australian Government evaluation of Australians Working Together.
32
  At the 
time that parents first attended a personal adviser interview 74 per cent were already 
participating in some activity (Social Research Centre 2005a:8).  For the majority 
this was economic participation: 64 per cent were employed, seeking employment 
or engaged in voluntary work or training for vocational reasons.  A further 10 per 
cent were studying or working voluntarily for reasons which were not vocational.  
An additional four per cent had care responsibilities for family members or friends 
that limited their ability to take part in employment or education.   
 
Many parents signed Participation Agreements that included those activities.  Of 
those who remembered signing a Participation Agreement when interviewed by the 
Social Research Centre (2005a:17), 61 per cent said that they were already doing at 
least one of the activities in their agreement before their adviser meeting.  Of their 
smaller sample of just 60 parents, Alexander et al. (2005:78) found that three-
quarters of the parents had an existing activity in their agreements.  More than half, 
33 parents, signed agreements which contained only activities they were already 
doing and a further eleven had agreements which included new and existing 
activities. 
 
                                                 
32
 The Social Research Centre (2005a and 2005c) surveyed income support claimants who had 
attended personal adviser meetings.  Respondents were interviewed twice, once in May or June 
2004, then again in November or December 2004.  Of the 3,007 participants in wave 1, 629 were 
Parenting Payment claimants whose young child was aged 13 to 15 years (Social Research Centre 
2005c:47-48).  Eighty-two per cent of the sample participated again in wave 2.  The Australian 
Institute of Family Studies was funded to research the impact of compulsory AWT participation on 
Parenting Payment claimants and their 13 to 15 year old children (Alexander et al. 2005).  To 
contextualise the impact of the program, the authors presented an appendix which detailed 
examination of the nature of parents‟ Participation Agreements.  Like the Social Research Centre 
study, this research was also undertaken over two waves, the first in June and July 2004 and the 
second in March and April 2005.  Alexander et al. (2005:13) interviewed 60 parents and their 
children in wave 1 and 55 in wave 2. 
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Both research teams found that parents most often agreed to include education, 
voluntary work or employment in their Participation Agreements (see table 6 
below).  The Social Research Centre found nearly half of the agreements included 
education or training and a similar proportion included voluntary or community 
work. A quarter said they would undertake to search for a job and a sixth part-time 
employment (Social Research Centre 2005a:17).  The activities of participants in 
the Alexander et al. (2005:80) research were also concentrated in the areas of 
education, voluntary work and employment, a greater proportion were employed 
and fewer were studying or engaged in voluntary work. 
 
Table 6. Activities included in Participation Agreements 
 
 Social Research 
Centre 
n=450 
% 
Alexander et al.
 33
 
n=55 
% 
Education or training 41 20 
Voluntary work 38 29 
Employment 16 22
34
 
Job search 25 4 
Care for family member na 11 
Health maintenance na 4 
Gain drivers license na 2 
Source: Social Research Centre (2005a:17) and Alexander et al. (2005:80). 
 
Of those who signed an agreement containing an existing activity, this activity was 
employment for nearly half and for most of the others this was voluntary work 
(Alexander et al. 2005:78).  Those who combined an existing activity with a new 
one most often started to study in addition to the paid work they already had.   
 
Not only were many parents already undertaking activities before they entered into 
a Participation Agreement, nearly all were spending far more time each week on 
those activities than was required.  On average, Alexander et al. (2005:80) found 
that parents committed 21 hours per week to the activities in the Participation 
Agreement.  Only two parents, out of the 55 at wave two of their research, were 
                                                 
33
 Detailed data about activities was collected at wave two of the survey.  At that time, around nine 
months after wave one, 55 participants were aware that they had a Participation Agreement 
(Alexander et al. 2005:80). 
34
 Two of the 12 employed parents were unpaid family workers. 
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doing six hours per week
35
 and only 4 were not spending any time on their activities 
when interviewed (Alexander et al. 2005:80).  The researchers asked respondents if 
they were committing more or less time than was required on their activities.  Those 
who said they were doing more than they needed averaged 23 hours per week on 
their activities, those who said they were doing about what was required or less 
averaged 17-18 hours per week.  This latter group had a substantially exaggerated 
sense of the extent of their participation requirements. 
 
A minority of parents were not already employed or studying or doing voluntary 
work at the time of their adviser interviews and very few parents were exempt from 
compulsory requirements.  Unfortunately, little is known about the new activities 
which parents agreed to undertake.  Little attention was given to separately 
analysing the agreements or experiences of these parents by the Social Research 
Centre (2005a, 2005c) which tended to conflate the results for all parents with 
compulsory activities.  With their smaller sample, Alexander et al. (2005) had 
limited capacity to separately analyse this group.  Nevertheless, the Social Research 
Centre (2005b:44) provides data on all parents who started new activities, which 
includes both those who were already engaged in some activity but who chose to do 
something new instead or in addition, and those who were not engaged in any 
recognised activity at the time of their adviser appointment.  Six months after 
signing a Participation Agreement, the most common new activities among both 
Parenting Payment Partnered and Single claimants was study or training, which was 
taken up by one fifth (see table 7).  Employment was just as popular among parents 
receiving Parenting Payment Single. 
 
                                                 
35
 Six hours is close to the required number of hours if the 150 hours is averaged out over six months. 
 162 
Table 7. Parenting Payment recipients‟ take up of new activities six months after 
attending an adviser meeting 
 
Commenced... Partnered 
% 
Single 
% 
Paid work 11 19 
Looking for work 8 14 
Study or training 21 19 
Voluntary work 3 7 
Source: Social Research Centre 2005b:44 
 
Alexander et al. (2005:78) reported that parents who signed agreements which only 
contained new activities most often agreed to study or do voluntary work; 
employment was a less favoured option.    
 
The frequency with which parents were already engaged in employment and the 
popularity of education as a new activity are supported by the Australian 
Government short evaluation report on Australians Working Together.  There was 
no clear reduction in numbers receiving Parenting Payment; if anything these had 
risen from 2002 to 2003 (DEWR 2005a:6).  A slightly larger proportion of all 
Parenting Payment recipients reported earnings at the end of the program compared 
to the beginning.  The increased proportion was greatest among those with 
compulsory activity requirements, from 51 to 54 per cent among Single claimants 
and from 26 to 29 per cent among Partnered (DEWR 2005a:10).  Twenty-three per 
cent of Parenting Payment Single recipients with high-school-aged children were 
studying and 16 per cent of Partnered recipients, up by 10 per cent and five per cent 
respectively (DEWR 2005a:12).  The report does not document changes in 
voluntary work or other activities.  
 
Research based on the pilot program of compulsory adviser meetings for parents 
showed that compulsory meetings increase the rate of attendance at meetings, and 
that responses to those meetings, in terms of intention to change plans, were very 
similar between parents who chose to attend voluntarily and those who were 
required to attend (Barrett and Cobb-Clark 2000).  However, this analysis did not 
show if those who chose not to attend the meetings had decided to take up new 
activities also.  Other research on this same pilot program found that when 
outcomes were measured in terms of proportion of parents with increased earnings 
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or leaving income support, that there was no difference between those who were 
required to attend the interview, those who did so voluntarily, and those who knew 
nothing of the program (Dockery and Strombeck 2004:436).  Furthermore, the same 
study found that making a plan to enter employment was followed through only by 
some parents – those who did not report any barriers to employment (Dockery and 
Strombeck 2004:440).  Only 6 per cent of parents who participated in the pilot had 
no barriers to employment.  Among the rest, those who said that they did not have 
appropriate skills for paid work or that their health might impede their ability to 
work or who cited other barriers, the mere act of developing a plan at an adviser 
meeting had no effect on their entry into employment.   
 
To date, no analysis has been undertaken which can demonstrate whether 
compulsory activity requirements for Australian parents result in improved 
employment or educational outcomes, as no study has simultaneously compared a 
group which has not been required to undertake activities with a group which has 
faced that requirement. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored Australians Working Together in action: the meeting between 
a parent and an adviser at which compulsory activities were discussed and 
contracted.  In chapter three, we saw that the policy sought to make a number of 
transformations, most notably from welfare claimant to employee and from full-
time mother to part-time mother, but also from dependent to independent and from 
passive to active.  The policy sought to make employment a component of good 
mothering.  We heard from mothers that they were addressed as customers, as 
workers, as compliant claimant, and as beneficiaries who were dependent but 
potentially independent.   
 
The alteration in mothers‟ identities was not, for many, a shift from welfare 
claimant to employee; they were already both welfare claimants and employees.  
Nor was it new for parents to be hailed as passive and dependent.  When parents 
received the letters ordering their attendance at the adviser meetings, the 
interpellation of compliant claimant resonated because of their previous experience 
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and their understanding of the negative social meaning ascribed to welfare receipt.  
However, Australians Working Together did reassert this aspect of being a 
beneficiary.  In order to ensure that parents would comply with the compulsory 
requirements of policy, they were reminded of their dependence on income support 
and threatened with the loss of this income if they did not obey.  They were treated, 
in the sense of the liberal adult citizen, as children, who would not do the right thing 
if they were not threatened with punishment.  Mothers recognised this and some 
resented it. 
 
Being ascribed as a customer was new. Attempts to level relations between staff and 
customer in Centrelink officers and the creation of advisers with whom parents were 
to negotiate an agreement were part of the new customer service environment in 
which Australians Working Together was implemented.  A customer identity was in 
direct conflict with a passive, dependent identity.  While the former was created 
through office furnishings and alterations in language, the latter was sustained with 
the threat of a loss of livelihood.  While the former was new, the latter was old and 
well-established. 
 
In order to achieve its intention of creating independent adults, Australians Working 
Together imposed compulsory requirements on parents, most notably in the form of 
Participation Agreements.  As a result, women who were already managing their 
family, employment and study lives were required to sign a contract in which they 
agreed to continue to do so.  For these parents, the majority of Parenting Payment 
claimants, rather than fostering independence, the Participation Agreements placed 
them in a situation in which they were required to seek state approval if they wished 
to change the ordering of their daily lives.  In order to achieve parents‟ compliance 
with this contractual arrangement, they were addressed with a well-known, easily 
recognised hail, as dependent.  While an interpellation as dependent was not new, it 
was narrowed and redirected towards parents.   
 
Australians Working Together did not dramatically change the daily lives of 
parents, as they were generally already engaged in the kinds of activities it 
encouraged.  However, what did change dramatically was the environment in which 
they parented.  No longer could mothers decide for themselves how best to organise 
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their employment, study and family.  Under Australians Working Together, they 
risked breaching a contractual agreement if they stopped paid employment to 
prioritise their children‟s needs.  Rather than making such decisions themselves, 
parents were instead required to notify Centrelink of any change and renegotiate 
their agreements.  Failure to do so carried severe consequences, a loss of income 
support.  While few if any penalties were applied to Parenting Payment claimants, 
the mothers in this study were well aware of this threat.  In addition, Alexander et 
al. (2005) showed that parents tended to have an exaggerated sense of their 
obligations under their Participation Agreement and that many also did not 
understand that they could renegotiate their agreements if they needed to.  As a 
result, parents might have continued with a heavier workload than necessary despite 
needing to change it for fear of losing their Parenting Payment.  Under Australians 
Working Together, the state was transformed into a supervisor and disciplinarian in 
mothers‟ lives.  Parenting was to occur around or alongside employment oriented 
activities.  The state‟s focus was not supporting care, but rather enforcing a 
trajectory towards employment. 
 
The policy neglect of care coupled with reduced autonomy served to mould parents‟ 
experience.  Parents‟ interactions with personal advisers, which formed the heart of 
their welfare-to-work experience, were characterised by struggles for recognition.  
By requiring parents to sign a contractual agreement, which they could only amend 
in discussion with a personal adviser, Australians Working Together denied parents 
the autonomy to know their own needs.  As Sennett (2003:262) writes,  
 
… autonomy means accepting in others what one does not 
understand about them.  In so doing, the fact of their autonomy is 
treated as equal to your own.  The grant of autonomy dignifies the 
weak or the outsider. 
 
Through Australians Working Together, the Australian government assumed that 
Parenting Payment claimants needed persuasion and threats in order to act in their 
best interests.  The majority of claimants agreed with the policy position on what 
was in their best interests and were already acting in that way.  Rather than limiting 
parents‟ freedom to make decisions for their families, the policy could instead have 
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supported parents in what they were doing; encouraging them and providing 
information, advice and assistance. 
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Chapter five 
‘It just didn’t add up’: Calculating welfare-to-work 
 
Cause that‟s the other thing that I notice, having the experience now 
of being employed full time, is that there are costs that aren‟t 
factored into it when they‟re looking at getting off benefits and then 
moving into the workforce.  Because the cost is - I am very isolated, 
so I don‟t have family I can just call upon - the cost for me then is 
emotional. Emotional.  At the end of the day I am exhausted from 
work and then to turn around and then not only cook dinner for two 
children, but listen and try and sort them out and manage them, help 
them with homework.  I got to a point where after three years I was 
exhausted. (Grace) 
 
Introduction 
When I spoke to mothers about employment, they explained how they weighed up 
the financial costs and benefits, as well as the non-financial.  They were very aware 
of how wages affected their Parenting Payment and their access to associated 
benefits and concessions, but they were also closely attuned to the effect of 
employment on their families.  Of those in a position to take paid work, some, like 
Grace, had given up their jobs because of the detrimental effect on their children 
and themselves, whereas others could not conceive of being without paid work, 
because of the important meaning it gave to their lives and the advantages it offered. 
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Margaret‟s employment is motivated by the social contribution she makes through 
teaching.  She loves the job, wants to be independent but, most importantly, wants 
to set an example for her sons. 
 
… because the boys‟ father didn‟t ever have a normal nine-to-five 
job that they saw, and because an awful lot of people where we live, 
not from any fault of their own, didn‟t have jobs, there where we 
were in the Housing Department.  I, for one thing, thought, „Gee, I 
am going to be the only example that my kids will see of people 
getting up and going off to work.‟  And I thought that is a really 
important thing for them to see … I enjoy my work, I feel it‟s 
useful and I also would prefer to be as independent as possible. 
(Margaret) 
 
Like Margaret, Helen believes employment is important, but not if the financial 
returns are too low.  Helen decided to turn down a full-time job because the 
additional money did not sufficiently compensate for the costs to her son.  She 
explained how she arrived at this decision. 
 
… I started thinking, „Do I really want this job?‟ … it would have 
been really stressful and really difficult.  I was already having lots 
of complaints from the teacher about not making the child do the 
homework.  By the time you get home at six o‟clock and you get 
dinner and [clear up?] and do the washing – because you‟ve got to 
keep up with that – forget homework … And so I actually sat down 
and was thinking, you know, „Is it worth me doing this job?‟ 
 
…  And I sat down and I wrote down – if I work full time, 8.30 to 
5.30 five days a week and put my child in before- and after-school 
care every day, and he‟d be fine for school hours, at the end of the 
day I would have been, after having paid for the after-school care 
… I would have been $80 a week better off.  And that would be just 
ludicrous.  To put myself and him through that.  It‟s not like there 
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would have been any huge financial rewards to make that 
worthwhile.  So I just scrapped it.  (Helen) 
 
Helen demonstrates how economic and non-economic elements of employment 
calculations interact.  How much money is needed to make the effort of a full-time 
job worthwhile to her and her son?  If she cannot support him doing his homework, 
how much is that worth?  Like her, parents attempt to balance each with the other.   
 
It was not my intention when starting this research to focus closely on the nature of 
mothers‟ employment decisions, but in the interviews, in response to my questions 
about how they made choices about employment, mothers like Margaret and Grace 
often explained in great detail how they weighed a range of economic concerns in 
concert with those of their own and their family‟s wellbeing.  This chapter focuses 
on both the financial and non-financial dimensions of those calculations, examining 
two elements in particular: the financial returns of employment versus income 
support, and the employment entitlements which support parents in their attempts to 
balance work and family demands. 
 
Financial „incentives‟ to take employment have been central to welfare changes in 
liberal welfare states (Travers 2005).  As seen in chapters one and three, Australia 
was no exception.  Incentives were important elements of the recommendations 
made by the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000), the government‟s 
response (Australian Government:2001), and the Australians Working Together 
package itself.  The effectiveness of policies encouraging employment among 
welfare recipients through financial incentives has been subject to considerable 
economic modelling and some quantitative social research (Hulse and Randolf 
2004, for example).  This dimension of welfare-to-work has rarely been examined 
using qualitative research (Hulse et al. 2003:19).  Yet qualitative studies offer 
valuable insight into how welfare recipients and low-wage workers incorporate 
economic factors into their calculations about the relative merits of employment and 
welfare receipt.  Large surveys have examined the attitudes of welfare recipients to 
income support, employment and to parenting and to explore the effect of new 
policies.  However, the intricacies of the interaction of economic concerns with 
parents‟ circumstances and their children‟s needs are such that they cannot be 
 170 
captured in large-scale questionnaire research.  Qualitative research is needed to 
„uncover the intersection between beliefs and economic practices … to begin to 
provide a thorough evaluation of the assumptions that inform current welfare-to-
work practices‟ (McDowell 2005:374).   
 
In Australian policy debates, the most prominent financial disincentives are 
effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs).  EMTRs are a feature of means-tested 
benefits, whereby income support is reduced as earnings increase.  After a certain 
earnings disregard, an amount of labour income which does not affect benefits, a 
taper rate is applied so that the value of income support payments gradually reduces 
as earnings increase.  The EMTR is the proportion of each additional dollar earned 
which is paid in taxes and lost from income support payments.  So for example, if a 
mother earns an additional dollar from which she pays 15 cents in tax and for which 
her Parenting Payment is reduced by 40 cents, she faces an EMTR of 55 per cent 
and keeps just 45 cents of her dollar‟s earnings.  For some this rate can be very high.  
As a result, concern has developed that if paid employment does not markedly 
increase beneficiaries‟ total income, then they may elect instead to continue to 
receive welfare payments.  This is the central „disincentive effect‟ of the Australian 
welfare system to which government officials refer in chapter three. 
 
To better understand mothers‟ experience of financial incentives and disincentives, I 
turn first to mothers themselves.  Examining their descriptions of the financial 
calculations they made when considering employment shows that they have a finely 
tuned understanding of EMTRs, even if they would not use that term.  Orthodox 
economists‟ depictions of these decisions, generally assumed to be decisions made 
by „rational economic man‟, demonstrate a very narrow interpretation of highly 
complex calculations.  Feminist economists, such as Sue Himmelweit (2002), locate 
such financial calculations within the gendered world in which mothers live and 
provide a better interpretation of mothers‟ economic decisions, while also providing 
a link to literature on care. 
 
Examining the non-financial elements in mothers‟ descriptions of their employment 
decisions, it is clear that the goal of achieving „work/family balance‟ is central.  
They strive to satisfactorily meet their commitments to their families as well as their 
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employers.  Recognising this, I examine the kinds of „family-friendly benefits‟ in 
employment which Parenting Payment claimants can access.  I draw on the 
Household Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia survey to explore the kinds 
of jobs in which Parenting Payment recipients are employed.  To provide a more 
sophisticated interpretation of the data, I developed a logistic regression model 
which shows that the most basic of in-work benefits, paid sick leave, is available to 
few part-time employees. 
 
The concept of „social care‟ encourages consideration of „the normative, economic 
and social frameworks within which [the activities and relations of care] are 
assigned and carried out‟ (Daly and Lewis 2000:285) and so suggests a new way of 
conceiving of Parenting Payment.  The low rates at which claimants can access paid 
sick leave, and the high rates at which parents combine earned income with social 
security payments, suggests that welfare payments act as a kind of back-up payment 
for people who do not receive paid leave from their jobs.  This leads me to conclude 
that Parenting Payment could be regarded as more than a social security benefit: it 
could be understood as a work/family benefit, one which enables rather than inhibits 
employment. 
Financial elements in employment decisions 
There is no doubt that most Parenting Payment recipients have a strong economic 
imperative to increase their weekly income.  As demonstrated in chapter two, the 
rates of poverty among households claiming social security benefits and among 
sole-parent households are high (Community Affairs References Committee 
2004:247-248; Harding and Szukalskz 2000:4).  All the mothers I interviewed were 
managing a very tight weekly budget, especially those with no employment income.  
They explained techniques for economising which they incorporated into all aspects 
of their lives, from day-to-day expenses like food and entertainment to bigger 
household expenses such as whitegoods or holidays.   
 
Helen believed that having a larger weekly income would actually help her to spend 
less: 
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It‟s just a poverty cycle.  If you don‟t have any money you can‟t 
spend the money to get the resources so that you don‟t need to 
spend the money later.  You can‟t buy food in bulk because it‟s 
cheap, because you don‟t have the money.  You know you can‟t get 
the credit to get the thing to pay it off later … because you don‟t 
have the financial resources to do that. So you are always paying a 
lot more for things.   
 
After Pam inherited her mum‟s house, her housing costs decreased.  One of the 
things she particularly enjoyed about having extra money was the opportunity to go 
out with friends.  She told me that previously: 
 
… They didn‟t ask me out because they knew I couldn‟t go out, 
couldn‟t afford it.  Sometimes a coffee, I couldn‟t even afford that, 
I‟d think, „Oh no, I need this money until I get paid again.‟  Or 
basically, „I need it if I run out of milk, or I run out of bread or 
something.‟  That was more important for me than going out for a 
cup of coffee with friends. 
 
Extraordinary expenses can be difficult to meet, as Nicole explained: 
 
I‟ve rung in tears before.  Like bloody school photos have come in 
and I‟ve got two kids living with me so that‟s nearly 60 dollars.  
But I‟ve already shopped that week and paid my rent and where am 
I going to get the money from?   
 
It is in this context that many mothers explained to me how they figured the 
financial gains and losses of employment.  Naomi told me: 
 
I was sort of self-employed for quite a long time.  But it was like, I 
kept hitting a peak of how much I could earn and I couldn‟t get any 
further. I find that whole Parenting Payment system is not very – it 
doesn‟t stimulate the person to get out and get any further.  I did the 
figures after doing the small business course … there was a whole 
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lot of things [benefits associated with Parenting Payment] and if 
you go past a threshold on your income, you lose all of that.  
Anyway, it just didn‟t add up.  It was six of one and [half-a-dozen 
of] the other.  If you are going to work for the whole week and you 
come out with the same amount of money as you could if you were 
on a Parenting Payment, you just never get ahead because you are 
stuck in the cycle. 
 
When Naomi talks about „hitting a peak‟ she is referring to the EMTR aspect of 
means-tested benefits.  The income disregard and earnings taper is different for 
single and partnered claimants of Parenting Payment.  This is an effect of Parenting 
Payment Single being a pension and Parenting Payment Partnered an allowance.  As 
a Parenting Payment Single recipient, Naomi could earn $148.60 per fortnight 
without affecting her benefit level (refer table 8).  Thereafter, for every additional 
dollar she earned her Parenting Payment was reduced by 40 cents.  As a Parenting 
Payment Partnered claimant, Alia faced a higher taper at a lower level of earnings 
than Naomi.  Alia could earn just $62 before her Parenting Payment was reduced at 
a rate of 50 cents in the dollar.  She would have lost Parenting Payment at 70 cents 
in the dollar for earnings above $245.  
 
Table 8. Earnings disregards and taper rates, 1 July – 19 September 2006 
 
Benefit Parenting Payment 
Single 
Parenting Payment 
Partnered 
Youngest child aged less than 8 aged less than 6 
Type of payment Pension Allowance 
Base rate 
$499.70 plus $17.80  
supplement 
$370.50 
Earnings disregard $152.60 $62 
Rate at which 
payments are reduced 
above earnings 
disregard 
Above $152.60, 40% 
$62 to $250, 50% 
Above $250, 60% (prior to 
1 July, 70%) 
Source: Centrelink 2006b. Notes: Rates for a principle carer with one child and partner, if applicable, 
in receipt of Newstart.  
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It is not only the loss of Parenting Payment dollars which mothers take into account.  
When Caroline was offered additional employment, she paused and calculated.  
How would it affect her household income and expenditure over the coming 
months?  She had to weigh up the advantages of taking shifts with a new employer, 
shifts she was proud to have been offered, over the loss of benefits she would face if 
she ceased to be eligible for Parenting Payment.  
 
I did work experience a few weeks back and they liked me that 
much they employed me, you know.  I‟ve done five shifts there and 
I haven‟t recorded [them with Centrelink], I will have to record it 
next fortnight and what I am going to be worried about is that I am 
going to lose the pension.  I don‟t want to lose it just yet because I 
want to get the benefits because my car is due for rego next month 
and I still want to get the free registration.  So, I am a bit worried 
about that.  But I am going to have to tell them at the nursing home 
that, „Okay, I am still on the pension, I will do so many shifts‟ 
work.‟  
 
Caroline determined that it was better to take fewer shifts and limit her income than 
to lose the waived fee for car registration granted to pensioners by the Roads and 
Traffic Authority (2005) in New South Wales.  This decision in no way reduced her 
determination to increase her employment and eventually stop receiving benefits, 
but in the short term she needed the additional benefits that Parenting Payment 
provided. 
 
Ancillary benefits associated with being a pension or allowance recipient are lost if 
parents earn enough to cease receiving cash assistance.  Those available through 
Centrelink include Rent Assistance, the Telephone Allowance and support for 
education costs.  Earnings over a certain level would also mean parents could no 
longer claim the Health Care Card which entitles holders to discounted 
pharmaceuticals and health services, but also to other concession discounts (some 
cinemas, for instance, offer reduced price tickets to Health Care Card holders).  
Many other organisations offer discounts or waive fees for pension or allowance 
recipients.  For example, local governments might provide for reduced council rates 
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and state government transport authorities usually offer concessions on public 
transport.  Child support payments from non-residential parents might be 
recalculated and reduced.  Parents also face the loss of family benefits in the form of 
Family Tax Benefit Part A.  Couple parents additionally lost access to Family Tax 
Benefit Part B if the „secondary‟ earner increased her income, as, at the time of my 
fieldwork, the cut-off level was very low for her earnings (Cass and Brennan 2003).   
 
Economic modelling demonstrates that many parents do face high effective tax rates 
when increasing their earnings.  People with dependent children are more likely to 
experience high EMTRs than those without children; in fact under the 2002 
tax/transfer system parents of children aged less than 16 years made up three-
quarters of all those who faced high EMTRs (Beer 2003:S18).  Lone parents 
confronted particularly high EMTRs, more than half of those who had earnings 
encountered EMTRs of over 60 per cent (Beer 2003:S18).  This was the case for 
only 20 per cent of parents in couples. 
 
Public and community housing tenants incorporate an additional element into their 
calculations because their rent is tied to their level of income.  Cheryl worked part 
time when her children were in primary school.  At one point she reflected on her 
weekly income: 
 
I worked out with the rise in my rent – because it all goes on the 
percentage of your income – so the rise in my rent, the tax I was 
paying, I lost my pension benefits, my card and whatnot, and I was 
paying before- and after-school care: I was actually earning five 
dollars a week for all the drama of going to work three days a week.  
(Cheryl) 
 
For those, like Cheryl, who live in public or community housing, EMTRs can be 
especially high as their rent is calculated at a set a proportion of their income.  Many 
public tenants are Parenting Payment recipients.  The proportion of sole parents and 
of women in public housing is considerably higher than in the community as a 
whole.  In 2000-01, 67 per cent of tenants were women and 27 per cent of tenants 
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were sole parents (Wood and Ong 2005:5).
36
  Rental rates in Australian public and 
community housing are generally set at 25 per cent of a tenant‟s income.  As 
tenants‟ income increases so does their rent.37  Many Australian public tenants face 
high effective tax rates; 16 per cent face EMTRs of more than 60 per cent when 
working part time (Wood and Ong 2005:8,26). Women, especially those with 
partners who are not in the labour force, are the most affected.   
 
Margaret told me that she felt forced to give up an offer of full-time employment 
she would have dearly loved to take, because her public housing rent would have 
increased so substantially. 
 
Certainly when I got the full-time job, I would have gone off it 
[Parenting Payment] completely.  With relish.  „Isn‟t this fantastic?‟  
And then the Department [of Housing] were trying to work out the 
rent and this guy … said, „Oh look, I have just discovered this rule 
that once you gross $1000 you have to pay full market rent.  You 
are not eligible for any rebate.‟  And on the house I am in, it is $500 
a week rent.  So I was earning I think it was $1043 a week, I would 
have had to pay $500 a week rent and we would have had less 
money than what I was getting [before], so I just had to cut back 
again.  I was honestly suicidal.  It was, and I am not normally a 
defeatist … I thought, „This is insane – one government department 
virtually preventing you from working to your full capacity.‟  I have 
the job, I was willing to work … It was like, now this has floored 
me, I have done everything I can to get ahead as much as I can and 
be as independent as possible, it was just like the end …  
 
… The only thing I could do was reduce my pay to half again, it 
meant I was eligible for a tiny little bit of pension, but also a Health 
Care Card, you know, you are eligible for bulk billing, dental, 
hospital, all of them.  And that $1.10 fare ticket is the most useful 
                                                 
36
 In contrast lone parents comprise just 5 per cent of the whole population. 
37
 There is typically also a lag, so that rent does not increase immediately when a tenant‟s income 
rises. 
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thing, particularly if you‟re a working, busy person, it is the most 
helpful.  It is such a big saving, it‟s fantastic. 
 
Margaret considered that it was important to be in receipt of a partial Parenting 
Payment as it entitled her to a range of other benefits.  Most important was the fact 
that a lower income meant a lower rent, but combined with savings from using a 
concession card on health and transport, the advantages of claiming Parenting 
Payment meant that working full time was just not worth it.  The operation of rules 
from the two departments combined to create a situation which Margaret described 
as „insane‟.  She faced two conflicting institutional rationalities which arose due to 
the different jurisdictional responsibilities of the state and federal governments and 
the different intent of the two systems.  The state government is responsible for 
public housing and the federal government for income support.  One seeks to 
provide housing to those on the lowest incomes, the other to encourage 
employment. 
Rational economic man ponders effective marginal tax rates 
Considerable Australian economic analysis has examined the interaction between 
receipt of social security benefits and entry into employment (see for example, Beer 
1998; Buddelmeyer et al. 2006; Creedy et al. 2003; Dockery et al. 2007; Ingles 
1998; Keating and Lambert 1998).  When EMTRs are high there is said to be little 
incentive to take employment, as the same or similar income could be derived from 
income support.  Reducing EMTRs would, therefore, increase the movement of 
people into employment (Creedy and Dawkins 1999:71).  Often, the reason why 
EMTRs would produce disincentive effects is not examined.  For example, Keating 
and Lambert (1998:281) write that high EMTRs are „problems of disincentives‟ and 
as a result „many of the lowest paid people are not much better off when they are 
working‟.  They proceed to explore models for reducing EMTRs, without specifying 
why high EMTRs serve as disincentives.  This is because the decision-maker they 
have in mind is homo economicus, rational economic man, the mainstay of orthodox 
economics (Meagher and Nelson 2004:104). 
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Orthodox economists view the rational economic man who makes a decision to take 
employment as a „utility-maximising, rational individual‟.  It is assumed he seeks 
maximum benefit for himself by weighing up his preference for leisure over his 
need for income (Flatau and Dockery 2001:7).  For this reason rational economic 
man would not increase his hours of employment if the financial returns were not 
sufficient to compensate for his loss of leisure time (Flatau and Dockery 2001:8).  
To some extent, then, orthodox economists would view mothers‟ decisions about 
employment, as I outlined them above, as rational economic decisions, in that they 
were trying to derive maximum benefit from earnings and income support.  This is 
an important finding because there is very little evidence about the behavioural 
effects of EMTRs in Australia (Travers 2005:101).  It means some mothers do make 
the types of calculated decisions about employment which economists predict.   
 
However, there are important qualifications to make here.  Firstly, mothers are not 
men.  This point might seem obvious, but conventional economics remains highly 
androcentric (Meagher and Nelson 2004:102). This has implications for how 
economic agents are perceived and leads to male norms in economic modelling.  
Secondly, „rational‟ decisions take account of more than dollars and utility.  People 
are social beings who make decisions in an environment with which they interact 
(Himmelweit 2000:12; Meagher and Nelson 2004:105).  So mothers make decisions 
informed by their notion of good mothering, which reflects social expectations.  
Thirdly, the mothers I interviewed were not making decisions to maximise 
individual utility, but rather family utility.  This raises the relational element of 
mothers‟ decisions (Himmelweit 2000:4).  Their decisions were centred around 
care, and were not solely motivated by individual self-interest.  As a result, mothers‟ 
decisions, concerned with the wellbeing of the family, might sometimes appear to 
mainstream economists as irrational, because family wellbeing did not necessarily 
equate with increased income.   
 
To better describe mothers‟ decision-making, Duncan and Edwards (1999) coined 
the term „gendered moral rationalities‟, as I noted elsewhere.  In their large study in 
Britain, the USA, Germany and Sweden, they found that lone mothers primarily 
understood lone motherhood in terms of their responsibility for their children 
(Duncan and Edwards 1999:51).  How mothers interpreted and discharged that 
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responsibility was shaped by their understanding of good motherhood.  With regard 
to combining employment and motherhood, these moral imperatives are gendered, 
hence gendered moral rationalities.  As a relation that is social, motherhood is 
situated in locality, race and class; so understandings of good mothering vary for 
women in the inner city to women in the suburbs, between white and black women 
and between working-class and middle-class women (Duncan and Edwards 
1999:121-128). 
 
Duncan and Edwards (1999:118) write: 
 
This is not to say that economic calculations about benefit levels, 
wage rates, day care costs and so on, are not an important factor in 
lone mothers‟ decisions about entering the labour force or living on 
benefits.  Rather this factor needs to be set within another model of 
rationality.  It is socially negotiated, non-economic understandings 
about what is morally right and socially acceptable which are 
primary factors in determining what is seen as rational behaviour. 
 
In making the decisions explored above, mothers appear to be rational actors, but 
their responsibility to their children is ever present.  For example, Grace explained 
that she could earn slightly more by working full time than she received on 
Parenting Payment, but the loss of time created tension in her family and depleted 
her energy.  Grace had to balance the benefits of more money against stress and 
exhaustion.   
 
Because [when] I work, my rent goes up, I start losing family 
payment and then at the same time, Parenting Payment. So yeah, it 
just becomes a nightmare.  And when you work out that, „Hang on, 
I‟ve worked 40 hours and I am only like $30 better off,‟ you go, 
„Hang on, $30 financially, but look at all the stress that I‟ve got and 
look at what I put my kids through, it‟s just not worth it.‟  At the 
end of the day, well that‟s how I sit down and work it out, you 
know, „Is this worth it?‟  „Hang on.  What‟s the stress to my family 
and how exhausted am I?‟ It‟d be different if, maybe, I don‟t know, 
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if I was getting an extra $100 or $200 a week, and I‟d think, „Oh I 
actually, yeah well I don‟t mind that amount of stress, because the 
compensation for that is [you‟re] $100 better off.‟  But again that 
only takes into effect, I sat down and worked out I should be 
earning about 50 or 60 thousand for that to kick in and it‟s like, 
yeah, those jobs are just [sarcastically] a bit out of my reach at the 
moment. 
 
We can see Grace attempting to put a monetary value on the strain her employment 
puts on her family; it is worth more than $30, rather closer to $100 or even $200.  
She concludes that the kind of employment she would need to make a full-time job 
worthwhile is presently unattainable.   
 
Mothers are aware of the effect their jobs can have on their children.  In the quote 
above, we see Grace, like other mothers I spoke to, testing the possible impact of 
employment.  Barrie Thorne (2001) shows how parents engage in a continual 
reading of signs in their children, they interpret them looking for larger meaning and 
develop an ever-changing series of responses.  This frequently revolves around 
homework, grades and the child‟s behaviour (Thorne 2001:368).  This scanning and 
looking for signs is central to the orchestration of care and is especially important 
when things change in the family due to new employment or new care arrangements 
(Thorne 2001:270-1).  Depending on what they see and how they interpret it, 
parents may decide the costs of employment are too great or, as Margaret did, that 
employment is essential.   
 
Time and energy are critical dimensions in mothers‟ assessments.  It is apparent in 
all of their discussions of employment: they are concerned with how they will 
parent their children as they would wish, with time and energy to help with 
homework, to support their children emotionally, to just be together as a family, not 
to mention time and energy to cook, clean and wash. 
 
In examining the calculations that parents make about employment, it is important 
to consider the family care practices they have developed.  To suddenly substitute 
money for time might well seem a poor deal to some children.  Grace‟s son 
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certainly let her know that he was not happy when she was not around.  During her 
most recent, week-long period of employment, he was moody and he skipped 
school.  For Grace, compared to how her son had reacted when she last tried 
employment, this was an improvement and evidence he would soon be ready for her 
to go back to work, but not ready yet.  Hochschild (2001:209-211) observed some 
working parents „Taylorizing‟ their home life, seeking to complete household 
chores efficiently, asking their children to make efficient use of time, and also 
creating time blocks within which to have „quality time‟ with their children.  Once 
again, children used to family time operating in a different, more meandering way 
may not readily accommodate a need to be efficient because of the time demands of 
their parent‟s job.  Their resistance, like that of Grace‟s son, could be difficult.   
 
In their research with young Australian people completing primary school and high 
school, Barbara Pocock and Jane Clarke (2005) found that around half of the young 
people they interviewed wished they could spend more time with their parents, even 
if it meant less money coming into the household.  Around a fifth of them wished 
they could somehow have both.  The young people said that they wanted their 
parents to be happy in what they do; that when their parents work the hours they 
would wish and enjoy their jobs it has positive effects at home.  On the other hand, 
the young people wanted their parents not to be „stressed‟ during the time they spent 
with them or to be otherwise negatively affected by their work.  These criteria also 
applied to mothers who were at home full time, the young people wanted them to be 
happy in that work, not bored or wishing for something else.  These children are 
active participants in their family lives and may choose to make their views known 
to their parents. 
 
Tess Ridge (2007) found similar issues in her British study with children of lone 
mothers who had recently taken employment.  The children were strongly aware of 
the importance of money in the family.  If their mothers had found secure 
employment and the family income had increased many felt that they personally 
benefited, for example because they were able to attend social events which they 
had previously been unable to afford (Ridge 2007:404).  Children also perceived 
that their mothers‟ employment raised their social status and they appreciated this 
both on their mothers‟ behalf as well as their own.  Changes in the time available for 
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children were felt most acutely by those whose mothers worked outside of school 
hours: these children missed the time they had previously spent with their mothers.  
Some children worried that their mothers might be suffering while trying to manage 
both employment and their family lives due to tiredness, stress, or physical and 
emotional health (Ridge 2007:410).  Children made significant contributions to 
support their mothers‟ employment.  They assisted more with housework and the 
care of siblings, they supported their mothers emotionally and they tried not to 
cause their mothers to worry about money or illness (Ridge 2007:412).  In this, 
Ridge demonstrates the importance of children as actors in maintaining mothers‟ 
employment.  
 
So a decision to take or expand employment or to reduce or give up employment 
involved balancing financial advantage with the wellbeing of the family.  Within 
each of these elements are complicated components that exert influence that may be 
complementary, but are often contradictory.  All can be difficult to assess.  The 
financial incentives of employment are not straightforward.  Rather parents tell of 
detailed calculations which demonstrate knowledge of EMTRs in practice.  
Thinking about employment also involves considering the dignity, self-worth and 
identity that would be provided by the available jobs.  Assessing family wellbeing 
includes examining one‟s own and one‟s children‟s health and emotional status, 
whether children would benefit more by the example of an employed parent, or of a 
parent who is at home when they are needed, and, of course, how to fit in the daily 
demand of all the housework.   
 
Quantitative research by the Department of Family and Community Services found 
similar themes.  A negative impact on the family was the primary disadvantage that 
parents cited with regard to employment, the extra money the primary advantage (A 
Gregory et al. 2003:6-7).  Parents were worried about their children and the family‟s 
wellbeing; about being away from their children, providing care as they would wish 
and having enough time – particularly for the family and the household chores.  
Those working full time found time pressures especially difficult and, like some of 
the mothers I interviewed, told of their exhaustion as a result. 
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As research with mothers and children cited above demonstrates, the family 
manages best when parents are able to achieve the balance between their work and 
family lives that they want.  Daly and Lewis‟ (2000) concept of social care 
encourages an analysis with a broad view, paying attention to the policy context in 
which employment and family care takes places.  In the second half of this chapter I 
explore whether or not the kinds of jobs to which Parenting Payment claimants have 
access help support them in this struggle to balance employment and family needs. 
Trying to find a balance between work and family 
Australians Working Together encouraged Parenting Payment claimants to engage 
in part-time employment.  This policy sits within a larger policy context in which 
part-time jobs have been promoted as an ideal means through which mothers might 
balance the competing demands of employment and family care.  As seen in chapter 
three, the Australian Prime Minister described a typical working couple with 
children as a „policeman and a part-time shop assistant‟ (Cass and Brennan 
2003:52).  Part-time employment offers particular advantages to mothers who, 
regardless of their employment status, commonly continue to shoulder the majority 
of unpaid work in the home (Craig 2007; Hochschild 1989).  Part-time employment 
allows mothers time in which to complete household and care tasks.  Research 
consistently finds mothers employed part time experience less work-life conflict 
that those who are full time (Crompton 2006:80, Fredriksen-Goldsen and Scharlach 
2001:128, Higgins et al. 2000:23, Hosking and Western 2005:8).  They spend less 
time on the job so they can better arrange their family lives to fit around their 
working hours.   
 
The „crunch time‟ of sickness, as Barbara Pocock (2003) describes it, illustrates 
some of the key work/family balance issues.  In order to accommodate family 
illness, mothers needed either highly flexible workplaces or very supportive 
families.  Cheryl, for example, has found the former.  Suitable employment and 
considerate employers enable her to care for her children at the same time as doing 
her job: 
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When they‟re sick, they can actually come with me, because I‟m 
doing [cleaning] houses, they can actually come to the job with me.  
And, like I said, they don‟t get sickly sick, so it‟s not like people are 
going, „Oh no, your child‟s got some potent virus or something 
that‟s contagious.‟  So I‟ve been lucky in that respect.  
 
Caroline is able to maintain paid employment because her parents, who live nearby, 
help her care for her sons.  
 
If I do have a job late in the afternoon they will make sure that if I 
don‟t get home for dinner, they will feed the kids.  Like last week, 
for instance, when I did the work at the nursing home I had two 
afternoon shifts which was 3 to 11 that night, well the boys went to 
Mum and Dad‟s and Mum gave them dinner … They‟re good 
support for me. 
 
A number of mothers said it was a challenge to find employment that would 
accommodate their care responsibilities.  It often meant trading away some of the 
financial benefits offered by other jobs.  Erica, for example, worked for a 
consultancy from home and could fit her job around her son and the housework.  
Erica believes that she may have earned more if she had worked in a different job, 
but the ability to work from home, as well as having „incredibly understanding‟ 
employers, was more important, especially as she had secure employment.  Erica 
has been able to keep the same job for more than ten years because, when she has 
needed time for her son, she has not had to stop work.  Erica found a job which she 
could fit around her family life. 
 
Tara has also found a way to balance the time she spends at work with time with her 
two sons.  She maintains a patchwork of casual jobs, but explained that she has 
„always taken work that fits in with the children‟.  She is currently working as a 
teacher‟s aide at their school and at the after-school care.  During the school 
holidays she works at the races and at holiday care.  While „all the casual work is a 
bit of a juggle‟, it is mostly centred on the boys‟ school, so she can be available for 
them at the same time as earning an income.  
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Belle has taken a more long-term approach.  When I interviewed her there were 
eighteen months remained until her eligibility for Parenting Payment would cease 
when her son turned 16.  Knowing that she would then have less income support, 
Belle was trying to increase her employability in the meantime.  In part, this 
involved taking short-term teaching jobs because they increased her work 
experience, even if they did not greatly improve her income.  Grace made the 
opposite decision, choosing not to seek employment in the short term.  She felt the 
financial returns were not enough to justify the difficulties her employment caused 
for her family. 
 
One of the key differences between Belle and Grace is the kind of employment they 
can expect to find.  Grace‟s jobs have been „mostly office work, administration – 
from bookkeeping to managing an office‟ and her employers had not given her the 
flexibility or understanding she needed to care for her children.  This form of work 
will still be available for her in the future, with some updating of her skills.  Grace 
has no expectation that future employment will provide the family benefits she 
needs for her children, nor any career-driven desire to take a job as soon as possible.  
Belle, on the other hand, is working in an academic job.  She feels that she must 
work steadily if she is going to secure a permanent position and that once she does 
so, she will have a good and reliable income.  While this goal is difficult, she feels it 
is achievable.  As shown in chapter two, many more parents on Parenting Payment 
are in circumstances like Grace than like Belle.  Many also have little employment 
experience or none at all and little hope of finding good employment with family 
benefits (Butterworth 2003:26; Dockery and Strombeck 2004:438).   
 
Support from others with fulfilling one‟s caring responsibilities can considerably 
reduce the stress that working parents face (Fredriksen-Goldsen and Scharlach 
2001:131).  It is not surprising then that lone mothers face particular difficulties in 
finding a work/family balance as they take most responsibility for their families‟ 
care needs.  Sole mothers are more likely than mothers in couples, often 
substantially more likely, to report an unmet need for family benefits at work 
(Hughes and Gray 2005:21).  This was the case for every measure on which mothers 
were surveyed by Hughes and Gray, including: flex time, rostered days off, working 
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from home, time off in lieu, informal arrangements, paid and unpaid leave.  Lone 
mothers are also more likely to believe their use of these benefits is disapproved of 
by their coworkers and would be refused by their bosses.   
 
Employment-based family benefits are unevenly distributed across the workforce, 
both within and between workplaces (Gray and Tudbull 2002:25).  Those on low 
incomes, in casual and/or part-time positions, are less likely to be able to take 
advantage of flexible work hours or family leave (Brennan and Blaxland 2005).  In 
contrast, those employees, usually professionals and para-professionals, who 
employers are most eager to retain, are most likely to be offered family-friendly 
provisions as a form of reward for their contribution (Thornthwaite and Buchanan 
2001:20).  Parenting Payment claimants are less well represented in these kinds of 
positions.  The kinds of occupations which Parenting Payment claimants hold are 
much more likely to be lower-status positions: twice the proportion work as 
labourers (generally cleaners) compared to other mothers; and in the field of 
clerical, sales and service work, Parenting Payment claimants more often work in 
elementary and intermediate positions, than do other mothers (HILDA 4.1, my 
analysis. See appendix three).  Only one-fifth of Parenting Payment claimants work 
as professionals, compared to one-third of other mothers. 
 
Work/family benefits are more often and more homogenously provided in the public 
sector.  The disparity in access to such benefits is greatest in the private sector, in 
which highly paid workers benefit substantially more than their low-paid 
counterparts (Thornthwaite 2004:176, Whitehouse and Zetlin 1999:230).  But only 
one-fifth of Parenting Payment claimants worked in the public sector, compared to 
one-third of mothers overall (HILDA 4.1, my analysis. See appendix three).  
HILDA data also shows that Parenting Payment recipients are more likely than 
other employees to work in small firms which can be less able to implement 
generous employee benefits.  As a result, Belle, highly educated and working for a 
very large organisation, has access to a great deal of flexibility in determining how 
and when she works, in contrast with Grace, who found neither flexible 
employment nor accommodating employers. 
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Paid sick leave, paid family leave and unpaid leave can help parents meet their 
family responsibilities (Bowes 2005:425).  The most fundamental of these 
employment entitlements is paid sick leave.  Both full- and part-time employees 
need family-friendly benefits.  This is most evident in times of sickness.  Illness is 
not predictable.  When it occurs suddenly, the work/family balance is put to the test 
(Pocock 2003).  Paid sick leave is intended precisely for such times.  It allows 
workers to take time off in order to care for themselves without losing income.  
Parents also often use paid sick leave to care for sick children.   
 
Paid sick leave and paid holiday leave are the most commonly available 
employment entitlements, each available to 71 per cent of the workforce in 2004 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005b:3).  That the proportions were identical is to 
be expected given that both act as markers of permanent employment.  In the 
following analysis, I focus on paid sick leave, because that is the benefit designed to 
help employees with an unexpected need to take time off from their job.  Paid sick 
leave is uncommon in part-time employment.  HILDA data shows that among 
employees who worked part time, just over a third (37 per cent) could use paid sick 
leave (HILDA 4.1, my analysis.  See appendix three).  Nearly all of those who had 
access to paid sick leave (96 per cent) were employed in permanent part-time 
positions.  So the key to being able to use paid sick leave is finding a permanent 
position, especially when you work part time.   
 
Parenting Payment recipients are encouraged to take part-time employment to 
reduce their need for income support.  If they sought new part-time jobs, what is the 
probability that they would be able to access the most basic of in-work benefits, 
paid sick leave?  Using 2004 data from the HILDA survey, I investigated which 
part-time workers could use paid sick leave and what facilitated the likelihood of 
being able to access it.  I developed the following model, using logistic regression, 
to explore the factors which increase or reduce the probability of paid sick leave 
being available among part-time employees only. 
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Table 9. Availability of paid sick leave among part-time employees 
 
 
Odds ratio of  
paid sick leave 
Hours per week 
(control=long part-time hours 21-34 hrs) 
1-14 hrs 
15-20 hrs 
 
 
0.1*** 
0.3*** 
Industry ANZSIC 2 digit 
(control=mean probability across all industries) 
Industries of 56% of women‟s employment 
Food retailing 
Personal and household good retailing 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 
Business services 
Education 
Health services  
 
 
 
0.9 
1.0 
0.3*** 
1.1 
1.7*** 
1.9*** 
Occupation 
(control=mean probability across all occupations) 
Professionals 
Associate professionals 
Tradespersons 
Advanced clerical & service workers 
Intermediate clerical, sales & service workers 
Intermediate production & transport workers 
Elementary clerical, sales &  service workers 
Labourers 
 
 
1.1 
1.5* 
0.8 
1.4 
1.2 
0.4** 
0.7 
0.6* 
Organisation size – number of employees 
(control=mean probability across all sizes) 
Less than 20 
20-99 
100-499 
500 or more 
 
 
0.6*** 
0.8 
0.9 
1.5*** 
Job tenure – years 
(control=less than 1 year) 
1 to 2  
2 to 5  
5 or more  
 
 
1.2 
2.3*** 
2.6*** 
Dependent children aged 15 or less 
(control=no children) 
Youngest less than 6 
Youngest 6-12 
Youngest 13-15 
 
 
2.2*** 
1.5* 
1.0 
Union membership 
(control=non-member) 
Member 
 
 
2.0*** 
Gender 
(control=female) 
Male 
 
 
0.6*** 
Sample: employees working less than 35 hours per week.  HILDA 4.1. 
Notes: McFadden‟s R2: 0.324.  ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 
 
The above model demonstrates that the longer one‟s part-time hours, the greater the 
probability of being able to use paid sick leave (see table 9).  Compared to someone 
working long-part-time hours (between 21 and 34 per week), someone working 15 
to 20 hours has odds of 0.3:1 – or just under one-third the odds – of being able to 
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use paid sick leave.  An employee working a short week of less than 15 hours has 
one-tenth the odds of being able to use paid sick leave compared to their 
counterparts working long part-time hours.  The likelihood of being able to access 
paid sick leave is extremely low for any but long-hours part-time workers; 
especially when remembering that this is a comparison between part-time workers, 
among whom only 37 per cent could use paid leave. 
 
The advantage of statistical modelling is that by including variables in the model, 
you control for their effect.  If examining cross-tabulations, it may seem that the 
underlying reason that employees with very short working hours have limited access 
to paid sick leave is because many work an industry that is less likely to offer paid 
sick leave, or in occupations where paid sick leave is less often available.  The 
above model, however, shows that working short hours has a large negative effect 
on the probability of being able to use paid sick leave when the effect of industry, 
occupation, size of the firm and union membership is controlled.  An employee 
working short hours has small odds of being able to access paid sick leave – and the 
shorter the hours, the smaller the odds. 
 
In addition, the above model offers some guidance as to the kind of part-time 
employment which would maximise the probability of paid sick leave.  Employees 
working in education or health services; in large organisations which employ more 
than 500 people; or in positions with long job tenure have the highest odds of access 
to paid sick leave.  Therefore, to maximise Parenting Payment recipients‟ chances 
of finding part-time work with paid sick leave, they should be supported to find 
employment likely to provide long-term prospects, and to train for positions in 
health and education, which generally require post-secondary qualifications.  In 
addition, to increase the likelihood that good part-time work is available requires 
labour market change, so that short hours part-time work offers paid sick leave, so 
that more retail and wholesale jobs offer permanent part-time positions, and so that 
it is not only professionals who have good chances of being offered permanent part-
time jobs. 
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Parenting Payment supporting employment 
Many mothers work part time, many of them in casual jobs (Pocock and 
Masterman-Smith 2005:127).  Part-time workers usually earn less money than full-
time workers and casual employment can be unpredictable.  As a result, casual part-
time jobs are easiest to manage for workers who are able to rely on another source 
of income (Pocock et al. 2004:39-40).  Casual workers have no access to paid leave 
when they or their family members are sick so another source of income makes it 
possible to take time off when necessary.  Otherwise they face the difficult choice 
between caring for their family‟s health and paying the bills.  For mothers the 
additional income is commonly that of their partner.  These families fit the 
„policeman and the part-time shop assistant‟ type described by Howard.  In these 
families, the mother working in a part-time job has a full-time income to 
supplement her own – she is not the policeman.  This is a family employment model 
part way between the dual-earner and the male-breadwinner, a one-and-a-half earner 
model (Lewis 2001).   
 
While they might at other times in their lives fit the one-and-a-half earner model 
family, when in receipt of Parenting Payment, parents do not.  It is worth 
remembering that it is precisely because they do not fit this model that claimants are 
entitled to Parenting Payment.  This is the case for both one-parent and two-parent 
families.  In one-parent families, as constructed by income support rules, the sole 
earner, if employed, is earning less than the family needs; in two-parent families, 
the parent regarded as the primary earner is unemployed, sick, disabled or otherwise 
unable to earn, or they may be employed but earning a low wage.  The primary 
carer may likewise be employed, but is also on a low income.  Parenting Payment 
claimants, then, have little or no other family income on which to rely when 
managing casual and/or part-time employment. 
 
In the meantime, mothers need to find strategies to manage the risks posed by 
casual, part-time positions.  This is a particular concern for mothers in receipt of 
Parenting Payment.  HILDA data shows that only half of all employed mothers 
claiming Parenting Payment were able to use paid sick leave, compared to 70 per 
cent of female and 80 per cent of male employees (see table 10). 
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Table 10. Access to paid sick leave among employees 
 
 Access to paid sick leave 
(%) 
Parenting Payment mothers 
in employment 
50 
All employed mothers 70 
All female employees 70 
All male employees 80 
Source: HILDA 4.1, my analysis 
 
Tara explained the importance of Parenting Payment to her in this regard: 
 
I don‟t get Parenting Payment currently because I have too much 
income from nearly full-time work in casual jobs.  But I do get 
Family Tax Benefits. And I have a health care card so the rates on 
the house are reduced … and I get a concession on public transport.  
Also, it‟s good to be connected to Parenting Payment in case I get 
sick.  I see it as a bit of a safety net. 
 
Part-time and casual workers need family-friendly benefits, just as full-time earners 
do; for instance, when they or their children fall sick.  A number of the mothers I 
spoke to used Parenting Payment in a way similar to Tara.  They regarded Parenting 
Payment as something to fall back on; a second source of income when their 
employment did not offer paid leave. 
 
More than that, Parenting Payment gave mothers a degree of flexibility in their 
employment arrangements, a safety net to fall back upon when there were problems 
with work, and so added an important dimension to their decisions about 
employment –the availability of Parenting Payment allowed them to stop work or 
reduce their hours, take intermittent jobs or casual jobs, „be there‟ for their children, 
take time off when they or their children were sick, study in order to increase their 
earning potential, ease their way back into the labour market slowly, and test how 
they and their children would cope with employment and decide that the time was 
not yet right.  Parenting Payment offered a source of stable income and as such gave 
parents a degree of security, regardless of whether or not they or their partners were 
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in employment.  This is an important dimension underlying parents‟ calculations 
regarding family and employment.  It meant they could afford to wait for a job 
limited to school hours or to stop work during the school holidays to care for their 
children.  The availability of Parenting Payment gives parents the option to put their 
children first when they cannot find employment that will allow them to do so.  It 
acts as a type of paid leave for parents in casual jobs, who would otherwise have no 
income if they failed to attend work because of illness in the family.   
Conclusion 
In calculating the advantages and disadvantages of employment, mothers focus 
strongly on the financial elements of the equation.  They demonstrate a strong, clear 
awareness of the economic trade-offs associated with taking or increasing 
employment when receiving means-tested benefits.  They know that the combined 
effect of lost income support and associated benefits plus taxes, especially when 
combined with increased rent for public tenants, can result in high EMTRs.  They 
know that increasing earned income does not always greatly increase the total 
household income.  In making these financial calculations, mothers are behaving as 
rational economic actors.  However, mothers also focus strongly on non-financial 
elements and demonstrate gendered moral rationalities, rather than the rationalities 
of homo economicus.  
 
The non-financial elements in mothers‟ evaluations include the importance of 
setting a good example for their children and the benefits for themselves in terms of 
their identity and self-esteem.  They are also concerned with „being there‟ for their 
children, which is more than just being there when they are sick or being there to 
help them with their homework or being there when they come home from school, 
although these are important, but rather providing their children with a sense of 
security that derives from knowing that their parent or parents are available to them 
and are caring for them.  The stress of time pressures is ever present in these 
equations.  Overall, mothers are concerned to be able to maintain a degree of 
balance between their employment and family lives. 
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Work/family benefits are designed to help parents to find this balance.  Mothers are 
encouraged to take part-time employment to ensure they have time after paid work 
for the unpaid work of the family.  However, if mothers work part time they are 
much less likely to be able to access the most fundamental employment entitlement, 
paid sick leave.  Parenting Payment claimants, whether sole or partnered, do not fit 
the dual earner model of the policeman and the part-time shop assistant in which 
they could rely on another full-time income if they are unable to work due to 
sickness.  Instead some use Parenting Payment in this way.  
 
Examining Parenting Payment in terms of Daly and Lewis‟s (2000) concept of 
social care raises the question of how the state could increase the capacity of parents 
in part-time employment to care for their children.  Tara‟s method of combining 
casual employment with income support as a „safety net‟ suggests a different way in 
which to view income support for parents, that is, as a benefit for work/family 
reconciliation.  Not a benefit which is negotiated with bosses, as many parents, 
working in low wage, casual jobs, are not in a position to bargain for good family-
friendly conditions, but one which is provided outside of the labour market, by 
government, for parents who would struggle otherwise to balance the needs of their 
children with those of their jobs.   
 
Interestingly, staff from the Department of Family and Community Services 
presented a paper in 2003 which examined work-family arrangements among 
Parenting Payment recipients and arrived at a similar conclusion: „Parenting 
Payment provides a way of achieving workforce attachment, increased income from 
paid work and work family balance.‟ (A Gregory et al. 2003:12).  Unfortunately, 
recognition of the importance of Parenting Payment for labour market attachment 
seems to have been lost in the introduction of Australians Working Together, a 
policy built on the opposite assumption: that income support inhibits claimants‟ 
commitment to employment.  The next phase of Australian welfare change more 
starkly ignored this issue.  In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I draw on my 
findings to examine the policy which replaced Australians Working Together in 
2006 and 2007, Welfare to Work. 
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Conclusion 
 
So I‟m all for supporting parents, giving them retraining while 
they‟re happy with it.  But I‟d like the other side of it, too.  „Okay, 
we won‟t be able to support you as much when the child is this age.  
Would you like to see the social worker and discuss some of the 
avenues that will support your family?‟  Not just, „Get a job, get 
money and everything will be all right‟. (Erica) 
 
Introduction 
This thesis arose from a concern with how mothers experienced the implementation 
of Australians Working Together, a policy package which required them, for the 
first time, to undertake compulsory activities in order to retain their benefits.  
Throughout most of the twentieth century, the Australian social security system 
gave dedicated payments to mothers to support the work of caring for children.  
While the eligibility criteria expanded over time – for example, to include additional 
groups of mothers and to include fathers – the fundamental policy logic remained 
the same.  If a parent, usually a mother, had no income or a limited income, the state 
would provide funds so that she could mother full time.  Australians Working 
Together changed this policy position by making employment-oriented activity an 
essential part of parents‟ eligibility for income support.  
 
I followed a sample group of women who were subject to Australians Working 
Together requirements to find out how they perceived the key policy issues at the 
juncture of family life, employment, education and welfare.  I situated their 
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experiences within the available evidence about Australian parents in receipt of 
income support: their activities and aspirations and the assistance and constraints 
which they encountered.  I compared mothers‟ description of the welfare policy 
problem with that of the officials who argued for policy change.  Using feminist 
welfare regime analyses, I located official conceptions of social security policy 
within the policy logics of adult-worker model families and citizenship 
responsibilities.  Next I tracked mothers as they entered the physical environment of 
the social security office to see how they experienced policy in practice, at the 
street-level of policy implementation. Here I considered the importance of the office 
space and the role of personal advisers in mediating policy within workplace, 
legislative and organisational contexts.  Finally I scrutinised mothers‟ decisions 
about paid work: how they determined whether it was worthwhile to take or keep a 
job; the factors they took into account; and the significant contribution made by 
income support towards enabling low-income mothers‟ employment. 
 
Starting with mothers‟ perspectives on the policy in their everyday lives, my 
analysis moved outwards to develop a social, economic and policy context for their 
experiences.  This is a new approach, grounded in the everyday lives of welfare 
recipients both epistemologically and methodologically.  The quotidian policy 
analysis drew on multiple research methods at several levels of analysis.   
 
Basing the policy analysis in mothers‟ experience led me to two bodies of 
sociological theory: recognition and care.  Theories of recognition and respect 
provided the framework I used to understand mothers‟ position within an income 
support system.  I developed a synthesis, drawing on the work of Honneth (1995, 
2003) and Fraser (2003), and augmenting it with Sennett‟s (2003) work on respect.  
These theories highlight aspects of the struggles for recognition of particular 
pertinence to mothers as providers of care and also as welfare recipients negotiating 
social security.  In their engagement with the welfare system, mothers sought 
recognition of: their autonomy to determine for themselves how to manage their 
family lives; the contributions they make to Australian society; and the care-giving 
which fills their day-to-day lives.  Investigating these theories further reveals the 
importance of redistribution operating in concert with recognition.  Mothers‟ desire 
for the value of care to be acknowledged speaks to feminist theories of care: as care 
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givers, their understanding of care is multifaceted.  They experience care as acts of 
love; as gendered responsibility; as a form of labour which requires skills, resources 
and time; and as relational, involving both the care recipient and the care-giver 
(Daly and Lewis 2000; Fisher and Tronto 1990; Ungerson 1983). 
 
This final chapter is structured around the theoretical themes which have emerged in 
this thesis: recognition for mothers‟ social contributions in terms of care as well as 
employment, education and voluntary work; recognition of autonomy; and 
redistribution.  I review some of the key findings of my analysis of Australians 
Working Together within this framework.  In doing so, I reflect on the implications 
for a significant Australian social security policy development which occurred after 
the completion of my fieldwork, Welfare to Work.  I conclude by drawing out 
possibilities for change for better recognition and better redistribution for low-
income mothers. 
From Australians Working Together to Welfare to Work 
Australians Working Together marked a significant shift in Australian social 
security policy for parents.  For the first time, compulsory employment-oriented 
activities were required of parents in receipt of income support.  Prior to the 
introduction of this policy, low-income parents could claim income support on the 
basis of their full-time care responsibilities throughout most of their children‟s 
school years.  Under Australians Working Together, Parenting Payment recipients 
whose youngest child was aged 13 to 15 were required to undertake compulsory 
activities in order to remain eligible for income support.  Australians Working 
Together was the beginning of a process which narrowed the place of care in the 
Australian social security system.   
 
Before the introduction of Australians Working Together in 2002 and 2003, low-
income parents, whether sole or partnered, could be eligible for Parenting Payment 
if their youngest child was aged less than 16 years.  There were no employment or 
training requirements.  Australians Working Together made annual meetings with a 
personal adviser compulsory for claimants whose youngest child was of school age.  
Claimants with high-school-aged children were additionally required to participate 
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in an approved activity for 150 hours within a six month period.  Australians 
Working Together compelled parents to enter into a contractual agreement with the 
state, committing themselves to a particular set of activities.  Failure to enter into or 
adhere to this agreement could lead to serious penalties, which could escalate from a 
reduction of Parenting Payment by 18 per cent for six months, to a 24 per cent 
reduction for six months, and finally to the total withdrawal of benefits for eight 
weeks. 
 
Australians Working Together was a first step in a new direction.  Welfare to Work, 
in contrast, was a leap.  Compulsory activity requirements are now imposed when a 
parent‟s youngest child is in the early years of primary school.  Today, parents are 
compelled to undertake at least 15 hours of employment per week.  Any parent not 
doing 15 hours of employment must seek such employment and also, in a period of 
six months, complete 150 hours of an additional activity: education, training or 
voluntary work.  Penalties for failing to comply with this expanded obligation have 
changed so that any breach could lead to a total loss of payments for eight weeks.  
Employment has become an essential and unavoidable obligation of low-income 
parents.  At the same time, the financial returns from combining income support 
with part-time employment have been reduced.  There is limited recognition of care 
or the resources needed to provide care in this policy.   
 
The findings of my research into mothers‟ experience of Australians Working 
Together have implications for Welfare to Work.  While the Australians Working 
Together package of policies finished in 2006 and 2007, many of the policy 
mechanisms continued under Welfare to Work.  Like Australians Working 
Together, Welfare to Work requires parents to make a contractual agreement with 
the state, and to undertake a set list of activities to remain eligible for benefits.  A 
meeting between a personal adviser and a parent remains at the centre of the 
agreement-making process under the new policy.  Many aspects of Australians 
Working Together were extended under Welfare to Work: the focus on 
employment, the amount of hours to be spent on activities and the group of parents 
targeted by the policy.  For these reasons, policy analysis of Australians Working 
Together is highly relevant to Welfare to Work.  In addition, as Welfare to Work is 
a relatively new policy, there is as yet little evidence about its operation and effects.  
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Research into Australians Working Together offers the only evidence of how 
compulsory employment-oriented programs for parents claiming income support, 
implemented through a personal adviser, work in an Australian setting.  Australians 
Working Together should not be treated as a closed period in Australian social 
security history.  The raft of policies it introduced changed the basis of income 
support for parents.  As such, Australians Working Together has long-term 
relevance for Australian social security policy analysis.   
Recognition and redistribution in everyday life 
I developed an everyday life approach to policy analysis in order to research 
mothers‟ experience of Australians Working Together.  I drew firstly upon Smith 
(1987, 1990) who encourages sociologists to treat the everyday life of women as a 
sociological problematic.  Following Smith meant starting the analysis from the 
point of view of mothers who were targeted by the policy, thereby acknowledging 
their unique perspectives and insights, and then moving outward, developing an 
understanding of their lives by investigating the complex of social relations in 
which they live.  I blended Smith‟s everyday life approach with the framework for 
welfare research designed by Williams and Popay (1999).  Williams and Popay 
encourage welfare researchers to conduct welfare policy analysis on multiple levels.  
The four levels are: the welfare subject; the social environment in which subjects‟ 
choices are constrained or facilitated; the policies and policy language that affect 
their lives; and broader social and economic developments. 
 
Everyday life methods are rare in policy analysis and particularly undeveloped in 
Australian welfare policy research.  My study has demonstrated the benefits of such 
an approach.  Focusing on Australians Working Together policy in operation from 
the perspectives of those whom it targets has helped me to highlight its complexities 
and inconsistencies and to identify outcomes perhaps unintended by policy makers.  
An everyday life approach demonstrates the meaning of policy for those it most 
directly affects. 
 
Low-income mothers of teenagers were at the heart of this study.  Internationally, 
research into welfare-to-work programs tends to focus on mothers of younger 
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children, often because employment obligations start earlier in a child‟s life than 
they have in Australia.  Similarly, studies into negotiating work and family tend to 
be concerned with mothers of younger children.  In focusing on mothers of 
teenagers, this study draws attention to the ongoing responsibilities of mothers, 
responsibilities which extend into their children‟s teen years.  The provision of care 
changes as children‟s needs change, but care remains a significant part of mothers‟ 
lives.  Therefore, complex negotiations of welfare-to-work and of work and family 
continue for mothers of teenagers. 
 
Undertaking an everyday life approach to welfare policy analysis across the four 
levels set out by Williams and Popay required the use of multiple methods.  I drew 
upon longitudinal, in-depth interviews with mothers of teenage children receiving 
Parenting Payment; interviews with Centrelink advisers who were responsible for 
implementing the policy; quantitative analysis using data from the Household 
Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia survey; analysis of how officials framed 
the welfare reform policy „problem‟; and extensive reviews of a wide range of 
literature.  This range of methods allowed me to build a picture of Australians 
Working Together which started with the perspective of Parenting Payment 
recipients and worked outwards to construct a contextual understanding of the 
policy in action. 
 
I argued in chapter three that policy which is developed without taking adequate 
account of the available evidence risks being ineffective, poorly targeted and even 
counterproductive.  Throughout the thesis I have presented evidence of a disjuncture 
between the assumptions of Australians Working Together policy and the lives of 
mothers claiming Parenting Payment who were targeted by it.  I now draw on my 
findings to examine Welfare to Work, seeking to determine if there is a similar 
disconnect between that set of policies and the everyday lives of mothers receiving 
income support.  In exploring the points of friction and mismatch, I am interested in 
finding possibilities for change.  I do so with a view to understanding how policy 
might be differently designed under a social justice agenda, as described by Ruth 
Lister (2001).  Applying a social justice agenda to the issue of employment and 
income support among mothers would involve publicly acknowledging the 
importance of benefits in alleviating poverty among low-income and lone-mother 
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families, recognising the social contributions made by mothers through both unpaid 
and paid work, and better involving social security recipients in welfare-to-work 
policy debates.   
 
The possibility for change lies in struggles for recognition.  In the spheres of legal 
rights and solidarity, recognition has transformative potential (Honneth 1995:176).  
Since recognition in both spheres relies on socially accepted criteria, people 
experiencing disrespect draw on those generalised criteria to argue for extended 
entitlement to respect (Honneth 1995:162).  Honneth‟s term, „struggles for 
recognition‟, refers to the development of social movements which strive to extend 
the reach of recognition, to extend legal rights so that they are more universal and to 
extend social esteem so that additional activities are valued as social contributions.  
Struggles are possible because of the normative potential in both spheres.  With 
regard to social security, the sphere of legal rights offers the potential for struggles 
to extend recognition of the right to and capacity for autonomy.  With regard to 
care, the sphere of social solidarity offers the potential for greater recognition of the 
social contribution of care work. 
 
The extension of recognition of autonomy and care has redistributive implications.  
In order to claim social rights and exert autonomy, one needs sufficient material 
resources (Honneth 2003:149).  Poverty is increasingly understood to be a denial of 
rights (Lister 2002:105).  If care were better valued, explicitly and publicly, as a 
social contribution, this might provide the basis for claims for better pay on the part 
of those whose employment revolves around care and also better recognition of the 
value of this work when it is unpaid.  Honneth (2003: 151) argues that Fraser 
separates redistribution from a framework of recognition.  He points out that it is the 
widespread acceptance of normative principles of recognition which provide the 
basis for redistribution.  However, Fraser (2003:48,65) does not assert that 
redistribution is separate from recognition principles; rather she describes 
redistribution and recognition as intertwined: „no redistribution without 
recognition‟.  Instead, Fraser argues that there are advantages in treating 
redistribution as a distinct analytic concept.  Her concern is that redistribution might 
be overlooked in an analysis focusing on recognition.  I believe her concern is 
justified.  It would be possible to examine the struggles for recognition of autonomy 
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and care by the mothers in this study without reference to redistribution.  It would 
be a limited argument, but nonetheless possible.  The analysis could be confined to 
the struggles for the autonomy to determine for one‟s self and one‟s own family 
how to prioritise care, employment, study and other activities; and to struggles for 
recognition of the social contribution of unpaid care work.  In this study, however, 
mothers‟ low level of income was a central and recurring concern of such strength 
that a separate analysis of the redistributive effects of policy is both justified and 
necessary.  For this reason, in my conclusion, I follow Fraser in presenting my 
findings regarding redistribution separately to those relating to recognition of care 
and autonomy. 
Recognition of care 
Throughout this thesis I have highlighted policy misrecognition of the unpaid care 
work of mothers.  My work has established that mothers place a very high value on 
care.  Their understanding of what constitutes good mothering and of the care needs 
of their children informs the way they approach their daily lives.  The need to 
provide care for their children in the way they think best is enmeshed with their 
thinking about family life, employment, education and voluntary work.  In their 
discussions of care, mothers spoke of care as labour involving effort and time.  For 
some, family care required a lot of energy and a lot of time because of their own and 
their children‟s health needs.  They took their concern about the provision of family 
care with them to their adviser interviews at Centrelink.  The need to preserve 
enough energy and time to provide care featured strongly as one of the key non-
financial elements of their calculations about welfare and employment.   
 
Australians Working Together allowed Parenting Payment recipients to continue to 
spend considerable amounts of time on unpaid family care.  It was only recipients 
with children aged 13 to 15 years who faced compulsory activity requirements.  
Recipients with children under that age could provide full-time care.  Those with 
13- to 15-year-olds were only required to undertake 150 hours of activity every six 
months, or around six hours per week. This policy rule provided mothers with 
considerable flexibility to fit activities around care responsibilities.  Mothers could 
either engage in their employment-oriented activities for a few hours each week or 
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choose to cluster their activities more intensively into shorter periods, leaving them 
free in school holidays, for example.  
 
While the written rules of Australians Working Together allowed Parenting 
Payment recipients to prioritise care, such recognition was offered in only a limited 
manner in the official depiction of the policy and in the policy as it was 
implemented (Skevik 2005:56).  As I demonstrated in chapter three, care was rarely 
mentioned by government representatives.  They made little acknowledgement of 
the value of mothers‟ unpaid care work as a social contribution.  Instead, paid 
employment was presented as the pre-eminent social contribution parents could 
make.  The public representation of social citizenship changed so that paid 
employment was the moral responsibility of all adults, including mothers (Shaver 
2002a:325,326).  The new citizen as presented in Australians Working Together 
rhetoric was not gendered, rather a worker devoid of care responsibilities (Brennan 
and Cass 2005).  Care was also largely overlooked by the policy in action.  When 
mothers attended their adviser interviews in order to draw up a Participation 
Agreement, they had little opportunity to discuss the care needs of their families.  
The interview guidelines asked few questions about care and provided even less 
opportunity to discuss family care in detail.   
 
Welfare to Work has further delegitimised unpaid care work.  Parents claiming 
income support are now required to engage in employment-oriented activities from 
the time their youngest child is in primary school, not high school.  As a result, 
many more mothers face a compulsory activity requirement.  In addition, a mother 
must commit to undertake at least 15 hours of employment each week or to seek 
such employment.  Nor do mothers have the flexibility offered under Australians 
Working Together to engage in employment more intensively during some weeks in 
order to leave other weeks free.  The 15-hour employment obligation applies at all 
times.  Furthermore, parents are required to accept any offer of „suitable‟ 
employment, which includes paid work of up to 25 hours per week, considerably 
more than the minimum requirement and substantially reducing the time available to 
provide care (Guide to Social Security Law, 3.2.9.70, reviewed 7 July 2007).  Low-
income mothers of school children can no longer elect to mother full time. 
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The degree to which an individual mother‟s conception of care is misrecognised by 
Welfare to Work is demonstrated by the following two examples.  According to the 
Guide to Social Security Law (section 3.2.8.30, 5 November 2007), a parent cannot 
be required to take employment if appropriate care or supervision for their child is 
not available.  The guide states that it is solely the parent who can determine if 
informal care arrangements are appropriate.  However, the guide provides 
Centrelink staff with an example of a situation in which a parent‟s contention that 
appropriate care is not available must be disregarded.  If a child frequently fails to 
attend school, and so a mother believes that she cannot take employment during 
school hours because she needs to supervise the child, this is not considered an 
adequate reason and she can be required to accept an offer of employment.  The 
appearance of allowing mothers to prioritise care swiftly dissolves. 
 
The second example of this misrecognition is the government promotion of family 
day care as an employment option for low-income parents.  At the introduction of 
Welfare to Work, one of the policy elements designed to support parents in meeting 
their activity requirements was the „Family Day Care Start Up Payment‟.  The logic 
underpinning this policy points starkly to a lack of appreciation for unpaid care 
work.  The payment, as its name suggests, provides one-off cash assistance to 
parents, supporting them in establishing a family day care business – formal child 
care that is provided in the home of the carer.  The payment is intended to assist 
parents to fulfil Welfare to Work activity requirements (FACSIA nd:1).  So the 
payments are designed to help a mother to establish herself in providing paid care 
for children from other families in her own home.  Care provided by the same 
woman in the same location, if unpaid, is not treated as work.  A mother could not 
fulfil her Welfare to Work obligations by providing unpaid care to her own children 
in her own home, because the policy regards only paid care as work, and therefore 
only paid care as an adequate social contribution.   
Recognition of the social contributions of employment, education 
and voluntary work 
Australians Working Together was designed to assist Parenting Payment recipients 
to enter employment, study or voluntary work.  In chapter three, I demonstrated that 
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public officials constructed the policy problem as requiring a transition from welfare 
into employment.  Welfare to Work, in its name, reinforces the notion that one is 
either claiming welfare or in work – not both – and the policy is designed to help 
parents transfer from one state to the other.  Under Australians Working Together, 
employment was presented as a central moral responsibility of all adults, a 
contribution to the community which Parenting Payment recipients, by being 
beneficiaries, were assumed not to be making.  However, evidence I presented in 
chapter two shows that prior to the introduction of Australians Working Together, 
Parenting Payment recipients were already employed at a very high rate.  Many 
mothers combined receipt of Parenting Payment with employment (FACSIA 
2006:53; HILDA 4.1 my analysis, see appendix three).  There was also a large 
group of Parenting Payment recipients who were unemployed, actively looking for a 
job but without success, and relying on Parenting Payment in the meantime. 
 
Often mothers drew upon Parenting Payment because the labour market did not 
provide the kind of employment they needed.  Some were working in part-time jobs 
and dearly wanted work which offered longer hours but could not find it (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2004:15; Gray et al. 2003:17).  Working short part-time hours 
provided insufficient income to sustain their families, so mothers supplemented 
their earnings with income support.  In chapter five, I showed that very few people 
working in part-time positions have access to paid sick leave, the most fundamental 
employment benefit.  Parenting Payment provided a safety-net for those women, so 
that even if they were sick and had no earnings for the week, they could ensure the 
rent was paid.  As they were unlikely even to access paid sick leave, it is probable 
that Parenting Payment recipients working in part-time jobs would not be able to 
take advantage of other family-friendly benefits at work.  The possible exception is 
flexible hours.  However, if a mother worked fewer hours in her casual job in order 
to be available for her children that week, she would also earn less income.  Again, 
Parenting Payment went some way towards making up the shortfall in the weekly 
budget.   
 
Chapter two provided evidence of high rates of participation in study and voluntary 
work among Parenting Payment recipients.  Many mothers were enrolled in 
education and training courses in order to improve their employment prospects 
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(Saunders et al. 2003).  Parenting Payment provided the family with some income 
while mothers worked towards this long-term goal.  Eventually, as I demonstrated, 
many mothers hoped to attain qualifications which would enable them to find good-
quality jobs, and thus be financially self-sufficient.  Other mothers spent significant 
amounts of time volunteering, making important social contributions through 
unpaid community work.  These contributions mothers valued for altruistic reasons; 
they felt they were helping in areas where they were needed. 
 
The Australians Working Together evaluation report stated that very few Parenting 
Payment recipients had ceased to claim benefits as a result of the program and that 
there was only a small increase in the rate of employment among parents (DEWR 
2005a).  This finding is not surprising, when considered in the light of evidence on 
pre-existing high rates of employment participation.  Furthermore, Australians 
Working Together did little to address the labour market issues which meant that 
parents found it necessary to combine employment with income support.  There was 
no push by government to improve the quality of low-wage, part-time employment.  
Australians Working Together only allowed mothers to engage in voluntary work if 
it were deemed to be improving their employability.  The voluntary work which 
mothers valued for its social contribution would not necessarily have been 
considered sufficiently employment-oriented to qualify as a Mutual Obligation 
activity. 
 
Australians Working Together did make an important contribution towards mothers‟ 
capacity to be financially self-sufficient: mothers could enrol in study or training to 
improve their qualifications.  The kind of courses which were supported under 
Australians Working Together included undergraduate degrees and trade 
qualifications.  Mothers could study part or full time for many years in order to 
attain a level of qualification which might improve their earning potential.  Chapter 
four showed that study was the most popular new activity for inclusion in a 
Participation Agreement.  Parenting Payment recipients who committed to a new 
activity tended to agree to education.   
 
Like Australians Working Together, Welfare to Work fails to recognise the diverse 
contributions already made by parents.  Employment is prioritised over education 
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and voluntary work.  Welfare to Work expanded the compulsory nature of 
Australians Working Together, requiring at least 15 hours of employment per week 
from parents.  Yet as shown in chapter two, many mothers were already working 
close to this number of hours prior to the introduction of Australians Working 
Together and, as noted above, many wished for, but could not find, additional hours.  
Merely mandating that mothers spend longer each week in paid employment does 
not necessarily ensure that they will be able to find more hours.  Welfare to Work 
requires parents working less than 15 hours a week to attend the Job Network for 
assistance in finding employment.  It is possible that registration with a Job 
Network member will increase parents‟ employment options.  Job Network 
members that offer well-run, high-quality employment programs and match their 
clients well with jobs may improve mothers‟ employment prospects.  However, the 
quality of Job Network services is uneven, with some performing very badly 
(DEWR 2008).   
 
Welfare to Work was accompanied by substantial industrial relations policy change, 
known as WorkChoices.  The new industrial policy reduced employment 
entitlements, encouraged one-on-one negotiation of employment conditions 
between employees and employers and treated work-family benefits as being 
primarily the responsibility of individual workplaces.  Policy analysts expected that 
low-income women workers would fare poorly under this new arrangement (Baird 
and Todd 2005, Pocock and Masterman-Smith 2005).  Early evidence suggests that 
this is the case (Elton et al. 2007).  Some women have had their pay levels fall, 
greater work intensification, less job security and less ability to negotiate hours of 
work.  Women at the intersection of Welfare to Work and WorkChoices have faced 
particular difficulties due to the 15-hour employment requirement (Elton et al. 
2007:89-90).  Those working in casual jobs, in which the hours change from week 
to week, may be involved in ongoing negotiations with their employer in order to 
maintain sufficient hours.  
 
Welfare to Work significantly reduced parents‟ ability to choose to engage in 
education, despite this being a popular option under Australians Working Together.  
Under Welfare to Work only short-term study of less than twelve months meets 
participation requirements (Guide to Social Security Law, 3.2.9.70, last review 7 
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July 2007).  Mothers wishing to enrol in a longer course, such as for a trade 
qualification or undergraduate degree, are not eligible for Newstart Allowance and 
are instead asked to apply for Austudy.  Austudy is only available to full-time 
students and provides less income than Newstart Allowance.
38
  
 
Australians Working Together and then Welfare to Work failed to recognise that 
most parents were already making the kinds of social contributions the policies 
mandated. 
Recognition of autonomy 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that Australians Working Together 
significantly reduced the autonomy of Parenting Payment recipients through 
compulsory activity requirements.  As I observed in chapter three, this reduction of 
autonomy occurred as part of a broader trend towards greater emphasis on the 
responsibilities over the rights of welfare recipients.  Government officials argued 
that Mutual Obligation, by articulating the obligations of welfare recipients, would 
ensure that they „gave something back‟ to the community that supported them and 
took advantage of opportunities for employment and training when they arose.  The 
community contribution to which government referred was narrowly focused on 
paid employment.   
 
Australian Government ministers argued that parents of teenage children were not 
making a contribution and not taking advantage of opportunities.  Their primary 
evidence for this was the rising number of Parenting Payment claimants, at a time of 
low unemployment across the population (Henman and Perry 2002).  If parents 
were not taking the employment which was available to them, they were 
demonstrating that they were unable to make good decisions for themselves, and 
therefore they needed help and „encouragement‟, in the form of an adviser, a 
Participation Agreement and penalties.  The compulsory activities which parents 
were contractually obliged to undertake were designed to help mothers follow a 
„normal‟ trajectory from full-time mothering in their children‟s youngest years 
                                                 
38
 In April 2008, the rates for a single person with one child were: Austudy - $465.60; Newstart 
Allowance - $472.80; Parenting Payment - $546.80 (Centrelink 2008). 
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towards part-time mothering and part-time employment during their children‟s 
school years.  The program was compulsory because it was based on the assumption 
that the fact of being a Parenting Payment recipient was in itself evidence that 
mothers were not making the best decisions for themselves and their families 
(Shaver 2001:341; Yeatman 2000:163). 
 
As a result, Australians Working Together reduced Parenting Payment recipients‟ 
autonomy to determine for themselves how to balance their commitment to 
employment and family.  Whereas previously a mother could elect to change her 
pattern of employment and study to suit her understanding of her family‟s needs, 
under Australians Working Together, if it meant she would not meet her activity 
requirement, she would have to negotiate her decision with Centrelink.  So, for 
example, if Alia decided to stop attending her English classes throughout summer 
because her asthma made walking to class in summer impossible, she needed to 
explain this decision to Centrelink.  If she did not explain her decision and if she did 
not fulfil an agreement to undertake 150 hours of English classes in a six-month 
period, she could be penalised and her benefits reduced.  If she explained her 
decision, but Centrelink found that the summer heat was not a sufficient reason to 
stop going to English classes, then Alia might be unable to renegotiate her contract.  
Then she would face a choice between protecting her health in the manner she felt 
was best and preserving her Parenting Payment by continuing to attend classes.   
 
Clearly the nature of the Participation Agreement and its negotiation were very 
important.  The agreement was developed in discussion with a personal adviser.  
The adviser was to take into account a mother‟s circumstances, aspirations and 
needs when drawing up the agreement with her.  So if Alia explained her 
circumstances, perhaps her agreement might be drawn up differently.  She could be 
exempt from any activity during summer, perhaps, or she could be referred to 
classes to which she could travel more easily.  However, as demonstrated in chapter 
four, mothers did not approach their adviser interviews with the sense that they 
could control the negotiation process.  Sitting down with the adviser, some felt 
unable to raise personal matters which might affect their ability to fulfil the 
agreement.  The open-plan office space, although creating a physical setting which 
attempted to level the power relations between beneficiaries and advisers, worked 
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against mothers‟ disclosure of sensitive matters because it did not provide a private 
environment for their conversation.  In addition, the adviser interview guide may 
have limited some parents‟ opportunities to raise issues which might affect their 
ability to undertake activities; it also provided few opportunities to discuss care 
responsibilities.  As a result, some Parenting Payment recipients would have signed 
Participation Agreements which were not appropriately tailored to their 
circumstances.  Although parents could renegotiate their agreement at any time, 
most did not understand this (Alexander et al. 2005:79).  Some parents, unable to 
meet their agreement, might have felt their only options were either to stop the 
activity and incur a penalty, or continue with the activity even if they felt it was 
detrimental to the family. 
 
Furthermore, Australians Working Together limited the autonomy of all Parenting 
Payment claimants whose youngest child was aged 13 to 15.  This was the case 
regardless of whether or not they were fully meeting the activity requirement prior 
to it becoming compulsory.  As demonstrated in chapter four, the majority of 
parents signed agreements in which they committed to continue to do an activity, 
usually employment, which they were already doing (Alexander et al.2005:78; 
Social Research Centre 2005a:17).  Even though they already managed their lives in 
a way which accorded with the official depiction of welfare recipients‟ obligations, 
these parents were required nonetheless to sign a Participation Agreement.  These 
parents demonstrated a capacity to make decisions for their family which also met 
government objectives, but their autonomy was constrained regardless. 
 
Welfare to Work substantially further reduces parents‟ autonomy when compared to 
Australians Working Together.  More low-income parents face compulsory 
requirements, as these now apply from when the youngest child is in primary 
school, and the requirements are greater, as noted above.  Parents‟ choice of 
activities is more limited under Welfare to Work; long-term study and part-time 
study are no longer activities which fulfil requirements.   
 
The Welfare to Work policy mechanism that most significantly reduces parents‟ 
autonomy is the requirement to report on their employment and job search to 
Centrelink every fortnight, compared to every six months under Australians 
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Working Together.  Each fortnight, parents receiving Newstart Allowance visit a 
Centrelink office to submit a form which details the number of hours they have 
worked, the income they have earned and the jobs for which they have applied.  
Parents who do not meet their activity requirements are asked their reasons, to 
determine whether they have a „reasonable excuse‟.  The level of reporting and 
explanation required can be demonstrated using the example of parents who 
generally meet their activity requirements through employment (Guide to Social 
Security Law, 3.2.8.40, reviewed 20 March 2008).  The hours a mother is employed 
are averaged across the fortnight, so that if she is employed for 10 hours in one 
week and 20 hours the following week, the total of 30 hours means she has fulfilled 
the activity requirement.  The hours are not averaged between fortnights, though, so 
a mother would not meet the activity requirement if she worked 35 hours in one 
fortnight and 25 hours in the following fortnight.  If she usually works 30 hours per 
fortnight, but for some unexpected reason she does not work the full 30 hours, a 
reasonable excuse would be that she was sent home from her shift early because 
business was slow.  If she is able to anticipate that she will not work her usual 30 
hours – for example, because she is told in advance not to come in while the 
business conducts a one day stock-take – then she must search for employment 
during that fortnight.  If it is likely that a mother will work less than her usual 30 
hours for more than one fortnight, then she must search for employment while her 
hours are below 30.  This highly detailed level of reporting significantly reduces a 
mother‟s autonomy to determine for herself when reduced hours are acceptable and 
what length of time being employed at reduced hours is too long.  Any time a 
mother‟s hours drop below 30 in a fortnight, she needs to explain why, whether or 
not it was anticipated, how long she expects to be working fewer hours and, if 
unable to answer these questions appropriately, explain why she did not look for 
another job.  This is just one example of the detail in which parents‟ lives are 
scrutinised under Welfare to Work. 
 
Welfare to Work substantially limits the autonomy of parents, not only to determine 
the level of care appropriate for their children, but also to decide for themselves 
what employment or education would be best in their circumstances.  Parents‟ 
autonomy is so limited that their activity is watched carefully and officially 
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observed non-compliance questioned every fortnight.  The amplified surveillance 
places parents at a high risk of being penalised. 
Redistributive dimensions 
As demonstrated in chapter two, parents receiving income support are at high risk of 
poverty.  Lone-parent families are overrepresented among families living in 
poverty, as are families which primarily rely on government benefits (Community 
Affairs References Committee 2004:247-248; Harding and Szukalskz 2000:4).  The 
mothers who participated in this study were highly aware of their weekly budgets.  
They managed their small incomes by shopping for bargains, going without, 
walking rather than catching public transport, socialising at friends‟ houses instead 
of going out for a cup of coffee.  For many, the additional income which 
employment provided was the primary motivating factor for seeking and keeping 
employment.  Yet mothers also wanted to ensure that they had enough time and 
energy for their families.  So, as I demonstrated in chapter five, when they weighed 
up the relative advantages and disadvantages of their current or potential jobs, they 
engaged in complex and detailed calculations, attempting to balance additional 
income against reduced income support, the loss of benefits associated with income 
support, less time and lower levels of energy.    
 
When the Australian Government argued for the need to change the welfare system, 
one of its key concerns was „incentives‟ to employment.  It introduced the Working 
Credit to soften the immediate and high effective marginal tax rates experienced by 
beneficiaries who started paid work.  Chapter three demonstrated that relieving the 
poverty of parents and other beneficiaries was an occasional feature in 
Government‟s promotion of employment among Parenting Payment recipients.  
Australians Working Together did not otherwise change the redistributive effects of 
income support for parents.   
 
By the time the Australian Government was seeking to introduce Welfare to Work, 
the term „poverty‟ had completely disappeared from its lexicon (Saunders 2006:6).  
In arguing for the benefits of employment, government officials instead promoted 
the moral advantages of employment and its long-term benefits.  Although 
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government representatives did present employment as improving financial 
prospects, they did not mention poverty.  The Department for Employment and 
Workplace Relations (DEWR 2005b:30) argued that Welfare to Work would 
improve the financial returns for income support recipients in employment: 
 
The Welfare to Work reforms will make employment more 
financially rewarding. From 1 July 2006 changes to income tests for 
most allowances and payments will allow people to keep more of 
their earnings. 
 
The department was referring to the changes to income tapers which were 
implemented for allowances, including Newstart and Parenting Payment Partnered.   
 
It is true that the Welfare to Work package did improve the taper rate for some 
benefit recipients.  It lowered the taper rate which had previously applied to 
Parenting Payment Partnered (see appendix one).  The upper earnings taper for 
Parenting Payment Partnered was reduced from 70 per cent to 60 per cent.  This 
change applied to all allowances, including Newstart.  However, it is manifestly 
untrue that Welfare to Work will improve the financial returns of employment for 
sole parents.  New claimants who have children aged eight or over will not benefit 
from the more „generous‟ pension earnings disregard and taper rates offered by 
Parenting Payment Single; instead they will face the far tougher rates of Newstart.  
Harding et al. (2005:3) estimated that in July 2006, a Parenting Payment Single 
recipient entering 15 hours of work under the previous system would keep $144 of 
their $195 earnings at the minimum wage (Harding et al. 2005:13-14).  Under the 
new system, the same parent earning the same wages but claiming Newstart would 
keep just $81.   
 
Harding et al. (2005:18) conclude: 
 
The effect of these income test and tax changes is thus to reduce the 
attractiveness of paid work to sole parents – and to reduce the 
amount of income that they have available to support themselves 
and their children after they undertake paid work. 
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Thus despite an ostensible concern about the financial returns of employment, the 
Welfare to Work reforms financially disadvantage sole-parent families – families 
who already experience higher rates of poverty than other families (CARC  
2004:224). 
 
Moreover, the penalties for failing to comply with requirements became harsher 
under Welfare to Work.  Under the new rules, a breach of requirements could result 
in a total withdrawal of income support payments for eight weeks.  Under 
Australians Working Together, an eight week suspension of payments was the 
toughest penalty, applied when the third breach of requirements occurred in a two-
year period.  Under Welfare to Work, the eight-week suspension applies to all 
breaches.  For families already struggling from week to week, the total loss of 
payments for even one week would be difficult.  Eight weeks without payments 
could be devastating.  As noted above, the greater frequency at which parents are 
required to report their activities further increases the risk that they might receive a 
penalty.  Many penalties are being applied.  While data about penalties incurred by 
parents is not available, the number of penalties for all beneficiaries with activity 
requirements was 15,000 in the first year (2006-2007), increasing sharply to 32,000 
in the following eight months (Karvelas 2008b).  The Department for Employment, 
Education and Workplace Relations responded to this revelation by instructing 
Centrelink to issue a penalty only „when the jobseeker clearly has no reasonable 
excuse‟, implying perhaps that reasonable excuses were not previously being 
adequately considered (Karvelas 2008a). 
 
The expanded and more complex activity requirements under Welfare to Work 
increase the vulnerability to penalties of parents who might struggle to understand 
what is expected of them.  Indigenous people, for example, are overrepresented in 
the recent flush of breach penalties (Karvelas 2008b).  I demonstrated in chapter 
two that parents who are not proficient in English, or who have problems with 
literacy or their mental health can sometimes experience difficulty understanding 
social security requirements.  One mother I interviewed did not even know the name 
of the benefit she received.  The risk that these women might unwittingly breach 
activity requirements is very high.   
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Far from improving the redistributive impact of income support for parents of 
school-aged children, Welfare to Work exacerbates the risk of poverty for families 
which already experience poverty at a high rate.  Welfare to Work increases the 
likelihood that these parents will be forced to try to survive without income support 
for two months at a time.  In addition, Welfare to Work reduces the income of many 
sole-parent families, and in this respect, the policy definitively fails to be 
redistributive.  As noted at the beginning of this conclusion, this failure has 
implications for recognition both in terms of social rights and social esteem. 
Conclusion 
Recognition is fundamental to our positive sense of self.  Mutual recognition 
supports self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Honneth 1995).  Social 
security policy can be delivered in a manner which enhances or undermines mutual 
respect (Sennett 2003).  Recent trends in Australian social security policy have 
misrecognised parents, most of whom are mothers.  Australians Working Together 
and later Welfare to Work, delegitimised care; diminished public acknowledgement 
of the value of the unpaid care work of low-income mothers; failed to recognise the 
high levels of employment undertaken by low-income mothers; constructed those 
mothers as being in need of highly interventionist public policy to ensure they 
engage in employment; and imposed harsh penalties in a complex system, placing 
low-income families at greater risk of poverty.  For some mothers in this study, the 
experience of Australians Working Together was painful and insulting, a 
consequence of disrespect.   
 
Yet policy developed around the principle of Mutual Obligation, where this 
involves true mutuality and truly mutual respect, has the potential to enhance 
parents‟ self-respect and self-esteem.  Caroline‟s experience of her adviser interview 
provides an insight into how programs designed to expand rates of maternal 
employment might be implemented respectfully.  Caroline met with an adviser who 
listened to her when she explained her family circumstances, her employment 
aspirations and her desire for financial self-reliance.  Caroline‟s adviser encouraged 
her to extend herself beyond what she had previously thought possible by enrolling 
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in vocational training to pursue a new career direction.  Undertaking and completing 
this training not only increased Caroline‟s self-esteem, but also increased her 
earning potential, and thus expanded her capacity to financially support her family 
solely from her earnings, as was her wish.  This meeting was an example of mutual 
respect operating in welfare policy.  The adviser respected Caroline‟s interests, 
concerns and aspirations, and Caroline respected the quality of advice and 
commitment to her well being demonstrated by the adviser.  This is the kind of 
mutual respect which Sennett (2003:262) seeks: respect for autonomy, which 
„means accepting in others what one does not understand about them.  In so doing, 
the fact of their autonomy is treated as equal to your own.‟ 
 
If social security policy were designed and delivered with the goal of mutual 
respect, it would also aspire to Lister‟s (2001:69-70) social justice agenda.  Such 
policy would publicly espouse the vital redistributive role of social security; 
acknowledge the significant public value of unpaid work, including the unpaid care 
work of low-income mothers; it would actively engage beneficiaries in policy 
debates, in recognition of their unique understanding of policy; and it would seek 
respectful relations between staff and beneficiaries at the micro-level of the front-
line interactions of policy implementation.  To best do this, policy would need to be 
based on evidence: on the considerable evidence of the value of care; the evidence 
of income support recipients‟ strong commitment to employment and to making 
social contributions, despite the disadvantage they experience; and the evidence of 
the benefits of including those with „expertise born of experience‟ in policy debates 
(Lister 2001:70).  This would be respectful policy.   
 
The Australian policy environment has changed since I started this research.  In 
November 2007, the Australian Labor Party was elected to federal government after 
eleven years of conservative Liberal/National Coalition rule.  The new government 
has made a commitment to social inclusion and created a new unit within the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to oversee policy in this area.  The new 
Minister for Families, Housing, Communities and Indigenous Affairs, Jenny 
Macklin (2008), has publicly stated that she intends to implement policy based on a 
„forensic analysis‟ of the evidence.  It is not yet clear to what extent these 
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commitments will translate into respectful policy.  Early signs are mixed.
39
  
However, in the beginning stages of the new government‟s assessment of social 
security policy, there is the potential for extending the reach of mothers‟ struggles 
for recognition of care and autonomy out from the everyday context in and around 
the Centrelink office into public debates about policy development. 
                                                 
39
 The Minister for Families, Housing, Communities and Indigenous Affairs, Jenny Macklin (2008), 
made an early policy announcement that the government would extend a policy implemented by the 
Howard Government under which half of the income support payments of Aboriginal families in the 
Northern Territory were withheld, only to be spent in approved shops.  Macklin announced that some 
Western Australian Aboriginal communities would also have their payments „quarantined‟.  The 
Minister provided no evidence as to why this was the best policy response to concern about 
neglected children. 
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Appendix One: Comparing Australians Working Together and 
Welfare to Work 
Table A1: Lone and partnered income support claimants, arrangements prior to and 
following the July 2006 Welfare to Work changes 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Parents in receipt of Parenting Payment on 1 July 2006 could remain on Parenting Payment until 
their youngest child turned 16 years.  New claimants from 1 July 2006 would be diverted into the 
new system. 
Y
o
u
n
g
e
s
t 
c
h
ild
 a
g
e
d
   Existing claimants
40
 New claimants 
 Single Partnered Single Partnered 
L
e
s
s
 t
h
a
n
 s
ix
 y
e
a
rs
 
Name 
Parenting 
Payment 
Parenting 
Payment 
Parenting 
Payment 
Parenting 
Payment 
Type of benefit Pension Allowance Pension Allowance 
Activity 
requirements 
    
Part-time study 
meets all 
activity 
requirements 
NA NA NA NA 
S
ix
 y
e
a
rs
 
Name   
Parenting 
Payment 
Newstart 
Allowance 
Type of benefit   Pension Allowance 
Activity 
requirements 
As above As above   
Part-time study 
meets all 
activity 
requirements 
    
 
S
e
v
e
n
 y
e
a
rs
 
Name 
Parenting 
Payment 
Parenting 
Payment 
  
Type of benefit Pension Allowance   
 
Activity 
requirements 
  As above As above 
 
Part-time study 
meets all 
activity 
requirements 
    
 
E
ig
h
t 
to
 f
if
te
e
n
 y
e
a
rs
 
Name   
Newstart 
Allowance 
 
Type of benefit   Allowance  
 
Activity 
requirements 
As above As above  As above 
 
Part-time study 
meets all 
activity 
requirements 
    
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Table A2: Earnings disregards and taper rates, 1 July – 19 September 2006 
 
 Sole parent
1
 Partnered parent
1
 
Benefit Parenting 
Payment 
Single to 
2006 
Newstart 
from 2006 
Parenting 
Payment 
Partnered to 
2006 
Newstart from 
2006 
Youngest child aged less 
than 8 
aged 8 or 
more 
aged less 
than 6 
aged 6 or 
more 
Type of payment Pension Allowance Allowance Allowance 
Base rate $499.70 plus 
$17.80 
supplement 
$444.20 $370.50 $370.50 
Earnings disregard $152.60 $62 $62 $62 
Rate at which payments 
are reduced above 
earnings disregard 
Above 
$152.60, 
40% 
$62 to $250, 
50% 
Above $250, 
60% 
$62 to $250, 
50% 
Above $250, 
60% (prior to 
1 July, 70%) 
$62 to $250, 
50% 
Above $250, 
60% 
1. Principle carer with one child, partner, if applicable, in receipt of Newstart. Source: Centrelink 
2005; Centrelink 2006a; Centrelink 2006b. 
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Appendix Two: Timeline of events 
 
Welfare reform under the Howard Government 1996-2006 
 
Date  
March 1996 Election of Liberal/National Coalition under John Howard 
October 1998 Re-election of Liberal/National Coalition Government for second 
term in office 
1998 Parenting Payment established, combining payments for sole and 
partnered parents under one name (although in practice still 
different payments). 
September 1999 Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot begins 
October 1999 Minister for Family and Community Services, Senator Jocelyn 
Newman commissions the Reference Group on Welfare Reform 
July 2000 Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Participation Support for a 
More Equitable Society Final Report, „McClure Report‟ 
November 2001 Re-election of Liberal/National Coalition Government for third 
term in office 
2001 Government response to the McClure Report, Welfare Reform: A 
Stronger, Fairer Australia 
September 2002 Parenting Payment recipients required to attend annual interview 
September 2003 Australians Working Together package implemented.  Parenting 
Payment recipients with youngest child aged 13-15 face activity 
requirements, 150 hours every six months. 
October 2004 Re-election of Liberal/National Coalition Government for fourth 
term in office 
March 2005 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, 
Workplace Relations and Workforce Participation, Working for 
Australia's future: Increasing participation in the workforce  
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government 
review strategies for encouraging increased participation for 
Parenting Payment recipients. 
May 2005 2005-06 Budget statement outlines Welfare to Work reforms 
November 2005 Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee, Report on the 
Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment 
(Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Bill 2005, and Family and 
Community Services Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work) 
Bill 2005 
Recommends legislation be passed with minor amendments. 
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Date  
July 2006 Welfare to Work measures commence 
November 2007 Election of Labor Party under Kevin Rudd. 
 
Howard Government ministers active in social security policy  
Tony Abbott, Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, 
January 2001 – October 2003. 
Kevin Andrews, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, October 2003 
– January 2007. 
Larry Anthony, Minister for Community Services then Minister for Children and 
Youth Affairs, July 1999 – October 2004. 
Mal Brough, Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 
January 2006 – November 2007. 
Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Social Security, March 1996 – January 2001. 
Kay Patterson, Minister for Family and Community Services, October 2003 – 
November 2007. 
Amanda Vanstone, Minister for Family and Community Services, January 2001 – 
October 2002. 
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Appendix Three: Household Income and Labour Dynamics of 
Australia Survey, Wave 4, 2004 
 
Table A3: Parenting Payment recipient employment  
 
 
Parenting 
Payment 
Parents Sex 
All 
persons 
 
M
o
th
er
 
re
ci
p
ie
n
ts
 
A
ll
 
re
ci
p
ie
n
ts
 
M
o
th
er
s 
F
a
th
er
s 
F
em
a
le
 
M
a
le
 
Employment status        
Employed 33.9 33.5 61.8 90.3 55.5 71.0 63.1 
unemployed 10.4 11.0 3.8 1.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Not in labour force 55.7 55.4 34.3 8.1 41.7 26.3 34.1 
n 307 321 1764 1333 5031 4848 9879 
Employed for full or part 
of last financial year       
Yes 46.5 45.6 69.6 93.8 61.4 74.9 68.0 
n 307 321 1764 1333 5031 4848 9879 
Occupation in main job        
Managers 2.8 2.1 5.7 13.2 5.3 10.4 8.1 
Professionals 12.9 13.9 25.3 18.6 23.9 17.4 20.3 
Associate Professionals 15.5 15.5 13.2 16.7 14.0 14.0 14.0 
Tradespersons 3.3 2.0 1.8 20.1 2.0 20.1 12.0 
Advanced Clerical & 
Service Workers 6.6 7.2 11.0 0.7 8.6 0.8 4.3 
Intermediate Clerical, Sales 
& Service Workers 32.5 35.1 25.5 7.4 26.5 8.8 16.7 
Intermediate Production & 
Transport Workers 4.7 2.7 2.6 12.9 2.5 13.0 8.3 
Elementary Clerical, Sales 
&  Service Workers 12.7 13.7 10.3 3.8 11.0 6.0 8.3 
Labourers 8.9 7.8 4.6 6.6 6.3 9.4 8.0 
n 115 112 1121 1237 2783 3426 6209 
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Table A3, continued. 
 
 
Parenting 
Payment 
Parents Sex 
All 
persons 
 
M
o
th
er
 
re
ci
p
ie
n
ts
 
A
ll
 
re
ci
p
ie
n
ts
 
M
o
th
er
s 
F
a
th
er
s 
F
em
a
le
 
M
a
le
 
Industry        
Agriculture 1.7 1.9 2.8 4.7 3.1 5.3 4.3 
Mining & construction 3.4 2.3 3.9 15.1 2.5 13.7 8.7 
Manufacturing 7.4 5.3 6.8 16.3 6.7 15.7 11.7 
Infrastructure services 6.0 5.1 4.0 11.0 4.2 10.3 7.6 
Wholesale & retail 17.7 17.9 15.4 13.3 16.6 15.5 16.0 
Government 3.0 3.2 5.3 6.4 5.1 5.4 5.2 
Finance, insurance, 
property & business 
services 10.3 11.1 15.1 14.5 16.4 13.7 14.9 
Education, health & 
community services 28.6 30.8 36.5 10.2 33.7 8.9 20.0 
Accommodation, cafes, 
culture, recreation & 
personal  services 21.8 22.4 10.3 8.5 11.6 11.4 11.5 
n 115 112 1121 1237 2783 3426 6209 
Women's top industries  
(ANZIC 2 digit)        
Food Retailing 8.7 9.4 5.2 2.4 4.9 3.7 4.2 
Personal and household 
good retailing 4.5 4.8 5.9 3.7 7.6 4.1 5.7 
Accommodation, cafes and 
restaurants 11.2 12.1 4.4 2.5 5.8 4.9 5.3 
Business Services 5.7 6.1 10.0 8.1 9.9 9.3 9.5 
Education 5.0 5.4 15.0 5.7 13.4 4.8 8.7 
Health services 10.0 10.8 14.4 2.8 13.6 2.7 7.6 
n 115 112 1121 1237 2783 3426 6209 
Job tenure        
1 yr or less 45.5 45.2 29.9 24.5 29.1 28.1 28.5 
1 less 2 yrs 16.0 17.2 10.8 9.3 11.6 10.6 11.0 
2 to less 5 yrs 20.6 19.8 26.2 20.1 24.1 21.8 22.8 
5 to less 10 yrs 12.2 13.1 17.7 19.5 15.9 15.5 15.7 
10 yrs or more 5.8 4.7 15.5 26.7 19.3 24.0 21.9 
n 115 112 1121 1237 2783 3422 6205 
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Table A3 cont. 
 
 
Parenting 
Payment 
Parents Sex 
All 
persons 
 
M
o
th
er
 
re
ci
p
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n
ts
 
A
ll
 
re
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n
ts
 
M
o
th
er
s 
F
a
th
er
s 
F
em
a
le
 
M
a
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Contract of employment        
Permanent 49.5 49.3 65.8 86.6 66.1 76.3 71.5 
Casual 44.1 44.1 25.7 7.0 25.9 16.0 20.6 
Fixed-term 6.4 6.6 8.6 6.5 8.1 7.7 7.9 
n 96 98 933 924 2366 2656 5022 
Usual hours /wk        
0-14 hrs 25.4 27.3 18.0 1.4 14.9 4.4 9.1 
15-20 hrs 22.0 21.2 19.8 2.2 14.3 4.7 9.0 
21-34 hours 31.1 32.0 25.7 3.6 20.2 7.3 13.1 
35 or more hrs 21.5 19.5 36.5 92.8 50.6 83.6 68.8 
n 114 111.4 1117.1 1235.9 2778.3 3421.7 6200 
Public sector        
Yes 12.1 13.1 23.3 13.2 20.2 11.4 15.3 
n 115 112 1118 1237 2780 3424 6204 
Firm size        
Less than 20 employees 37.0 34.2 33.0 36.8 32.1 38.4 35.6 
20-99 employees 24.4 24.9 15.0 14.4 14.1 14.5 14.3 
100-499 employees 8.3 8.1 8.3 9.8 9.4 9.8 9.6 
500-999 employees 3.2 3.5 5.1 5.9 4.7 5.4 5.1 
1000-4999 employees 4.6 5.0 8.8 10.9 9.3 10.0 9.7 
5000 employees or more 17.6 19.0 24.0 19.9 23.5 17.8 20.3 
Unknown 4.9 5.3 5.8 2.4 6.9 4.0 5.3 
n 108 106 1097 1224 2729 3380 6109 
Union member        
Yes 13.1 14.1 22.0 30.6 25.2 27.0 26.2 
n 115 112 1121 1237 2782 3426 6208 
Quintiles of hourly wages        
1st 22.2 21.6 14.1 8.1 17.5 15.2 16.2 
2nd 42.3 44.7 24.1 12.8 24.0 18.0 20.8 
3
rd
 19.1 19.1 22.8 17.7 22.1 20.3 21.1 
4th 8.9 9.4 22.3 26.9 21.4 21.0 21.1 
5th 7.6 5.2 16.7 34.6 15.1 25.5 20.7 
n 102 102 988 1069 2513 2959 5472 
Note: Weighted using wave 4 longitudinal weights. 
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Appendix Four: Australians Working Together adviser interview 
schedule 
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